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In recent years, the initial public offerings (IPOs) on the Ghana Stock Exchange (GSE) 
witnessed some level of undersubscriptions. The purpose of this research was to 
investigate the extent to which valuation, pricing, and performance of prior IPOs listed on 
the GSE contributed to this state of undersubscriptions. The research was informed by the 
valuation and pricing framework of Roosenboom.  The research questions addressed 
whether IPOs on the GSE were under/overpriced and whether the projected and pre-issue 
financials were free from forecasting errors and earnings management. A cross-sectional, 
explanatory research design was employed to examine a dataset of 30 sampled IPOs. The 
dataset, obtained from IPO prospectuses, trading data, and financial statements, was 
analyzed using both logistic and multiple regressions. IPO valuation methods, first-day 
returns (R(1st day)), absolute forecast errors (AFE), and discretionary current accruals 
(DCA) served as dependent variables and firm characteristics of size, age, profitability, 
dividends, price-to-value (P/V) ratios, owner-manager, and auditors’ reputation served as 
independent variables. Results revealed that firm characteristics were not significant 
predictors of the choice of IPO valuation methods, IPOs were underpriced and their R(1st 
day) were significantly predicted by P/V ratios, the financial projections were over 
forecasted and their AFE were not predicted by the independent variables, and the pre-
IPO financials experienced earnings management and their DCA were significantly 
explained by the owner-manager variable. This research contributes to positive social 
change by assisting regulators, investment bankers, corporations, and institutional 
investors in improving their respective roles in the valuation and pricing of IPOs on the 
GSE, thus reducing the observed IPO undersubscriptions in the stock market.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
In this study, I conducted an empirical analysis of the valuation, pricing, and 
performance of IPOs on the GSE. My conception of this study came when, as a student 
accountant, I undertook a mini research project on working capital management in 2002. 
This mini project required a visit to the GSE. In my interactions with the head of research 
at the GSE, we veered into various topics in financial management including the 
problems of perceived mispricing of IPOs on the exchange. The need to conduct this 
research, however, goes beyond the problems of perceived mispricing of IPOs on the 
GSE because the problems of IPO mispricing are not confined to emerging markets such 
as the GSE. The valuation and pricing of IPOs on any capital market—developed or 
emerging—is not without challenges. The Facebook’s IPO represented a sterling example 
of such valuation and pricing challenges. According to Diamond (2012), the failure of 
this IPO was the most important in the history of the American capital markets. Literature 
in this field abounds with several reasons for this failure, among which was the following 
three outstanding reasons. 
The first of these reasons was the fraud behind Facebook’s IPO. Macey (2013) 
pointed out that the lawsuits that followed the debacle alleged, among others, that 
Facebook and its directors lied about the prospects of the corporation in their Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings. This lying and falsehood, Macey further noted, 
was specifically related to the reduction in Facebook’s revenue. This reduction in revenue 
was as a result of increasing users of Facebook turning away from the traditional PC-




(Macey, 2013). This drop in revenue prospects, according to Macey, was brought to the 
attention of the underwriters and other institutional investors, but the wider investing 
public was not made aware of this prospect. 
The second reason related to the distortion in the sales structure of Facebook’s 
IPO. Various explanations, according to Diamond (2012), have been offered as to the 
reasons for the perpetuation of the previously noted fraud. Among these explanations 
were the problems that were witnessed by the NASDAQ itself in that the stock exchange 
opened unusually late. This delay in the opening of the exchange, Diamond further noted, 
resulted in the cancellation of several orders. Another important explanation is related to 
insider capitalism (Diamond, 2012). The insiders to Facebook prior to the IPO were its 
founder Mark Zuckerberg and its venture capitalists: Peter Thiel, Goldman Sachs, and a 
Russian investment firm called DST. These insiders sold more shares in the IPO than the 
company itself. The initial sales of shares to the underwriters, at the price of $38, resulted 
in $16 billion in sales proceeds; of this amount, $9 billion went to the insiders, with the 
company only retaining $6.7 billion and the underwriters gaining $176 million by way of 
fees (Diamond, 2012, p. 11). This distortion in the allocation of the sales proceeds of the 
IPO presupposed that the entrepreneur, Mark Zuckerberg, and the Facebook’s venture 
capitalists were more concerned with cashing out rather than with continued viability of 
the company post issue. 
The third reason related to the need for a thorough regulatory supervision over 
IPO activities. Macey (2013) pointed out that the Facebook’s IPO was “a big black mark 




or omissions that resulted in the failure of the IPO. According to Cervellati, Di Sandro, 
and Piras (2013), the IPO lacked the trio of transparency, responsibility, and 
accountability. In relation transparency, Cervellati et al. pointed out that the financial 
information that Facebook and its underwriters produced to back the IPO lacked the 
needed transparency. This transparency was essential if the general investing public were 
to be fully informed about the financial position and performance of the company in 
which they were putting their money. The issue of responsibility presupposed that the 
IPO was fraught with conflict of interest on the part of those that mattered in the issuance 
of the IPO. The preoccupation of Mark Zuckerberg, Peter Thiel, Goldman Sachs, DST, 
and the underwriters was mainly on how they could use the IPO to enrich themselves and 
not with using the IPO to further the prospects of Facebook itself. By way of 
accountability, regulators did not call upon Facebook to render proper accounts of its IPO 
valuation and pricing. In summary, the Facebook’s IPO signals the need for 
intensification of regulation and supervision over IPO valuation and pricing in any 
market. 
The mispricing of IPOs brought to the fore by the Facebook’s example implies 
that human beings are inherently inclined to defrauding others whenever they have the 
opportunity to do so. In this respect, the positive social change implication of this study 
hinged on the identification of ways to improve the accuracy of IPO valuation and pricing 




  Background of the Study 
The Role of Stock Exchange in an Economy 
The primary role of a stock exchange in an economy is to ensure the efficient 
allocation of capital resources. Fama (1970) made this assertion in a seminal paper on the 
efficiency of capital markets. A stock exchange, according to Fama, is an efficient 
allocator of capital when prices that are assigned to the securities traded on that exchange 
reflect, accurately, the underlying financial assets and performance of its listed 
corporations. For the price of any stock to accurately reflect the underlying fundamentals 
of its corporation requires the valuation of that corporation’s net worth (Damodaran, 
2012; Fernández, 2013). This valuation had been seen as “the point at which theoretical 
finance hits the harsh road of reality” (Pereiro, 2002, p. vii). One aspect of such reality in 
corporate financial management, according to Ragupathy (2011), is that of getting a 
corporation listed on a capital market through an IPO of that corporation’s stock to the 
wider investing public. According to Cogliati, Paleari, and Vismara (2011), there are two 
main categories of stocks’ valuation methods: the direct and the relative valuation 
methods. In direct valuation, the value of a firm is estimated from its underlying 
fundamentals. In relative valuation, however, the value of the firm is estimated from the 
prices of its comparable firms that are already trading on the stock exchange. For direct 
valuation methods, examples could include discounted cash flow, dividend discounted 
model, residual income, and economic value added (Roosenboom, 2012). The relative 
valuation methods include such examples as the price to earnings, price to sales, price to 




Berkman, Bradbury, and Ferguson (2000) concluded that these two categories of 
valuation methods have similar accuracy and that the choice of a given valuation method 
depends on the market for which the valuation is being conducted. 
Problems With IPO Valuations and Pricing 
Although there exists a sizable number of studies on IPOs, such research has 
mainly focused on the post issue performance of IPOs with little attention paid to the 
valuation and pricing of those IPOs (Deloof et al., 2009). Roosenboom (2007) was 
emphatic about this lack of attention when noting that the literature on IPO valuation is 
particularly thin and that not much exists when it comes to how investment bankers value 
and price IPOs. The lack of attention to such research is even more pronounced in 
emerging markets in Africa (Hearn, 2010). Compounding the problems of this lack of 
research on valuation and pricing of IPOs in emerging markets is the difficulty of 
applying the traditional valuation methods that are usually the preserve of valuing IPOs 
in the developed markets (Pereiro, 2006). This difficulty is mostly because emerging 
markets are prone to manipulation due to their relatively small sizes and highly 
concentrated nature (Pereiro, 2006). It is, therefore, not surprising to read Nwude (2010), 
who bemoaned the lack of clear-cut methods for determining share prices on the Nigerian 
Stock Exchange (NSE). Nwude further noted that the appropriate methods for the 
valuation and pricing of securities on the NSE have remained problematic. If the NSE is 
beset with this lack of appropriate valuation methods in its security pricing practices, then 
one cannot expect the GSE, which is a neighboring West African stock market to that of 





The need to take a scholarly look at the IPO valuations on the GSE was more so 
because, in recent times, there has been a seeming lack of investor confidence in IPO 
offerings on the market. The cases in point were the undersubscription by investors in the 
IPOs of Tallow Oil Plc, Accra Hearts of Oak Football Club, and Comet Properties 
Limited (Agama, 2011). The undersubscription in the case of Comet Properties Limited 
was so severe that the company could not meet the listing requirements of GSE and 
hence had to withdraw its IPO (Agama, 2011). These cases of undersubscription had led 
some professionals in the market to wonder whether or not the investment community 
does have confidence in IPO valuations of listed stocks on the Ghanaian bourse (Agama, 
2011). As could be inferred from the seminal paper of Fama (1970), one of the ways a 
stock exchange could lose the confidence of its investing public is when there is a 
perceived lack of accuracy of its IPO valuations and pricing. For the GSE, one is left 
wondering whether the lack of accuracy in its IPO valuations and pricing could be the 
bane of this loss of investor confidence. In view of this perception, I sought through this 
study to examine the valuation methods, processes, and procedures that were employed 
by the investment banking firms on the GSE. 
Purpose of the Study 
This study was an attempt to provide a means of investigating IPO valuations, 
pricing, and performance on the GSE. In this study, I first considered the return 
characteristics of 30 sampled IPOs listed on the GSE. Secondly, I examined the role of 




Thirdly, I considered the firm-specific and emerging market factors that had influenced 
the choice of valuation methods used by the Ghanaian investment bankers in their 
valuation and pricing of those IPOs. Fourthly, I reviewed how these investment bankers 
combine the value estimates of those valuation methods to determine the fair value 
estimate and price of a given IPO. Finally, I examined the incidences of errors and the 
possibilities of earnings management (i.e., creative accounting or window dressing) in the 
earnings forecasts incorporated in the IPO prospectuses of these corporations. 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
Research Questions 
To make the problem statement amenable to scholarly research, I provided 
answers to the following three main research questions:   
1. What valuation methods do underwriters in Ghana use in valuing IPOs listed 
on the GSE and what firm-specific and emerging-market factors influenced 
their choice of those valuation methods?  
2. How do underwriters combine the value estimate of each valuation method to 
arrive at fair values of IPOs and how do they set the preliminary offer price on 
the basis of those fair value estimates?  
3. Are the management earnings forecasts and the pre-IPO financial statements 
incorporated in the prospectuses of Ghanaian IPO firms free from forecasting 
errors and the tendencies of earnings management? 
In framing Research Questions 1and 2, I followed Roosenboom (2007), who used 




bankers in the French IPO market. In framing research question 3, I was inspired by the 
works of Jelic, Saadouni, and Briston (1998) and Lonkani and Firth (2005). These two 
different research works focused on assessing the accuracy of earnings forecast of IPO 
firms listed on (a) the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange during the period of 1984-1995 
(Jelic et al., 1998) and (b) the Stock Exchange of Thailand for the period spanning 1991-
1996 (Lonkani & Firth, 2005). In addition to these three main research questions, I 
intended further to provide answers to the following subsidiary research question:   
4. What IPO pricing anomalies occur on the GSE and is there a cross-sectional 
relationships between the price-to-value ratios as determined by the 
investment bankers and the over/undervalued first-day returns observed on the 
GSE? 
In framing the subsidiary research question, I was guided by the literature on IPO 
performance as mooted by the work of Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004) who first 
asked “Are IPOs really underpriced?” and the counterwork of Zheng (2007) who asked 
an opposing question, “Are IPOs really overpriced?” 
To reduce the research questions to testable hypotheses, I raised and tested the 
following hypotheses regarding (a) choice of valuation methods; (b) determination of the 
fair value estimates of IPOs; (c) application of price discount in the setting of preliminary 
offer price; (d) forecasting errors in the managerial estimates of earnings forecasts in IPO 
prospectuses; (e) assessment of the presence, or otherwise, of earnings management in 
the pre and post IPO financial statements of the IPO firms; and (f) assessment of IPO 




Hypotheses 1: Choice of IPOs’ Valuation Methods 
H0: The choice of IPO valuation methods by investment bankers in Ghana is not 
dependent on firm-specific factors and emerging market factors. 
H1: The choice of IPO valuation methods by investment bankers in Ghana is 
dependent on firm-specific factors and emerging market factors. 
In Hypothesis 1, the dependent variables were the valuation methods that were 
used in the valuation of IPOs by the investment bankers on the GSE. The specific 
valuation methods that I concentrated on were those relating to multiple valuation 
methods (MULT), the discounted cash flow method (DCF), economic value added 
(EVA), and any other (OTH) valuation methods that had been used by those investment 
bankers. The independent variables that I used to explain the dependent variables fell 
under the firm-specific factors and emerging market factors categorizations. In relation to 
the firm-specific factors, the variables that I examined were those relating to the size of 
the IPO firm (SIZE), the age of the firm (AGE), the extent to which firm’s assets are 
tangible (AIP), the profitability of the firm pre-IPO (PROF), the growth prospects of the 
firm in relation to sales (GROW), and the historical and expected dividend payouts of the 
firm (DIV). In relation to the emerging-market factors, I considered such factors as GDP 
(GDP), inflation rate (INF), money market interest rates (MMR), money supply (M2), 




Hypotheses 2: Fair Value Estimates of IPOs 
H0: The weight assigned to the value estimate of each valuation method in 
determining the fair value estimate of an IPO does not depend on firm-specific and 
emerging market factors. 
H1: The weight assigned to the value estimate of each valuation method in 
determining the fair value estimate of an IPO depends on firm-specific factors and 
emerging market factors. 
In Hypothesis 2, the dependent variables were the weightings assigned by the 
investment bankers to the value estimates of each of the valuation methods. In this 
regard, the dependent variables in this hypothesis are the same as those used in 
Hypothesis 1, except that the weights (W) that were attached to the value estimates of 
each of the valuation methods were prefixed to the variables used in the Hypotheses 1. In 
this respect, the dependent variables were denominated as: the multiple valuation 
methods (MULTW), the discounted cash flow method (DCFW), economic value added 
(EVAW), and other (OTHW) valuation methods. The independent variables in these 
hypotheses were, without any exception, the same as those used in Hypotheses 1. 
Hypotheses 3: Price Discount and the Setting of Preliminary Offer Prices 
H0: The application of price discount in the setting of preliminary offer price of an 
IPO does not depend on firm-specific and emerging market factors. 
H1: The application of price discount in the setting of preliminary offer price of an 




In Hypothesis 3, the dependent variable was the IPO price discount 
(DISCOUNT). This price discount, according to Roosenboom (2007), could be computed 
as follows: “(fair value estimate - preliminary offer value)/fair value estimate” (p. 1226).  
In this study, I followed the same basis of measuring price discount. The independent 
variables in these hypotheses were, without any exception, the same as those used in 
Hypotheses 1 and 2. 
Hypotheses 4: Forecasts Errors in IPO Prospectuses 
H0: The absolute forecasting error observed for each IPO firm is not dependent on 
the firm’s size, retained ownership, forecasting interval, age, gearing, and auditor’s 
reputation. 
H1: The absolute forecasting error observed for each IPO firm is dependent on the 
firm’s size, retained ownership, forecasting interval, age, gearing, and auditor’s 
reputation. 
In Hypothesis 4, the dependent variable that was the absolute forecast error 
(AFE). According to Gounopoulos (2011), AFE measures the overall accuracy of any 
earnings forecasts. In helping to predict the magnitude of such forecast errors in IPO 
prospectuses of the GSE listed firms, I examined the following six independent variables: 
the IPO firm’ size (SIZE), proportion of shares retained by the pre-IPO owners of the 
firm (OWN), forecast horizon (HOR) of the IPO firm’s earnings forecasts, the pre-IPO 
operating history of the IPO firm as measured by age (AGE), the level of IPO firm’s 





Hypotheses 5: Earnings Management in IPO Prospectuses 
H0: Ghanaian IPO firms’ do not exhibit non-zero earnings management in the pre- 
and post-issue IPO years. 
H1: Ghanaian IPO firms’ do not exhibit non-zero earnings management in the pre- 
and post-issue IPO years. 
In Hypothesis 5, the dependent variable was the discretionary current accrual 
(DCA). The presence of this type of accruals in the pre- and post-issue financials of an 
IPO firm is considered by scholars in this field to represent the extent of earnings 
management in that firm’s prospectus. To predict the existence of earning management in 
the IPO prospectuses of GSE listed firms, I relied on such independent variables as the 
decision of IPO firms to comply with international accounting standards (IAS), the extent 
to which the firm’s board of directors consist of non-executive (EB), the quality firm’s 
auditor (AUD), the ownership structure of the firm’s shares post-issue (OWN), and the 
post-issue levels of shares ownership retained by the pre-IPO owners (ROWN). 
Hypotheses 6: IPO Pricing Anomalies on the Ghana Stock Exchange 
H0: There is no significant cross-sectional relationship between price-to-value 
ratios (P/V) and over/undervalued first-day returns observed on the GSE. 
H1: There is a significant cross-sectional relationship between price-to-value 
(P/V) ratios and over/undervalued first-day returns observed on the GSE. 
In Hypothesis 6, the dependent variable was the first-day return on the trading of 
the IPO firm’s stock post-issue (R(1st Day)). According to Purnanandam and 




performance literature as the difference between the offer price and the first trading-day 
market price. The independent variables that I used to predict the over/underpricing of the 
first day returns of the stocks of IPO firms listed on the GSE were the price-to-value ratio 
of the IPO firm’s stocks (PV), book-to-market value of the IPO firm’s equity (BTMV), 
the level of accruals in the IPO firm’s earnings post-issue (ACCURALS), the consensus 
analysts’ earnings growth rate for the IPO firm’s stock post issue (GROWTHAIP), and 
the post- issue ratio of IPO firm’s EBITDA to sales (EBITDA). 
Operationalization of Hypothesized Variables 
I set forth the operational definitions and the basis for the empirical measurement 
of each of the variables in each of the six hypothesis in both the literature review section 
(Chapter 2) as well as the methodology sections (Chapter 3) of this study. By way of 
empirical testing, I tested Hypothesis 1 using logistic regression analysis whilst the 
remaining Hypotheses were tested using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression 
analysis. 
Nature of the Study 
 From the above research questions and the related hypotheses, I determined this 
study could best be conducted using a quantitatively led nonexperimental research 
design. The study is nonexperimental research because the independent variables of the 
study cannot be subjected to any form of experimental manipulation–true 
experimentation or quasi-experimentation. Using Johnson (2001)’s categorization of 
nonexperimental research, which was done along the lines of ‘time’ and ‘objective’ 




‘explanatory’ by way of objective. It is cross-sectional because I collected data for each 
of the variables in each of the six hypotheses at a time in which those data occurred. The 
study was also ‘explanatory’ because I sought to explain the processes and procedures of 
IPO valuations on the GSE as well as to explain the ‘how’ and ‘why’ those valuations 
were carried out. 
Conceptual Framework for the Study 
The ideas from literature on which I grounded this research were those ideas and 
concepts of IPO valuation, pricing, and performance that were espoused by Roosenboom 
(2007, 2012) and Deloof et al. (2009).  Roosenboom (2007)’s research work, on the 
valuation of IPOs by underwriters in the French IPO Markets, is the foundational basis 
for the conduct of this study. The key ideas and concepts espoused by Roosenboom were 
further conceptualized in 2012 in diagrammatic form as shown in Figure 1. From this 
conceptual framework, it could be noted that in determining the eventual prices of IPOs, 
underwriters first have to decide on the valuation method(s) that could assist them in 
coming out with a fair value estimate of the corporate stock.  Following the estimation of 
the fair market value of the corporate stock, the investment bankers deliberately introduce 
a price discount to come out with a preliminary offer price. In the case of underwriting in 
France, Roosenboom (2012) pointed out that the investment bankers advertise this price 





Figure 1. IPO valuation and pricing. From “Valuing and pricing IPOs,” by P. 
Roosenboom, 2012, Journal of Banking & Finance, 36(6), p. 1656.  
Following these advertisements, the investment bankers will then be in a position 
to gauge investor sentiments and investor demands for the impending IPO. The 
investment bankers use this information to adjust the preliminary price to arrive at the 
final offer price.  
Deloof et al. (2009), in building upon the work of Roosenboom (2007), extended 
their data collection and analysis beyond quantitative analysis of Roosenboom to a 
qualitative assessment of how investment bankers in Belgium perceived the accuracy of 




Definition of Terms 
Absolute forecast error: A metric that measures the relative deviation of actual 
earnings from forecast earnings and provides an indication of how close the forecasts 
were to actual profits in absolute terms (Gounopoulos, 2011).  
 Accruals: Accrual accounting arises when the recognition of transaction and/or 
events in the financial statements are made by managers in periods that do not match with 
the periods in which the related cash flows of those transactions/events occur 
(Roosenboom, van der Goot, &Mertens, 2003).  
Comparable firm: In valuing a giving firm’s IPO using accounting-based 
comparable multiples, one will need a comparable firm, which is a firm similar to the 
firm whose IPO is being valued in terms of underlying characteristics in risk, growth, and 
cash flow patterns (Damodaran, 2011).  
Discounted cash flow (DCF) method: A method for estimating the value of firm’s 
equity stock by discounting its future free cash flows to the present value using an 
appropriate discount rate (Clayman, Fridson, & Troughton, 2012).  
Discounted dividend method (DDM): A method for valuing a firm’s equity stock 
by discounting the firm’s future dividend payments to the present value using an 
appropriate discount rate (Cupertino, Da Costa, Coelho, & Menezes, 2013).  
Discount rate: A rate that is used to find the present value (i.e., the value today) of 




Dividend payout ratio: A measure of total dividend payment by a given IPO 
firm’s shareholders divided by the firm’s earnings as disclosed in the firm’s IPO 
prospectus (Fattoum & Delmar, 2013). 
Dividend yield: A return made to a stockholder by a given IPO firm in relation to 
the price at which the shares of that firm was purchased by the stockholder (Guo, 2011).   
Earnings management: Earnings management in financial reporting occurs when 
management structure transactions in such way that the financial reports mislead users 
about the underlying economic performance of the company (Lee & Masulis, 2011). 
Other terms used for earnings management include creative accounting or window-
dressing. 
EBITDA: A measure of an IPO firm’s earnings before interest, taxes, and 
depreciation, and amortization (Chemmanur & Krishnan, 2012).   
Economic value added (EVA): A method for valuing a firm’s equity stock that is 
computed as the net operating profit after taxes minus the cost of capital. EVA is a 
proprietary valuation framework developed by the consulting firm Stern Stewart that is a 
derivative of the traditional residual income model distinguished from the latter 
principally by the accounting adjustments to profits and capital specified by Stern Stewart 
(Silverman, 2010). 
Emerging/frontier markets: A stock market located in a country whose economy 
reflects numerous market imperfections (e.g., barriers to entry, government regulations, 




financing, concentrated ownership structures, and low institutional ownership, etc.) that 
create both risk and opportunity for the investor (Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013).   
Enterprise value: A total market value of the firm’s equity and debt, less the value 
of its cash and marketable securities/investments. Enterprise value per share, according to 
Rhodes and Ligon (2013), could be calculated as (market value of equity + book value of 
debt – cash)/ (shares outstanding after the offering).  
Fair value: This is the amount at which an asset (or liability) could be exchanged 
between a willing buyer and a willing seller when the former is not under any compulsion 
to buy, and the latter is not under any compulsion to sell (Pinto, Henry, Robinson & 
Stowe, 2012). 
Forecast error: This is the difference between the actual earnings and the forecast 
earnings and then divided by the absolute value of the actual earnings (Bulut & Er, 2011). 
Initial public offering (IPO): A process of selling stocks to the public for the first 
time. An IPO of equity represents a critical stage of development, which is often referred 
to as the “re-birth” or “re-start” of the organization (Moore, Bell, Filatotchev, & Rasheed, 
2012). 
Investment banking firm: A firm that manages a security issuance and designs the 
structure of its issue. Beyond securities’ issuance, such a firm could also be providing 
such services as underwriting equity offerings, underwriting debt offerings, advising on 
mergers and acquisitions, providing analyst research-services, and providing market-




Price-to-book-value ratio: A valuation ratio calculated as the price per share 
divided by book value per share. This ratio, in comparison with other value multiples, is 
better suited for the valuation of financial service firms (Damodaran, 2011). 
Price-to-cash flow: A valuation ratio calculated as the price per share divided by 
cash flow per share. This ratio, as a valuation multiple, provides a better idea of the 
amount of money available to management for further research and development, 
marketing support, debt reductions, dividends, share repurchases, and so on (Fávero & 
Belfiore, 2011). 
Price-earnings multiple: A valuation ratio calculated as the price per share 
divided by earnings per share. The ratio is an indicator of how much value the market 
places on each currency unit of firms’ earnings (Taliento, 2013). 
Price-to-sales ratio: A valuation ratio calculated as the price per share divided by 
sales per share. This ratio is less susceptible to accounting distortions than the price-to-
book and price-to-earnings ratios. Whilst transitory items such as the differences between 
accounting and economic depreciation, and accounting rules requiring firms to expense 
immediately intangible investments such as R&D, employee training, and advertising can 
distort price-to-book and price-to-earnings ratios (Danielson& Lipton, 2012).   
Price-to-value: A ratio of the eventual offer price of an IPO and the average fair 
value estimate of that IPO computed from the various valuation methods. The P/V ratio 
has been empirically proven to be a good predictor that is capable of explaining more 




Residual income method (RIM): A model of stock valuation that views intrinsic 
value of stock as the sum of book value per share plus the present value of the stocks’ 
expected future residual income per share (Beynon & Clatworthy, 2013). 
Assumptions 
I underpinned this study on several fundamental assumptions. These assumptions 
were aspects of the study that I believed cannot be demonstrated to be true but were 
assumed to hold for the purposes of conducting this research. The first of these 
assumptions was that only firm-specific and emerging market factors influenced the 
choice of valuation methods by investment bankers in Ghana. In this regard, I assumed 
that other factors such as industry-related factors and stock-market specific factors did 
not influence the choice of those valuation methods by investment bankers. The second 
was my presumption that the discount rates the investment bankers used in the valuation 
of each IPO-firm’s stock were accurate and, therefore, those discount rates were taken as 
given in the IPO prospectuses. I also assumed that the determination of the systematic 
and unsystematic risks facing the valuation of each of those IPO stocks was done to 
precision by the investment bankers and the management of IPO firms. 
Scope and Delimitations 
Although this study is about an empirical analysis of IPO valuation, pricing, and 
performance in emerging markets, the study was geographically confined to the 
examination of IPO processes and procedures of the GSE as a stock exchange that is 
located in an emerging market. This study could have been extended to cover all stock 




and resources could not allow for such an extension. The study could have also 
considered the accuracy of the costs of capital (discount rate) that have been used by the 
investment bankers in Ghana in their valuation of corporate stocks of IPO firms; such 
consideration was, however, not made in this study. The study could have also considered 
the impact of other factors (i.e., industry-related factors and stock-market specific factors) 
on the choice of valuation methods by investment bankers in Ghana; such considerations 
were also not made. In spite of these delimitations, however, I considered the choice of 
valuation methods by investment bankers in Ghana in relation to the influence of firm-
specific and emerging-market variables. Secondly, I considered how investment bankers 
in Ghana assigned weights to the value estimates of each valuation methods. Thirdly, I 
examined how the preliminary offer prices of the IPOs listed on the GSE were 
transformed into the eventual offer prices through the use of price discounts by the 
investment bankers. Fourthly, I considered the accuracy of management earnings 
forecasts in IPO prospectuses by examining the extent of forecasting errors as well as the 
tendencies of earnings management in the pre-IPO financial statements incorporated in 
the IPO prospectuses. Finally, I considered the short-term over/underpricing of those 
IPOs’ prices post-issue. 
Limitations 
The key limitation of this study boarded on the limited number of IPO listings on 
the GSE, which as of 2012 stood at only 35 IPOs. This number is insignificant when 
compared with the 228 sampled IPOs that Roosenboom (2007) studied in the French 




study is not out of place, because Deloof et al. (2009) in their conduct of a similar study 
only dealt with 45 sampled IPOs listed on the Euronext Brussels. Similarly, Berkman et 
al.’s (2000) study on the accuracy of various valuation methods in the New Zealand 
Stock Exchange also covered only 45 sampled IPOs. Finally, Bulut and Er (2011) in their 
study of forecast errors on the Istanbul Stock Exchange studied only 30 IPOs.  
Significance of the Study 
Filling the Gaps in the Current IPO Literature 
From the gaps in the literature enumerated in the background section of this 
chapter, I noted that these gaps related to (a) the IPO literature being bereft of literature 
on pricing and valuation of IPOs in both the developed and emerging markets; (b) the 
difficulty in applying traditional valuation methods in emerging markets; (c) the recent 
increase in the number of undersubscriptions in the IPO listings on the GSE; and (d) the 
loss of investor confidence as a consequence of these undersubscriptions. The potential 
contribution of this study is to provide a means of filling these gaps. My study filled the 
gap relating to the scholarly contributions on IPO valuation and pricing by bringing 
together all the relevant scholarly articles penned so far in this field of financial 
economics. Through this contribution, the literature review aspect of this study is a 
compendium on the IPO valuation, pricing, and performance. In filling the gap relating to 
the applicability of the traditional valuation methods in emerging markets, this study 
focused on application of these methods on the GSE. Choosing the GSE as the context of 
the study means that the valuation and pricing of IPOs were examined from the 




emerging/frontier market as a stock exchange within the sub-Saharan Africa provided a 
further opportunity of studying the valuation and pricing of IPOs from the perspective of 
emerging market located in an economically emerging continent. 
Implications of the Study for Social Change 
A scholarly look at the IPO valuation, pricing, and performance in this study 
presupposed that there is a need for transparency, responsibility, and accountability in 
IPO listings on stock exchanges. This need, as I pointed out in a prior section, is typified 
by the Facebook’s IPO debacle. The IPO was priced at $38 per share and at this price, the 
lead underwriter, Morgan Stanley, and 32 other underwriters bought their stakes. These 
underwriters and their big clients sold their stakes in the IPO at a starting trading price of 
$42.05 resulting in an instant profit of $4.05 per share. Four days after the IPO, Facebook 
and its underwriters were sued for fraud (Marcy, 2013). The problems that confronted 
Facebook’s IPO, according to Cervellati et al. (2013), could be summed up as resulting 
from the lack of supervision that is required to ensure transparent financial statements 
and to protect investors. This lack of transparency, wrong corporate culture, and conflicts 
of interest, according to Cervellati et al., had the potential of provoking stock crashes and 
damage to the investors’ confidence in the overall financial system. Another explanation 
for the Facebook’s IPO debacle, Cervellati et al. further noted, was due to distortions in 
analyst valuations caused by conflicts of interest and behavioral biases on the part of 
these valuation analysts. From this narrative of the Facebook’s IPO, it is obvious that as 
humans we are inherently inclined to defrauding others whenever given the opportunity 




For Whom Is the Study Important? 
In view of the social change issues associated with IPO valuations, pricing, 
performance, this study will be important to the following: 
1. The Ghana Stock Exchange. This is because, for the exchange to increase the 
ratio of listed companies to the number of companies within the economy, the 
way it values and prices IPOs should be aboveboard and in this way the GSE 
could engender investor confidence in its operations.  
2. The investment bankers. These professionals are the ones who undertake the 
valuations and pricing of corporate stocks. Putting together a scholarly 
perspective on how they have performed so far will improve the accuracy of 
those valuations and pricing. In the end, they stand to benefit as investors and 
corporate perceptions of their professional services increase through improved 
and more accurate IPO valuations and pricing practices.  
3. Corporations wishing to get listed. If this study ends up achieving its set goal 
of improving the valuation and pricing accuracy of IPOs; then more and more 
corporations will begin to consider the listing of their stocks on the GSE as 
one of the most preferred options available to them for raising capital.  
4. The regulatory/supervisory authorities. When valuation and pricing of stocks 
goes wrong as was the case with the Facebook’s IPO; the bodies that come up 
for blame are those charged with regulatory and/or supervisory authority over 
the issuance of those shares. In the case of capital markets in Ghana, the 




ensuring that investors are not shortchanged by the IPO offerings of 
corporations in Ghana. In this regard, such a policy maker should be interested 
in scholarly work whose aim was to bring to the fore the accuracy of the 
stocks, the issuance of which they have so far superintended. 
5. The investing public. Investors who are the eventual target of every IPO 
should be interested in an academic paper geared towards increasing their 
level of understanding on how those IPOs, in which they participated and put 
their hard earned currency into, were valued and priced. 
Summary and Transition 
In this introductory chapter, I have introduced my readers to the beginning and 
end of my doctoral research. The introduction section to this chapter provided my readers 
with an understanding of how I came by the topic of the study as well as the reasons why 
there was a need to subject the topic to a scholarly review. In the background section of 
the study, I provided a brief summary of the literature in financial economics that related 
to the scope of the study. In this brief summary, I considered the role of a stock exchange 
in an economy as well as the role stock valuation plays in corporate financial 
management. I also examined the gaps that existed in the literature regarding IPO 
valuation and pricing as well as the problems that are faced by investment bankers when 
it comes to the valuation and pricing of IPOs.   
Following this background to the study, I then went on to consider other sections 
of the chapter such as (a) the problem statement around which the entire study revolves; 




study that allowed me to reduce the problem statement into an academic research; (e) the 
nature of the study by way of its methodological underpinnings; (f) the conceptual 
framework for the study, which was drawn from literature and gave a mental picture of 
the processes and procedures that are used by investment bankers in the valuation and 
pricing of IPOs; (g) the definition of the technical terms that were used in the study; (h) 
the assumptions, scope, limitations, and delimitations; and (g) the significance and the 
positive social change implications of the study.  
In the rest of the study, I extended this introductory chapter by presenting the 
detailed review of literature in chapter 2. In chapter 3, I set forth the methodology used in 
conducting the research by considering in detail the operational definition of variables in 
each of the six hypotheses, the research design that scoped and delimited the research 
method, the sampling and sampling procedures used in the study, the procedures for data 
collection and analysis. In chapter 4, I presented the results of the data analysis by setting 
out both the descriptive statistics of each of the hypothesized variables and the overall 
testing of each of the six hypotheses. In chapter 5, I discussed the findings of the 
analyzed data in relation to providing answers to each of the four research questions on 
which this study revolves. I also presented in chapter 5 the implications of the research 
findings for each of the major stakeholders on the GSE and gave recommendations for 







Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
Organization of the Literature Review 
 In the conduct of this literature review, I reviewed prior research and literature 
that related to the problem statement, the purpose statement, the research questions, and 
the hypotheses that were set forth in Chapter 1. I then encapsulated the content of this 
literature review in a literature review map. The review map, as set forth in Figure 2, is 
divided into three main titles within which I conducted the entirety of the literature 
review. From the map, it can be noted that the first of these titles covers the research on 
the valuation of IPOs. The second title covers the research on IPO pricing, and the third 
and final title covers the research on the post issue return performance of IPOs. These 
three main titles I further divided into subtitles. Under the IPO valuation main title, for 
example, the three main subtitles relate to IPO valuation methods and their accuracy, 
choice of valuation methods, and management earnings forecasts in IPO prospectuses. 
Each of these three subtitles I further divided into sub-sub-titles. Under the IPO valuation 
methods and their accuracy, for example, I considered literature that related to the various 
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Strategies Used for Searching the Literature 
Building literature through course works. The literature review map depicted 
in Figure 1 and its related literature reviews were put together at the various stages of my 
doctoral course work at Walden University.  
 Libraries, databases, and search engines, and search terms used. In my 
conceptualization of the research topic and putting together of the literature review map, I 
mainly relied on Walden University’s library. The databases I searched included, but 
were not limited to, Business Source Complete/Premier, ABI/INFORM Complete, 
Emerald Management Journals, SAGE Premier, and Accounting & Tax (from ProQuest). 
Each of these databases contained thousands of full-text academic journals in business, 
management and finance that were crucial to my retrieval of the pertinent journal articles 
that formed part of my literature review map depicted in Figure 2. In addition to the 
library and databases, Google Scholar as a search engine played an important role in the 
initial search for the journal articles that related to a given area of my research. The 
ability to link the searches on Google Scholar to Walden University’s library was equally 
important in ensuring the ease of access and retrieval of the needed journal articles. The 
key terms I used in searching for literature included IPOs’ valuation, pricing, forecasting 
errors, earning management, GSE, underpricing, and overpricing. 
Scope of the Literature Reviewed 
 Years searched. The journal articles used in this study were mainly published 
between 2009-2013. This 5-year expanse stands in consonance with the requirement by 




journal articles and other referencing sources is within the preceding 5 years of their 
doctoral dissertation. In spite of my desire to accord with this requirement of Walden 
University, my referencing list now stands at 72% of the 5-year expanse requirement. 
The 85% requirement was difficult for me to accord with because (a) as noted in Chapter 
1, literature in this area of IPO research is particularly thin and hence a 13% shortfall 
(i.e., 85%-72%) may be justifiable; and (b) some of the literature I considered as being 
seminal in nature and so their deployment in this study cannot be considered out of place 
even though they fell outside the 5-year preceding boundary. 
 Types of literature reviewed. The seminal papers in financial economics 
literature that I used in this study were those relating to the scholarly works of Fama 
(1970) and Ritter (1998). For the current peer-reviewed literature that fall within the 5-
year ambit of this study, the research works that were cited included, but were not limited 
to those of Ahmad-Zaluki et al. (2011); Cecchini et al. (2012); Dechow et al. (2010); 
Deloof et al. (2009); Gounopoulos (2011); Lin et al. (2010); Robinson and Robinson 
(2012); Roosenboom (2012); Xu (2010); and Yong (2011). The other peer-reviewed 
literatures that were neither seminal nor falling within the 5-year ambit were considered 
in this study because without their incorporation into the literature review, this study 
cannot represent a compendium of literature on IPO valuation, pricing, and performance. 
Such literature included, but was not limited to the research works of Demirakos et al. 
(2004); Jelic et al. (1998); Lonkani and Firth (2005); Purnanandam and Swaminathan 




IPO Valuation: The Roles of Three Key Stakeholders 
The Role of Investment Bankers in IPO Valuation and Pricing 
A corporation before going public ought to have its stocks valued. Through this 
valuation, a determination could be made of the price range within which the firm’s IPO 
will be offered to the public. Fernández (2013) concurred with this assertion when he 
remarked that a valuation is the means by which investment bankers determine the offer 
prices of IPOs.  Investment bankers are usually given the responsibility by the 
management of the IPO firm to determine the offer price. This delegation of the pricing 
decision, according to Roosenboom (2007), is because investment bankers are valuation 
experts whose certification of the offer price is of absolute necessity if the market is to 
take the IPO firm serious. The primary role of these investment bankers in the valuation 
of corporate IPOs, Roosenboom further noted, is necessitated by the problem of price 
discovery that confronts both the issuing firm, on one hand, and the market participants, 
on the other. This problem of price discovery together with the roles of all three parties–
the issuing firm, the stock market participants, and the investment bankers–are 






Figure 3.Conceptual map on the role of investment bankers in IPO valuation. 
The Role of Issuing Firm’s Managers in IPO Valuation and Pricing 
In spite of their delegation of the pricing decision to the investment bankers, the 
management of the IPO’s issuing firm is ultimately responsible for the entire IPO 
decision-making process. Brau and Fawcett (2006), in a survey of 336 chief financial 
officers (CFOs) in the United States, noted that the role of the issuing firm’s managers 
straddles such issues as their (a) motivation to get their firms listed, (b) decision on the 
timing of their IPOs, and (c) decision on the choice of a lead underwriter. In relation to 
the motivation for going public, the survey results revealed that IPOs provide the issuing 
firms with the public shares that the firm could use as consideration in future mergers and 
acquisitions. This finding, according to Brau and Fawcett, stands contrary to a widely 
held belief in academic theory that firms conduct IPOs when external equity will 
minimize their cost of capital. This minimization of cost of capital proposition, according 
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to Brau and Fawcett, was further heightened by the 1984 pecking order financing theory 
of Myers and Majluf that argued that firms seek funding in the order of internal equity, 
debt financing, and then external equity. In relation to the decision-making factors that 
influence the corporate managers’ timing of their IPOs, the survey results of Brau and 
Fawcett revealed that the overall stock market conditions are the most important factor 
that influenced the IPO timing-decisions of issuing firms’ managers. This factor stood out 
as the most important in comparison with such other IPO timing-decision factors as 
industry conditions, first-day stock performance of recent IPOs, the fact of having other 
comparable firms getting listed, and the need to raise capital to enhance growth of their 
companies. For the issuing firms’ managers’ role in having to select investment bankers 
to champion the issuance of their IPOs, the survey results pointed out that the most 
important variable that influenced managerial decision-making is the ability of the 
investment banking firm to provide the needed expertise that will ensure a successful IPO 
issuance. The results debunked the notion that the fee structure of underwriters was a 
matter of concern in such a selection exercise. 
The Role of Institutional Investors in IPO Valuation and Pricing 
The role of institutional investors in any IPO processes is so important because, 
according to Jenkinson and Jones (2009), institutional investors are, more often than not, 
able to produce price-relevant information that does assist the investment bankers in their 
IPO’s price discovery. This information-revealing-role of institutional investors is 
because in most countries such investors do engage in pre-bookbuilding meetings with 




investors having to put together research reports that give them an indication of a possible 
price range of a pending IPO (Jenkinson & Jones 2009). These research reports do, in 
most cases, provide information on the valuation models that were used by the investors 
in arriving at a given IPO’s price range. In addition to their pre-bookbuilding activities, 
institutional investors do reveal pricing information of a pending IPO through the bids 
they submit during the bookbuilding stage itself. The final stage in the IPO processes, in 
which the provision of valuable information to the investment bankers by institutional 
investors, is taken notice of in the eventual allocation of IPO shares. The allocation of 
such shares by the investment bankers, according to Jenkinson and Jones, is usually done 
in such a way that it will reflect the information production and revelation efforts of a 
given institutional investor. 
IPO Valuation: How Do Investment Bankers Value and Price IPOs? 
IPO Valuation Methods and Their Accuracy 
There are several methods of IPO valuation opened to these investment bankers. 
For ease of categorization, Roosenboom (2007) distinguished between five valuation 
methods – the peer group multiples, the dividend discounted model, the discounted cash 
flow model, the economic value added method and underwriter-specific valuation 
methods. Deloof et al. (2009) in their conduct of somewhat similar research on IPO 
valuations in Belgium rather spoke of the discounted free cash flow model (DFDC), the 
dividend discounted model (DDM), and the multiples approach to valuation. In relation 
to the multiples approach, Deloof et al. spoke of such sub-categories as Price to earnings 




value to sales (EV/S), Price to book (P/B), dividend yield, and P/E-to-growth. The 
accuracy of each of these valuation approaches put forward by Roosenboom are 
considered in turn. 
Multiples (MULT) valuation. One of the most important studies on the 
assessment of valuation accuracy of accounting-based market multiples is the research 
work of Kim and Ritter (1999). The IPOs market in the United States, the authors further 
noted, was largely dominated by young companies and that for these companies; the 
effort of putting forecasted future cash flows together is a difficult, if not impossible, task 
to undertake. Giving these difficulties, the use of DCF techniques are, therefore, 
bedeviled with grievous errors that render the IPO values from these techniques 
imprecise and, therefore, result in IPO mispricing. In this regard, the use of accounting-
based market multiples in conjunction with comparable firm multiples, according to Kim 
and Ritter, is widely recommended for valuing IPOs. Bhojraj and Lee (2002), in adding 
their voice to this debate noted that the proponents of DCF valuation methods, more often 
than not, do resorts to use of market multiples when estimating terminal values that they 
incorporate into their DCF valuation. In spite of this popularity in the use of accounting-
based market multiples, Kim and Ritter noted the lack of systematic study on the 
usefulness of this approach to IPO valuations. Bhojraj and Lee, on their part, noted the 
lack of theory to guide the application of these multiples in IPO valuation and pricing. 
Antonios, Ioannis, and Panagiotis (2012) spoke of mixed and biased valuation results in 
the use of multiples. This is because their empirical instigation of 3,572 sampled United 




on one hand,  negatively biased ‘means’; the ‘medians,’ on the other hand, were rather 
positively biased. In this regard, the research work of Kim and Ritter revealed that the use 
of P/E ratio and other comparable firm multiples lacked precision especially when those 
multiples are underpinned by historical accounting data. Using forecasted accounting 
information, according to Kim and Ritter, could substantially improve the valuation 
accuracy of these market multiples. 
Dividend discounted model (DDM) valuation. The accuracy or otherwise of 
DDM was given a wider coverage in the work of Deloof et al. (2009). The quantitative 
findings of Deloof et al. revealed that investment bankers in Belgium rely on several 
valuation models in their computation of IPO prices. In spite of the usage of various 
models, however, Deloof et al. remarkably found out that the eventual IPO prices are 
rather closer to the estimates that are derived using DDM. This closeness of the offer 
price to DDM estimates, according to Deloof et al., is a matter of mere coincidence and is 
not because investment bankers primarily rely on the DDM estimates. The fact of the 
matter, Deloof et al. further noted, is that DDM tends to produce lower valuations when 
compared with other valuation techniques, but the eventual offer prices tend to be closer 
to the DDM estimates because of the price discounts that the investment bankers attach to 
the higher valuations derived from other valuation techniques. DDM, according to Deloof 
et al., is considered by investment bankers in Belgium to be too conservative and hence 
most of those bankers are less reliant on it. The use of DDM by investment bankers, 
Deloof et al. further noted is only for the purposes of serving as a control for checking the 




Discounted cash flow (DCF) valuation. DCF valuation technique had been 
touted as the most important valuation method by almost all the investment bankers in 
Belgium, (Deloof et al., 2009). This superiority of DCF valuation techniques is also 
widely acclaimed in theory by such academic and scholarly writings of Berk, DeMarzo,  
and Harford (2012); Brahmana and  Hooy (2011); Gleason, Johnson, and Li (2013); 
Hoffmann, (2013); Imam, Chan, and Shah (2013); Ionaşcu and Ionaşcu (2012); Nel 
(2010); Panda (2013); Panda (2013); Pandey (2012); Perek and Perek (2012); Reddy, 
Rajat, and Nangia (2013); Reis and Augusto, (2013); and Schnaidt and Sebastian, (2012).  
In comparison with other valuation methods, Deloof et al. further noted that those 
bankers considered DDM as being conservative, whilst the multiples valuation 
techniques were considered to be driven by market sentiments and hence is prone to 
providing higher or lower valuations in hot or cold markets. In spite of this positive light 
in which Deloof et al. painted the DCF technique, a study by Berkman et al. (2000) on 
IPO valuation of 45 firms in New Zealand concluded that there was not much difference 
in the accuracy of valuation estimates that were derived from the DCF and P/E 
comparable methods. This result, according to Berkman et al., was in conformity with the 
results obtained earlier by Kaplan and Ruback in 1995; which indicated that, for a sample 
of large leveraged buy-outs, both DCF and P/E methods provided reasonable estimates of 
value. These empirical findings presupposed that none of the valuation techniques is 
superior and hence investment bankers in the valuation of a given firm’s IPO do resort to 




Economic value added (EVA) valuation. The use of EVA as a valuation 
technique for pricing IPOs, according Roosenboom (2007), is not widespread. This less 
widespread usage of EVA in IPO valuations could be explained by the research work of 
Tsuji (2006). According to Tsuji, the claims and counterclaims in favor and out of favor 
with the use of EVA as a method for corporate valuation had largely been informed by 
prior research works conducted in the United States. Tsuji, therefore, evaluated the 
effectiveness of EVA as a valuation measure in Japan by comparing EVA with several 
other common valuation measures such as cash flow and operating incomes. The 
empirical findings of Tsuji revealed, among others that (a) EVA had a weaker 
relationship with the levels of corporate values than accounting measures such as 
operating income and profit after tax; (b) EVA, is limited, in its ability to effectively 
capture the levels and dynamics of the corporate market expectations; and (c) EVA could 
be increased by arbitrary increasing profit and/or arbitrary decreasing investment capital. 
These weaknesses and the possibility of manipulations tend to make EVA a less robust 
measure of corporate value when compared with those valuation methods that deploy 
cash flows. In spite of these weaknesses claims, however, scholars such as Abdeen and 
Haight (2011); Kumar and Tamilselvan (2013); Sharma and Kumar (2010); Silverman 
(2010); and van der Poll, Booyse, Pienaar, Büchner, and Foot (2011) do see EVA as one 
of the best performance and valuation measurement metric in financial economics. 
Analyst specific (AS) valuation. Like EVA, analyst specific valuation methods 
were found by Roosenboom (2007) to be less wide-spread in usage. This analyst specific 




valuation methods? To best explain what Roosenboom (2007, 2013) meant by this label, 
one could turn to the empirical works of Demirakos, Strong, and Walker (2004, 2010). In 
their earlier work, Demirakos et al. (2004) were concerned with the identification of the 
valuation methods that were used by investment analysts. In this respect, Demirakos et al. 
undertook a content analysis of 104 analysts’ reports produced by the various investment 
bankers of 26 large UK-listed companies. The results of this content analysis, according 
to Demirakos et al. (2004), revealed that financial analysts tend to use the industry 
circumstances of a giving firm as a barometer for choosing a suitable valuation method. 
In their second paper, Demirakos et al. (2010) examined the extent to which valuation 
model choices affect the accuracy of the target price. In this paper, Demirakos et al. noted 
that the ‘sell-side analysts’ deployed earnings and other variables forecasts in producing 
target prices for the stocks they cover. In analyzing the predictive accuracy of this target 
prices, Demirakos et al. (2010) concluded that analysts use DCF models instead of the 
P/E models when it comes to the justification of bolder target prices. Demirakos et al. 
(2010), also came to the conclusion that analysts are more likely, than not, to use P/E 
models in a bull market and DCF models in a bear market. From these two empirical 
research works of Demirakos et al., it could be concluded that no valuation method(s) can 
be labeled as analyst specific valuation and; therefore, Roosenboom (2007) by this label 





Choice of IPO Valuation Methods: Firm-Specific Factors 
Determinants of firm-specific factors. Roosenboom (2007) in his formulation of 
the cross-sectional determinants of the choice of valuation methods by investment 
bankers in France spoke of several firm-specific factors. According to him, the firm-
specific factors that influenced the choice of valuation methods by investment bankers, in 
their valuation and pricing of IPOs included the size of the IPO firm, the age of the firm, 
the extent to which firm’s assets are tangible, the profitability of the firm pre-IPO, the 
growth prospects of the firm in relation to sales, and the historical and/or expected 
dividend payouts of the firm. 
Firm’s size (SIZE). In relation to the size of the IPO firm, Roosenboom (2007) 
pointed out from prior research, that larger firms are easier to value than smaller firms. 
This is because such firms have more stable and easier to forecast cash flows and 
dividends. For such firms, therefore, Roosenboom concluded that investment bankers are 
more likely to use direct valuation methods such as DDM and DCF in their valuation of 
these firms’ IPOs. The measurement of an IPO firm’s size, according to Roosenboom, 
could be done using the natural logarithm of total assets (LnSIZE). The total assets, 
Roosenboom further pointed out, could be the total assets reported on the balance sheet 
of the IPO firm and that this balance sheet could also be that of the most recent financial 
year prior to the firm going public. 
Firm’s age (AGE).In relation to the age of the IPO firm, Roosenboom (2007) 
argued, from prior research that the greater the age of a given IPO firm, the less risky the 




in existence long before its IPO listing intentions, then the firm should be capable of 
producing the data required for the purposes of accurately forecasting the firm’s future 
cash flows or dividends. This argument, according to Roosenboom, supports the notion 
that the greater the age of an IPO firm the more likely it is for investment bankers to 
value that firm using direct valuation methods such as DDM and DCF. The age of an IPO 
firm, Roosenboom further pointed out could be measured using the natural logarithm of 
one plus firm age (Ln(1+AGE)). This measurement basis could serve as an ex ante proxy 
for the measurement of a given IPO firm’s risk (Roosenboom, 2007). In summary, the 
greater the age of a given IPO firm, the lower the degree of risk that the firm can be 
assumed to have. 
Tangibility of firm’s assets (AIP).Tangibility of an IPO firm’s assets is the 
extent to which the firm’s total assets are represented by tangible assets. Roosenboom 
(2007) argued from prior research that accounting data tend to be more reliable when it 
comes to the measurement of tangible assets than the measurement of intangible assets. 
In this regard, the higher the tangibility of a given firms assets, the more likely it is that 
the investment bankers will be valuing that company using accounting-based market 
multiples such as P/E, P/S, P/EBITDA and so on. EVA, according to Roosenboom, could 
also be a valuation method that investment bankers are likely to deploy when an IPO 
firm’s assets are highly tangible. In relation to the measurement of an IPO firm’s 
tangibility (AIP), Roosenboom posited that such a measurement can be the ratio of PPE 
(i.e., plant, property, and equipment) to the total assets of the firm at the end of the 




Firm’s profitability(PROF).In relation to the profitability of an IPO firm, 
Roosenboom (2007) hypothesized that investment bankers are more likely to use peer 
group multiples when an IPO firm is relatively more profitable. This assertion, according 
to Roosenboom, is because the use of such peer group multiples may not be a possibility 
if the IPO firm is less profitable. This is more so because the use of such multiples could 
result in such absurdities as low or negative multiples valuations.  
Firm’s growth (GROW). In relation to the growth potential of a given IPO firm, 
the hypothesis put forward by Roosenboom (2007) was that for rapidly growing firms, 
short-term free cash flows tend to be negative. In this regard, investment bankers are 
likely to employ multiples valuation methods as a basis for the valuation and pricing of 
such firms’ IPOs. In measuring the growth of an IPO firm, Roosenboom employed 
forecasted sales growth during the IPO year (GROW) as a proxy for growth 
opportunities. 
Firm’s dividend payout (DIV). Finally, in relation to the dividend payout ratios 
of IPO firms, Roosenboom (2007) argued that investment bankers are more likely to 
employ DDM in the valuation of IPO firms that have high historical or high expected 
future dividend payout ratios. The measurement of this payout ratio, according to 
Roosenboom could be inferred from the expected dividend payouts as stated in the 
prospectuses of the IPO firm. 
Empirical findings on firm-specific factors. In relation to each of the firm-
specific factors noted above, Roosenboom (2007) in his examination of the IPO valuation 




Marchés, came to five main empirical findings. The first of these findings was that 
investment bankers are likely to employ multiples methods (MULT) when an IPO firm is 
forecasted to be relatively profitable (PROF) and/or when valuing firms with high growth 
(GROW) potential. The second was that investment bankers are more likely to use 
(DDM) when valuing firms that are deemed to be less risky as proxied by (Ln(1 + AGE)) 
and/or when a firm is forecast to pay a substantial portion of its future earnings as 
dividends (DIV). The third was that there was no evidence to support his conjecture that 
discounted cash flow (DCF) method was popular with investment bankers when valuing 
larger (LnSIZE), older companies (Ln(l + AGE)) with lower growth rates (GROW). The 
fourth was a finding that was contrary to expectation that (EVA) as a valuation method 
will be one of the obvious choices when an IPO firm’s assets are more tangible (AIP). 
The fifth and final finding of Roosenboom was that statically the use of analyst specific 
(AS) valuation techniques by investment bankers as a valuation method was not 
significant. 
Choice of IPO Valuation Methods: Emerging-Market Factors 
Determinants of emerging-market factors. The macroeconomic uncertainties 
facing businesses that ply their trade in emerging economies included, but were not 
limited to, illiquid capital markets, controls on the flow of capital, weak accounting 
practices, and high levels of political risk (Koller, Goedhart, & Wessels, 2010). 
Valuations in such economies, according to Koller et al., are influenced by the need to 
adjust for such macroeconomic factors as foreign exchange rate fluctuations, high levels 




un-Nisa and Nishat (2011) contributed to research in this field by empirically examining 
the determinants of stock price movements of 221 firms listed on the Karachi Stock 
Exchange (KSE) in Pakistan over the period of 1995-2006. Their research was conducted 
using the Generalized Method of Moments (GGM) on the data of those stock prices. 
Mehr-un-Nisa and Nishat pointed out that the observed behaviors of the stock prices of 
these firms were influenced by variables that fall under the categorizations of corporate 
fundamentals (i.e., firm-specific factors) or under macroeconomic factors. Mehr-un-Nisa 
and Nishat considered these firms’ specific-factors to be internal to the firm whilst the 
macroeconomic factors were said to be external to the firm. In relation to the variables 
falling under the microeconomic factors categorization, Mehr-un-Nisa and Nishat spoke 
of such variables as the growth rate of GDP, an inflation rate (INF), money market 
interest rates (MMR), money supply (M2), size of the stock market (SZ), and the 
financial depth of the stock market (FD). 
Empirical findings on emerging-market factors. The research work of Mehr-
un-Nisa and Nishat (2011) brought to the fore various empirical findings on each of the 
macroeconomic variables that were considered. The first of these findings was that the 
stock prices of the firms listed on the KSE increased by 0.870 percentage points 
whenever there is one percentage point growth in the real gross domestic product (GDP) 
of the Pakistani economy. This result, according to Mehr-un-Nisa and Nishat is indicative 
of the fact that the growth in the real sector of the economy does impact share prices 
because such growth increases the levels of incomes, savings, and investments. The 




one percentage point increase in the inflation rate (INF), there was a corresponding fall in 
the stock prices of the firms studied by 0.729 percentage points. The implication of this 
inverse movement in the stock prices, Mehr-un-Nisa and Nishat pointed, is that 
inflationary pressures reduces savings and investments, thereby forcing investors on the 
market to pull out of the market through the sales of their shares. This in turn results in an 
increased supply of shares, thereby forcing the prices of the shares downward. The third 
finding of Mehr-un-Nisa and Nishat was that an increase in the interest rates (MMR) by 
one percentage points results in a 1.432 decrease in the share prices of the firms under 
study. This finding, according to Mehr-un-Nisa and Nishat, was to be expected because 
such an increase reduces money supply in the economy; which in turn causes some 
investors in the economy to reduce their investments in equity, in favor of cash or 
investment in interest bearing instruments. A reverse finding that was made by Mehr-un-
Nisa and Nishat was that one percentage point increase in money supply (M2), increases 
share prices by 40.319 percentage points. In relation to the size of the stock market, (SZ), 
Mehr-un-Nisa and Nishat found that one parentage increase in the market size results 
only in 0.004 percentage point increase in the share price. This finding, according to 
Mehr-un-Nisa and Nishat, is insignificant and is indicative of the fact that trading on KSE 
is largely dependent on few companies with large market capitalization. Finally, in 
relation to the development of the financial markets in general (both money and capital 
markets), Mehr-un-Nisa and Nishat found that a percentage increase in the financial 
intermediation increases the share price by 0.015 percentage points. This, according to 




liberalization in Pakistan in 2001 began paying off by showing a positive relationship 
between such liberalization and the prices of firms stocks that were traded on the KSE. 
Determinants of an IPO’s Fair Value and Preliminary Offer Price 
Use of single vs. multiple valuation estimates. From the foregone, it is obvious 
that as to which valuation method(s) is/are employed by investment bankers in their 
valuation and pricing of a given IPO will be dependent on firm-specific factors and the 
macroeconomic or emerging-market factors that affect the performance of all the firms 
and their stocks in the giving economy. Investment bankers in their choice of valuation 
method(s), according to Pereiro (2002), are guided by whether to use a single valuation 
method or to use two or more of such valuation methods. The debate as to whether to use 
a single valuation or multiple valuation methods in the valuation of corporations is an 
issue that had raged within the cycles of taxation laws and jurisprudence in the United 
States. The Revenue Ruling 59-60 (1959-1 C.B. 237), in section 3, subsection 1 took 
notice of the fact that the determination of the fair market value of a closely held 
corporation will depend upon the circumstances of that corporation and hence “no 
formula can be devised that will be generally applicable to a multitude of different 
valuation.”  In spite of this legal and tax restrictions, investment bankers in their 
valuation of corporations for the purposes of IPO listings do resort to the use of multiple 
valuation methods (Roosenboom, 2007; Deloof et al., 2009). According Pereiro (2002), 
the use of multiple valuation methods by most practitioners is akin to the proverbial 
elephant and the blind men. The tale of each of the blind men on guessing the nature of 




nature of the beast. The valuation and pricing of the firm’s IPO is not an exact science 
and hence each method tends to compute only one aspect of the firm’s value. 
Assignment of weights re multiple valuation estimates. Having used more than 
one valuation method, the investment bankers, according to Pereiro (2002) could opt for 
one of the two ways of reporting their valuation results. One approach, Pereiro spoke of, 
is to report the results obtained from each of these valuation methods without trying to 
reconcile the results in a unique value. The other approach, according to Pereiro is to 
synthesize the different results in a unique, singular, or synthetic value. For the purposes 
of getting an IPO listed, investment bankers may need to provide a single or unique value 
estimate, and this will require the use of some weighting of the various value estimates 
derived from the various valuation methods. According to Pereiro, the techniques for 
conducting such weightings could be categorized into explicit or implicit weighing 
methods. In relation to the implicit weighting techniques, Pereiro pointed out that 
investment bankers give the final (i.e., synthetic) value, without stating the basis for the 
derivation of such value from the various value estimates. On this score, Pereiro 
admonished that, the use of implicit weighting is not advisable because it does not 
enlighten investors or anyone interested in understanding the results of the valuation. In 
relation to the explicit weighting techniques, Pereiro spoke of fitness-based quantitative 
weighting and precision-based quantitative weighting. With the fitness-based techniques, 
Pereiro noted that the investment banker considers the purpose for which the valuation is 
being conducted as well as the characteristics of a corporation being valued. The 




relative importance of a giving valuation method vis-à-vis the valuation purpose and firm 
characteristics. With the precision-based weighting technique, however, Pereiro pointed 
out that investment bankers resort to weighting the various valuation estimates using 
statistical precision of a given valuation method. The statistical precision of a given 
method, according to Pereiro, is measured as “the inverse of the standard deviation of the 
error of the valuation estimation” (p. 64). As to which method of weighting is more 
accurate than the other, Pereiro further noted, is a matter of debate among academics and 
hence the use of the fitness-based technique is common among investment bankers. 
Empirical evidence on weighting in IPO valuation research. Roosenboom 
(2007), in his contribution to the literature on how investment bankers in France assign 
weight to the value estimates of the various valuation methods, pointed out that one of the 
bankers arrived at the fair value of a giving IPO by assigning a weight of 2/3 to the 
multiples value estimate and 1/3 to the discounted cash flow value estimate. This 
practical example by Roosenboom presupposed that values were assigned on the basis of 
the relative importance as suggested by the fitness-based quantitative weighting of 
Pereiro. Roosenboom further posited that Bayesian theory, as put forward by prior 
researchers, suggested that investment bankers are more likely to assign weights to those 
valuations that they believed to be more accurate for valuation of a given firm’s IPO. In 
this regard, Roosenboom hypothesized that when larger and older corporations are being 
valued for the purposes of IPO listing, higher weights should be expected to be assigned 
to the direct valuations methods such as DCF and DDM. In the same vein, when 




Roosenboom argued that higher weights are to be assigned to multiples valuation 
methods. EVA, according to Roosenboom, should be expected to be assigned higher 
weights when one can argue that accounting numbers are capable of capturing value as 
generated by tangible assets more than the value generation of intangible assets. 
Roosenboom also argued that when there is a commitment by an IPO firm to the payment 
of high dividends in the future that could be an indication that higher weighting should be 
assigned to the DDM. 
Price discount and the setting of preliminary offer price. The key source of 
IPO underpricing is the deliberate introduction of a price discount by the investment 
banker that is leading the IPO listing efforts of a given corporation. This price discount, 
according to Roosenboom (2007) is computed by investment bankers’ in France as “(fair 
value estimate - preliminary offer value)/fair value estimate” (p. 1226). The reasons for 
the introduction of such price discounts are behind the case for IPO underpricing 
considered in one of the succeeding sections of this literature review. 
IPO Valuations: A Review of Management’s Earnings Forecasts 
Earnings Forecasts in IPO Valuations 
Disclosure of earnings forecasts in IPO prospectuses. The disclosure of 
earnings forecasts in IPO prospectuses is meant to reduce the information asymmetry that 
usually exists between the management of the issuing firms and investors (Firth, 
Gounopoulos, & Pulm, 2013). In spite of this laudable objective, the disclosure of such 
forecasts is not universally adopted. In some jurisdictions, such disclosures are 




to Clarkson, Dontoh, Richardson, and Sefcik (1992), these disclosures are almost 
nonexistent in the United States’ markets, universal in the United Kingdom, and 
voluntary in the Canadian markets. Scholars, in this field, have advanced several 
empirical and practical arguments as to the pros and cons of such disclosures of earnings 
and terminal value forecast. In their examination of such disclosures in the Canadian 
markets, Jog and McConomy (2003) pointed out that such a disclosure gives investors 
much information on the extent of underpricing incorporated in the valuation and pricing 
of a given firms IPO. An earlier research in the same market by Clarkson et al. revealed 
that the inclusion of such forecasts in IPO prospectuses does provide investors with the 
good news about the earnings prospects of the issuing firms and enables the market to 
make corrections to any forecasting errors that may come to their notice. According to 
Firth et al., the role of such earnings forecasts in signaling the value of the issuing firm 
cannot be overemphasized in that their signaling impact is more pronounced than other 
signaling mechanisms that could exist in the market. In spite of all these advocacies for 
the disclosure of earnings forecasts in IPO prospectuses, Cormier, Lapointe-Antunes, and 
McConomy (2014) provided legal reasons as to why management could be reluctant in 
providing such forecasts. Cormier et al. pointed out that faced with less litigious 
environment corporate managers in Canada, unlike their counterparts in the United 
States, are at liberty to provide investors with such disclosures. 
Measurement of forecast errors in IPO prospectuses. The mandatory or 
voluntary disclosures of earnings forecasts in IPO prospectuses in some jurisdictions 




forecasts. There seemed to be unanimity in the literature on the measurement of such 
inaccuracies or errors in earnings forecasts. Scholarly literature in the field, such as those 
of Bulut and Er (2011), Gounopoulos (2011), Jelic et al. (1998), and Lonkani and Firth 
(2005), spoke of two measurement metrics–the signed forecast error and the absolute 
forecast error. The signed forecast error, according to these scholars, measures the 
direction of bias in the forecast; whilst the absolute forecast error measures the overall 
level of accuracy in the forecasts. 
Empirical findings on forecast errors in IPO prospectuses. Jelic et al. (1998) 
in their assessment of forecast accuracy in the IPO prospectuses of 124 listed companies 
on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange between 1984 and 1995 found that the mean 
forecast error was +33.37% (p. 57). This result, Jelic et al. noted, was an indication of 
under forecasting depicting that corporate managers were conservative with their 
forecasting figures. Chen, Firth, and Krishnan (2001) conducting a similar research on 
the accuracy of forecasting errors in the IPO prospectuses of companies listed on the 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange found that the mean absolute forecast error was 21.96% (p. 
226). This result, according to Chen et al., implied that the absolute forecast error was 
greater or lower than the forecasted profit by as much as 22% (p. 226). Lonkani and Firth 
(2005) found a mean and median forecast error (FE) of negative 6.88% and negative 
4.02% respectively (p. 278). These findings were made by Lonkani and Firth when they 
examined the accuracy of earnings forecast provided in the IPO prospectus of listed firms 
in Thailand. The negative signs on the mean and median FE, Lonkani and Firth (2005) 




forecast. This finding of Lonkani and Firth stood in contrast to the pessimistic forecast in 
other East Asian markets as was brought to the fore by the results of Jelic et al. (1998) 
and Chen et al. (2001). On the issue of forecasting accuracy, as measured by the absolute 
forecasting error, Lonkani and Firth found that the mean and median absolute forecasting 
errors were 35.76% and 20.83% respectively (p. 278). This result, Lonkani and Firth 
noted, was consistent with the absolute forecast errors observed in other East Asian 
markets. 
Determinants of forecast errors in IPO prospectuses. Prior research in this 
field of financial economics had, according to Gounopoulos (2011), put forward some 14 
potential factors that could explain the magnitude of forecast errors in IPO prospectuses. 
My research hypotheses, which closely followed those of Jelic et al. (1998), were tested 
on the basis of six of such potential variables. These six variables were firm’s size, 
proportion of shares retained by the owners, forecast horizon, firm’s operating history as 
measured by age, companies gearing, and auditors’ reputation. 
Firm size(SIZE).In relation to firm’s size, the evidence gleaned from prior 
research, had been that, it is much easier to forecast the earnings prospects of larger 
companies than it is for smaller companies (Gounopoulos, 2011). This, according to Jelic 
et al., is because firstly, larger companies tend to be more stable and hence for these 
companies there is a high probability that management will be more accurate in putting 
forward their earnings forecasts. Secondly, Jelic et al. further pointed out that those 
companies also tend to have the financial muscle to provide the needed resources for the 




such companies are usually in control of their market situations and hence they tend to be 
less susceptible to fluctuations in the economic environment in which they operate. Like, 
Jelic et al., the subsidiary hypothesis I tested under the firm size, as a determinant of 
forecast error, is “the larger the company, the lower the forecast error” (p. 66). In this 
regard, firm size could be deemed as being negatively correlated with absolute forecast 
error. 
Retained ownership (OWN).The theoretical and empirical arguments and/or 
findings in financial economics are that, there exist information asymmetry and that 
corporate insiders have more information about the future prospects of a company when 
compared to corporate outsiders (Jog & McConomy, 2003; and Chen et al., 2001). In this 
regards, Gounopoulos (2011) argued that the measurement of the accuracy of earnings 
forecasts is equal to the extent to which pre-issue shareholders continue to hold onto the 
share after the IPO listing. Jelic et al. (1998), in buttressing these theoretical and 
empirical arguments, put forward a testable hypothesis that the forecast error should be 
lower if the proportion of post-IPO shares retained by pre-IPO owners is higher. In this 
regard, the higher the post-listing share ownership, by pre-listing shareholders, the more 
negatively correlated management earnings forecasts will be with absolute forecast error. 
Forecast horizon (HOR). Jelic et al. (1998) noted of the varied and opposing 
arguments in the literature about the impact of short-term versus long-term forecasting 
horizons on absolute forecasting error. Some scholars, according to Jelic et al., have 
argued that the longer the forecasting horizon, the more accurate the forecasting can be; 




Gounopoulos (2011)’s position was that the accuracy of every forecast tends to 
deteriorate the longer the forecasting horizons. This position could be buttressed with the 
earlier position of Chen et al. (2001) when they noted the increment in risk and 
uncertainty in forecasting over the long-term. In this respect, Chen et al. found that there 
is a significant positive relationship between forecasting horizon and forecasting errors. 
Jelic et al., in spite of their opposing argument above, sided with the view that the shorter 
the forecasting horizon; the more accurate forecasting tends to be. In this regard, in 
relation to the forecasting horizon variable, Jelic et al. hypothesized that the forecast error 
should be lower if the forecasting horizon is shorter. This means that whilst short-term 
forecasting horizons are correlated negatively with absolute forecast error; long-term 
forecasting horizons are rather correlated positively with absolute forecast error. 
Firm’s age (AGE). As noted in the previous sections of this literature review, 
firm’s age is being used here as a proxy for measuring the operating history of a company 
that is putting its share for sales to the general public through an IPO. In forecasting, the 
importance of data emerging from the company’s historical operating activities cannot be 
overemphasized (Jelic et al., 1998; Jog & McConomy 2003). The findings of Chen et al. 
(2001) buttressed this fact when they pointed out that older companies are less risky, as a 
result, of their experience in putting forward better and more accurate forecasts. In this 
regard, Jelic et al. put forward the hypothesis that the forecast error should be lower if the 
age of the IPO-firm is higher. This means that the older the company, the more accurate 




Financial leverage (LEV). According to Jelic et al. (1998), it is widely accepted 
view in the literature that companies that have comparatively high levels of debt are 
highly volatile with regards to their profitability. This perceived volatility in their 
earnings makes their earnings forecast more susceptible to forecasting inaccuracies. This 
perception, according to Gounopoulos (2011), was buttressed by an earlier study that 
noted that the higher the level of firm’s financial leverage, the higher its level of risk 
relating to the preparation of its earnings forecast. As a result of this assertion, 
Gounopoulos (2011) hypothesized that the higher the financial leverage, the higher one 
should expect the absolute forecast error to be. The hypothesis of Jelic et al. was rather 
the opposite when they claimed that the higher the financial leverage, the lower one 
should expect the absolute forecast error to be. This contrary view of Jelic et al. stemmed 
from the fact that firms that are highly leveraged (geared) are subjected to more rigorous 
scrutiny by their creditors, and hence there will be less managerial incentive in putting 
forward earnings forecasts that are error prone. 
Auditor’s reputation (AUD). The consensus in the literature is that the big four 
global audit firms are more reputable in their delivery of opinions on the accuracy or 
otherwise of management earnings forecasts included in the IPO prospectuses (Jelic et 
al., 1998). In seeking to test the relationship between auditors’ reputation and the 
accuracy of earnings forecasts, Jelic et al. pointed out that the dummy variable of one 
could be assigned if the audit firm was one of the Big Four and zero if it was not. The 
logical hypothesis that follows from these assertions is that the absolute forecast error 




forecasts incorporated into the IPO prospectus of an IPO-firm. In other words, the 
deployment of any one of the Big Four audit firms is negatively related to absolute 
forecast error. The Big Four audit firms, according to Gerakos and Syverson (2014), are: 
Ernst & Young, Deloitte and Touché, KPMG, and PricewaterhouseCoopers. 
Earnings Management in IPO Valuations 
Definition of earnings management. Earnings management in financial 
reporting, according to Roosenboom et al. (2003), occurs when the structuring of 
financial transactions are in such a way that the financial reports mislead users about the 
underlying economic performance of the company. Financial reporting systems, 
Roosenboom et al., produces accounting earnings that are made up of actual cash flows 
from operating activities and non-cash- operating activities that are referred to as 
accruals. Accrual accounting, according to Roosenboom et al., arises when the 
recognition of transaction and/or events in the financial statements are made by managers 
in periods that do not match with the periods in which the related cash flows of those 
transactions/events occur. Earnings management occurs when the impact of such accrual 
accounting decisions by corporate managers is that of ensuring a giving outcome by way 
of reported earnings. In measuring earnings management, Dechow, Ge, and Schrand 
(2010) conducted a literature review of over 300 articles that had been put forward on 
quality of earnings since 1964. This extensive review of the literature by Dechow et al 
had revealed that almost all the proxies used for measuring earnings quality, and for that 
matter, earnings management are accrual-based. Dechow et al. spoke of the various 




which proxy of accrual-based earning management a researcher ends up employing, the 
researcher should be mindful of the circumstances in which each proxy works well and 
not adopt the same proxy for all circumstances. 
Factors influencing levels of earnings management. Literature in this field of 
financial economics had revealed various factors that have the potential of influencing the 
levels of earning management. Cormier and Martinez (2006) studied the relationship 
between management earnings forecasts, earnings management, and stock market in the 
valuation of IPO listings in the French markets. In this study, Cormier and Martinez 
considered such factors as the decision to comply with international accounting 
standards, the degree of independence of the board, a high-quality auditor, the ownership 
structure, and the ownership retained by the entrepreneur. In this study I followed 
Cormier and Martinez in considering the influence of each of these factors on the 
direction and magnitude of earnings management in prospectuses of Ghanaian IPOs. 
IAS/IFRS compliance (IAS). The adoption of international accounting standards, 
according to Cormier and Martinez (2006), is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition 
for the achievement of high-quality financial reporting information. The key argument in 
the deployment of international accounting standards in the earnings reportage, in the 
prospectuses of IPO firms, is that such a deployment should result in the lowering of the 
information asymmetry between management and the potential investors. In this regard, 
Cormier and Martinez contended that the adoption of generally accepted international 
accounting standards will result in the production of high quality financial information on 




IPO earnings forecasts will be lower for IPO-firms that comply with IAS/IFRS standards. 
This hypothesis implies that the adoption of international accounting standards is 
negatively correlated with earnings management. 
External board (EB). The role of effective corporate governance, in ensuring the 
production of high quality financial information had been given much space in the fields 
of accounting and financial economics. One metric for measuring the effectiveness of a 
corporation’s governance framework, according to Cormier and Martinez (2006), is by 
assessing the level of independence of the board of directors (i.e., the extent to which the 
board is made up of external or non-executive directors). Using this metric as a proxy for 
measuring the extent of earnings management of IPO firms, Cormier and Martinez 
further hypothesized that earnings management will be lower for IPO-firms whose board 
of directors consist mainly of external or non-executive directors. In other words, the 
higher the representation of non-executive directors on corporate boards, the lower the 
magnitude of earnings management.  
Auditor (AUD). As noted in the previous section on earnings forecast, the 
consensus in the literature is that the big four global audit firms are more reputable in 
their delivery of opinions on the accuracy or otherwise of financial statements  and 
management earnings forecasts included in IPO prospectuses (Jelic et al., 1998). In view 
of this reliability perception, Cormier and Martinez (2006) also pointed, from their 
review of prior literature, that the use of any of the Big4 audit firms is of higher quality 
than a non-Big4 audit firm. In this regard, Cormier and Martinez put forward a testable 




auditors. This means that when a firm’s IPO prospectus is given a bag of acceptability by 
any of the Big4, that prospectus is devoid of the tendencies of earnings management. 
Owner-manager (OWN). The widely held view in literature is that earnings 
management is a common occurrence in manager-controlled firms than in owner-
controlled firms. The reason for this view, according to Cormier and Martinez (2006), is 
because managers are more prone to ensuring the maximization of their earnings-related 
bonus-payments. In this regard, Cormier and Martinez posited that earnings management 
in IPO earnings forecasts will be lower for IPO-firms whose pre-IPO shares are closely 
held by the pre-IPO owners. 
Retained ownership (ROWN). The theoretical and empirical arguments or 
findings in the literature of financial economics are that there exist information 
asymmetry and that corporate insiders have more information about the future prospects 
of a company when compared to those outside of those corporations (Jog & McConomy, 
2003; and Chen et al. 2001). In this regards, Gounopoulos (2011) argued that the 
measurement of the accuracy of management earnings forecasts can be high to given the 
extent to which pre-issue shareholders continue to hold onto the share after the IPO 
listing. Jelic et al. (1998), in buttressing these theoretical and empirical arguments, put 
forward a testable hypothesis that forecast errors in IPO earnings forecasts will be lower 
if the proportion of post-IPO shares retained by pre-IPO owners is higher. In a similar 
vein, Cormier and Martinez (2006) also argued that if the percentage of share ownership 




management will be greatly reduced. Hence the higher the proportion of shares retained 
by the owners, the lower the tendencies for earnings management. 
Post Issue Return Performance: The Case for IPOs Under/Overpricing 
Are IPOs Really Underpriced? 
Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004) posed this all-important question as a title 
to their research on this phenomenon. The thrust of Purnanandam and Swaminathan’s 
argument was that IPOs seemed underpriced because of the wrong measurement basis 
that had over the years been adopted by scholars in this field. Underpricing, according to 
the authors, will always be the phenomenon observed as long as the basis of 
measurement is that of comparing the offer price to the first-day return. This 
measurement basis had over the past decades consistently resulted in an average first-day 
return of between 10-15% (Purnanandam & Swaminathan, 2004, p. 811). This basis of 
measurement, in the opinion of Purnanandam and Swaminathan, ought to be reconsidered 
and, therefore, their paper is one of the first academic attempts in the reconsideration of 
this measurement basis. The argument of authors is that instead of measuring short-run 
IPO performance as the difference between the offer price and the first trading-day 
market price, their measurement should rather consider some notion of long-run fair 
value. In this respect, Purnanandam and Swaminathan computed ‘fair values’ using price 
multiples such as price-to-EBITDA; price-to-sales; and price-to-earnings of non-IPO 
industry peers. The fair values, once computed, are used to assess IPO performance by 
comparing those fair values (V) to the offer price (P). The results that had emerged from 




relatively large capitalization IPOs from 1980 to 1997 had revealed the median IPO as 
overvalued by about 14% to 50% (p. 812) and hence the question: are IPOs really 
underpriced? 
Are IPOs Really Overpriced? 
Zheng (2007), in response to Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004), asked a 
counter question: are IPOs really overpriced? In responding to this question, Zheng 
conducted an empirical study of selected 2,493 IPOs over the same period of 1980-1997 
using the same basis of sampling criteria that were used by Purnanandam and 
Swaminathan (2004, p. 814). In computing the fair value, Zheng (2007) departed from 
Purnanandam and Swaminathan on the point of the use of ex post instead of ex ante peer-
matching non-IPO firms. The reason for such a departure, according to Zheng; was 
because Kim and Ritter (1999) had already argued that the valuation of IPOs using 
comparable firm multiples is not of use if those valuations were done using historical 
numbers rather than forecasts. Given this point of departure, Zheng christened his ex post 
peer-matching method as ‘growth-matching method,’ and that of Purnanandam and 
Swaminathan as ‘comparable firm multiple method’ (p. 10). Testing the two methods on 
relatively similar sampled data, Zheng’s results using the comparable firm multiple 
method were very consistent with the results obtained by Purnanandam and 
Swaminathan. Using his growth-matching method, however, Zheng (2007, p. 22) came to 
the conclusion that the results obtained by Purnanandam and Swaminathan were sensitive 
to the two key issues of (a) control for growth expectation and (b) whether new primary 




that there was no overvaluation of IPO return performances. Zheng, therefore, concluded 
that the results were consistent with the widely held view that IPOs are underpriced at 
offer price and fairly valued in the aftermarket in relation to the comparable seasoned 
firms. In this respect IPO’s cannot be said to be overpriced as claimed by Purnanandam 
and Swaminathan. 
The Case for IPO Underpricing 
Judging from Zheng’s counter argument, there seems to be a case for IPO 
underpricing. The existence of this IPO underpricing is one of the most important 
anomalies or puzzles that have long fascinated financial economists (Zaremba & 
Żmudziński, 2013). An empirical research of Loughran, Ritter, and Rydqvist (1994) 
revealed the incidences of short-run underpricing for all the 25 countries that were 
covered by their study. The conclusion Loughran et al. came to was that the underpricing 
phenomenon exists in every country with a stock market. The differences observed about 
this phenomenon from one country to the other are the depth and breadth of the 
underpricing (Van Heerden & Alagidede, 2012). As pointed out by Ritter (1998), various 
explanations had been offered in IPO performance literature as to why there exists this 
phenomenon of short-run underpricing. According to Ritter, these explanations include, 
but were not limited to the winner’s curse hypothesis, the market feedback hypothesis, 
the bandwagon hypothesis the investment banker’s monopsony power hypothesis, the 





The winner’s curse hypothesis. This hypothesis, according to Lin, Kao, and 
Chen, (2010), holds that IPO underpricing is a consequence of information asymmetry 
and rationing. This information asymmetry, according to Lin et al., is one which exists 
between one group of investors (i.e., the informed investors) and another group of 
investors (i.e., the uninformed investors). When an IPO with a best performing prospects 
is put forward for sales, the informed investors who are aware of these prospects will 
crowd out the uninformed investors. When an IPO that is without a good prospect is put 
forward for sale, the informed investors will not subscribe, thereby, leaving the 
uninformed investors to oversubscribe and bear the subsequent losses that come with the 
bad prospects of that IPO. This curse of being denied good IPO offers whilst being 
saddled with oversubscribed bad IPOs do result in the uninformed investors not 
subscribing to IPOs when offered for sale. To avoid this undersubscription by the 
uninformed investors, investment banking firms and their clients in offering IPOs for sale 
do intentionally underpriced in order to avoid the failure of those IPOs, as a result, of this 
winner’s curse hypothesis. 
The market feedback hypothesis. This hypothesis is of the view that the market 
is more informed and holds more information than the corporate managers that are 
putting forward their IPOs for sales (Hill & Hiller, 2009). According to Ginglinger, 
Faugeron-Crouzet, and Vijayraghavan (2003), the market feedback hypothesis stands 
contrary to the notion of signaling theory, which holds that corporate managers being 
insiders have better information about their corporations than the market; hence they send 




of their corporations to be. The reverse to the signaling theory is that market participants 
given their understanding of IPO prospects and their post issue trading in those IPOs 
rather sends valuable information that informs the subsequent capital budgeting decisions 
of corporate managers. In view of this reserve information flow, Ritter (1998) argued that 
investment bankers may underprice IPOs and in this way induce regular investors to 
reveal information during the pre-selling period. This information, Ritter further pointed 
out, is then used to assist in the eventual pricing of IPOs issues. 
The bandwagon hypothesis. This hypothesis, according to Ritter (1998) and 
Yong (2011), holds that investors will either end-up subscribing or not subscribing to a 
given IPO sales, not based on the information they possess about the prospects of the 
IPO, but on the basis of whether other investors are buying or not buying that IPO. In this 
regard, investment bankers and corporate managers have no other options, but to 
underprice their IPOs in order to induce, the first few, investors into buying the IPOs so 
as to kick start a buying bandwagon among other investors. 
The investment banker’s monopsony power hypothesis. The argument of this 
hypothesis, according Robinson and Robinson (2012), was that IPO underpricing is a 
means by which investment bankers absolve themselves of the legal liabilities and 
associated reputational damage if they are found to have spewed up IPOs whose values 
are more than the actual worth of the company. Another plausible reason Ritter (1998) 
had attributed to this underpricing hypothesis is that it allows investment bankers expend 




The lawsuit avoidance hypothesis. This hypothesis holds that IPOs are 
deliberately underpriced by investment bankers in order to avoid the legal liabilities that 
do arise on the claims of violating the Securities Act of 1933. This Act affords investors 
the opportunity of bringing an IPO-related lawsuit against those involved in the 
marketing and sale of new equity issue (Lin, Pukthuanthong, & Walker, 2013). Damages 
in suits brought under the Act, Lin et al. further pointed out could be very costly in terms 
of settlement payments, waste of management time and destruction of underwriter’s 
reputation. Given the weight of damages an overpriced IPO could engender: investment 
bankers are better-off underpricing their IPO issues as by so doing minimal or no 
damages will ensue in a legal suit. Ritter (1998) in summing up on these explanations 
noted that underpricing seems to be a means by which investment bankers tend to reduce 
the probability of a future lawsuit. Lowry and Shu (2002, p. 309) in their empirical study 
noted that there are two different perspective for the explanation of the law avoidance 
hypothesis. The first of these is that of ‘the insurance effect’ where firms with higher 
litigation risk underprice their IPOs by a greater amount as a form of insurance. The 
second perspective is that of ‘the deterrence effect’ where IPO underpricing is used by 
investment bankers and corporate managers as a means for lowering expected litigation 
costs.  
The signaling hypothesis. Underpricing new issues, according to Ritter (1998), 
leaves investors with a good taste. This is because the underpricing of an IPO becomes a 
signal to the market as to the quality of the firm’s future performance. The firm as well as 




opportunity of selling further shares in the secondary market at higher share prices 
(Espenlaub & Tonks, 1998). According to Ritter, the empirical evidence in support of the 
signaling hypothesis has been doubtful in that the impact of IPO underpricing on the 
subsequent season sales of shares by IPO firms had not proven the hypothesis. This 
assertion was also buttressed by Espenlaub and Tonks when they noted that post-IPO 
share issuance is indeed related to initial returns, but the same is not true for insider 
selling. 
The ownership dispersion hypothesis. This hypothesis, according to Ritter 
(1998), holds that investment bankers intentionally underpriced IPOs. This is because the 
creation of a large pool of dispersed ownership results in the generation of significant 
liquidity for the issue as well as a dispersed ownership that will not be able to stand in the 
way of management. Boulton, Smart, and Zutter (2010) in their empirical studies of this 
phenomenon noted that underpricing do indeed result in a broad ownership of IPO shares. 
This, according to Boulton et al., in turn increases secondary market liquidity and that 
this increment in the marketability and liquidity do result in reduced investor required 
return. Boulton et al. were, however, quick to add that such a broad dispersion of 
ownership has a cost of increasing investor-borne information. 
Summary and Conclusion 
In this literature review, I have exposed my readers to the relevant scholarly 
literature that has been penned so far in this field of financial economics. I began the 
literature review section by given my readers a pictorial view of the key thematic areas 




literature review sections of this study. The three key thematic areas covered in this 
literature review were those of IPO valuation, IPO pricing, and IPO performance. Each of 
these thematic areas was designed to encapsulate the overall topic of this study: 
Valuation, pricing, and performance of initial public offering on the Ghana Stock 
Exchange. 
In relation to the IPO valuation ambit of this study, I first drew my readers’ 
attention to the role that is normally played by investment bankers in the valuation of 
those IPOs. Following this, my readers were given a rendition of the various IPO 
valuation methods that are at the disposal of these investment bankers. The literature 
review then continued with an examination of the firm-specific factors and the emerging 
market factors that underpin the choice of each of the valuation methods by investment 
bankers. In relation to the IPO pricing aspects of the literature review, the issues of price 
discounts and the setting of the preliminary and eventual offer prices were discussed. The 
IPO prices, once determined and the related stocks are offered for sale by the investment 
bankers, the attention of scholars then turns towards the accuracy of those IPO offerings. 
In this section of the study, I turned my readers’ attention to the two key issues of 
accuracy measurement in IPO valuation and pricing–forecasting errors and earnings 
management. I provided literature on these two areas in relation to their definition, the 
factors that influenced them by way of magnitude and direction, and the empirical 
evidence that have been put forward by various scholars so far. In relation to the post-
issue IPO return performance, the literature review concentrated on the arguments for and 




Having laid down the scholarly giants on whose work this research hinges upon, I 
now proceed to the methodology section of the study in chapter 3. In this methodology 
chapter, the detailed review of literature set forth in this chapter 2 informed the detailed 
operational definition and measurement of the hypothesized variables and the appropriate 
methodologies for collecting and analysing data needed in testing each of the six 
hypotheses. The chapter 2 also dovetailed into chapter 4 and 5 by providing the findings 
of other scholarly works in the field of financial economics that could be compared with 


















Chapter 3: Research Method 
Introduction 
In the first section of this chapter, I present the operationalization of the research 
hypotheses. I begin the section by restating the hypotheses that were set forth in Chapter 
1 of the study. Following this restatement, I gave the definition and the measurement 
basis of each of the variables–dependent or independent–in each of the six hypotheses. In 
the second section of the chapter, I focus on the research design and rational. As noted in 
Chapter 1, the nature of the hypothesized variables was such that they could be best 
tested using a quantitative-led nonexperimental research design. In this section, I 
considered the rationale for choosing this design and the categorizations of the design. In 
the third section of this chapter, I considered the research methodology in which I set out 
the sampling and sampling procedures employed in this study. I follow with a detailed 
description of the data collection methods that I used in gathering the necessary data for 
testing of each of the hypothesized variables. I gave a description of the measurement 
instruments that I used in the collection of data. I then spell out the data analysis plan of 
the study which included the methods used to prepare the collected data for analysis. I 
continued the data analysis by considering the cross-sectional regressional analyses that I 
employed in the testing of the various hypotheses. I conclude chapter with a summary 




Operationalization of Research Hypotheses 
Restatement of Research Hypotheses 
Hypotheses 1: Choice of IPOs’ valuation methods. H0: The choice of IPO 
valuation methods by investment bankers in Ghana is not dependent on firm-specific 
factors and emerging market factors. H1: The choice of IPO valuation methods by 
investment bankers in Ghana is dependent on firm-specific factors and emerging market 
factors. 
Hypotheses 2: Fair value estimates of IPOs. H0: The weight assigned to the 
value estimate of each valuation method in determining the fair value estimate of an IPO 
does not depend on firm-specific and emerging market factors. H1: The weight assigned 
to the value estimate of each valuation method in determining the fair value estimate of 
an IPO depends on firm-specific factors and emerging market factors. 
Hypotheses 3: Price discount and the setting of preliminary offer prices. H0: 
The application of price discount in the setting of preliminary offer price of an IPO does 
not depend on firm-specific and emerging market factors. H1: The application of price 
discount in the setting of preliminary offer price of an IPO depends on firm-specific and 
emerging market factors. 
Hypotheses 4: Forecasts errors in IPO prospectuses. H0: The absolute 
forecasting error observed for each IPO firm is not dependent on the firm’s size, retained 
ownership, forecasting interval, age, gearing, and auditor’s reputation. H1: The absolute 
forecasting error observed for each IPO firm is dependent on the firm’s size, retained 




Hypotheses 5: Earnings management in IPO prospectuses. H0: Ghanaian IPO 
firms’ do not exhibit non-zero earnings management in the pre- and post-issue IPO years. 
H1: Ghanaian IPO firms’ do not exhibit non-zero earnings management in the pre- and 
post-issue IPO years. 
Hypotheses 6: IPO pricing anomalies on the Ghana stock exchange. H0: There 
is no significant cross-sectional relationship between price-to-value ratios (P/V) and 
over/undervalued first-day returns observed on the GSE. H1: There is a significant cross-
sectional relationship between price-to-value (P/V) ratios and over/undervalued first-day 
returns observed on the GSE. 
Operational Definition and Measurement of Hypothesized Variables 
In Table 1, I set forth the variables for each of the six hypotheses with respect to 
their dependent variables and independent variables alongside the scholarly sources that 
had previously used those variables.  
Valuation methods as dependent variables in Hypotheses 1. As shown in the 
table, the dependent variables in Hypotheses 1 were the different valuation methods that 
were at the disposal of the investment bankers when valuing the stocks of a given IPO 
firm. These dependent variables remained the same for both the firm-specific and 
emerging-market factors. Those valuation methods comprised DCF, DDM, EVA, MULT, 






Dependent and Independent Variables in Each of the Six Hypotheses 
 
Firm-specific factors as independent variables in Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3. In 
putting together the hypotheses relating to firm-specific factors, I was also inspired the 
work of Roosenboom (2007), who as cited by Deloof et al. (2009), pointed out that the 
Hypotheses No. Hypotheses Title Dependent Variables Sources of DVs Independent Variables Sources of IVs
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usefulness of a valuation method depends on the firm characteristics that are influencing 
the choice of such valuation method. In this regard, the firm-specific characteristics I 
considered were those relating to the size of the IPO firm (SIZE), the age of the firm 
(AGE), the extent to which its assets are tangible (AIP), the profitability of the firm prior 
to the listing of its stocks (PROF), the growth prospects of the firm in relation to sales 
(GROW), and the expected dividend payouts of the firm (DIV). I set forth the operational 
definitions of each of these firm-specific variables in Table 2. 
Table 2 
Operational Definition of Independent Variables: Firm-Specific Factors 
Independent variable      Operational definition 
 
Size The total assets for the most recent 12-month 
balance sheet reported in the prospectus. That is the 
12-months balance sheet prior to the IPO. 
Age The age of the IPO-firm where age is the difference 
between the IPO year and the founding year in the 
prospectus. 
Asset’s tangibility Plant, property, and equipment from the most recent 
12-month balance sheet disclosed in the prospectus 
divided by total assets. That is the 12-months 




Profitability The ratio of current year’s forecasted earnings 
before interest and taxes (EBIT) to current year’s 
forecasted sales. Where current year is the year of 
IPO flotation and forecasted earnings and sales are 
the earnings and sales forecasts incorporated in the 
IPO prospectuses. 
Sales growth Forecasted sales growth during the current year. 
Where current year is the year of IPO flotation and 
forecasted sales growth is the growth in sales 
computed as the difference between the sales 
forecast of earnings incorporated in the IPO 
prospectuses and the actual sales as stated in the 
financial statements prior to the year of IPO 
flotation. 
Dividend payout ratio Future dividend payout ratio (dividends/net income) 
as disclosed in the prospectus. This future dividend 
payout ratio will be determined by averaging the 
payout ratio of the year-on-year projected financial 
statements.  
 
Emerging-market factors as independent variables in Hypotheses 1, 2, and 




need to adjust for such valuation complications as inflation (INF) and interest rate 
(MMR) and exchange rate (FER). Mehr-un-Nisa and Nishat (2011) in buttressing this 
assertion spoke of such additional macroeconomic or emerging market variables as the 
growth rate of gross domestic product (GDP), the size of the stock market (SD), the level 
of financial intermediation (FD), and the level of the money supply in the economy (M2). 
These measurement variables, as put forward by Koller et al as well as Mehr-un-Nisa and 
Nishat, informed my operationalization of the macroeconomic or emerging-market 
factors. I set forth the operational definition of each of these emerging market factors in 
the following table. 
Table 3 
Operational Definition of Independent Variables: Emerging-Market Factors 
Independent variable  Operational definition 
 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) This is the market value of all goods and services 
produced within a country during a giving time 
period–usually a year (Parkin, 2013).This will be 
measured as the annual percentage GDP growth rate 
of the Ghanaian economy for the year prior to the 
IPO flotation. The sources of this variable for this 
study were the World Bank national accounts data 





Inflation This is the extent to which the cost of living in 
Ghana rises on monthly basis. It is also the process 
in which the price level is rising and money is 
losing value (Parkin, 2013). This will be measured 
as the inflation rate for the year prior to the IPO 
flotation. The source of this variable for this study is 
the IMF’s International Financial Statistics as 
reported byindexmundi.com. 
Interest rates This is the income that capital earns (Parkin, 2013). 
This will be measured as the percentage deposit 
interest rate in the Ghanaian economy for the year 
prior to the IPO flotation. The source of this 
variable for this study is the IMF’s International 
Financial Statistics as reported byindexmundi.com. 
Exchange Rate This is price at which one currency exchange for 
another (Parkin, 2013). This will be measured as the 
real effective exchange rate index for the year prior 
to the IPO flotation. The source of this variable for 
this study is the IMF’s International Financial 
Statistics as reported byindexmundi.com. 
Stock Market Size This is the size of the stock market as measured by 




GSE in the year prior to the IPO flotation expressed 
as a percentage of GDP. The sources of this variable 
for this study are the Standard & Poor’s, Global 
Stock Markets Factbook, and supplemental S&P 
data as reported byindexmundi.com. 
Money Supply (M2) A measure of money that consist of currency, 
travelers check and checking deposits owned by 
individuals, and businesses (M1), plus time 
deposits, savings deposits, money market mutual 
funds, and other deposit (Parkin, 2013). This will be 
measured as the percentage growth rate in money 
and quasi money within the Ghanaian economy for 
the year prior to the IPO flotation. The source of 
this variable for this study is the IMF’s International 
Financial Statistics as reported byindexmundi.com. 
Financial Intermediation This variable that traces the developmental levels of 
financial intermediation in Ghana over the study 
period. This will be measured as domestic credit 
provided by the banking sector, for the year prior to 
the IPO flotation, expresses as a percentage of GDP 
within that year. The source of this variable for this 






To empirically model the choice of valuation methods on the GSE, I tested 
Hypothesis 1 through the following cross-sectional logistic regression equation: 
 , 	
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 +  +  + 
 +   + !
+ " + #$
 + +% + 
 + 2 + 
+ 
  +  (                                                                                                   (1) 
Weighting valuation methods as dependent variables in Hypotheses 2. 
Roosenboom (2007) pointed out that the data he obtained from the French IPO market 
enabled him to determine the weights that were assigned by the underwriters to the 
different valuation methods. In assessing the role of each valuation method in the 
determination of a given IPO’s fair value, Roosenboom used these assigned weights as 
the dependent variable and hence for the discounted cash flow (DCF) method, for 
example, the dependent variable was DCFW. Following Roosenboom, I also used the 
data obtained from the respective prospectuses of the IPOs on the GSE concerning the 
assignment of weights to the various valuation methods as the dependent variable. To 
empirically model these valuation weight assignments on the GSE, I tested Hypothesis 2 
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Price discount/premium as the dependent variables in Hypothesis 3. As to the 
extent to which investment bankers on the GSE apply price discount in the setting of 
preliminary offer prices, Roosenboom (2007) pointed out that the computation of the 
discount as: “(fair value estimate - preliminary offer value)/fair value estimate” (p. 1226). 
To empirically model the offer IPO price discounts on the GSE, I tested Hypothesis 3 
through the following cross-sectional regression equation: 
	$ =  +  +  +  + 
 +   + !
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 + #$
 + +% + 
 + 2 + 
+ 
  +  (                                                                                                  (3) 
Absolute forecast error as dependent variable in Hypothesis 4. The dependent 
variable used in this hypothesis was the AFE. This variable, according to Jelic et al 
(1998), could be mathematically defined as: 
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Where: Aj,T is the actual earnings for firm j at period T and Fj,T is the forecast 




accuracy of earnings forecasts could and should also be assessed using forecast error 
(FE) and squared forecast error (SFQ). The mathematical definitions of these two 
additional variables were set forth by Jelic et al (1998) as: 
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0100                                                                                            (6) 
I set forth in Table 5 the operational definitions of each of the independent 
variables I used in predicting the observed forecast inaccuracies. 
Table 4 
Operational Definition of Independent Variables Relating to Hypothesis 4 
Independent variable   Operational definition 
 
Size This is the total assets of the IPO-firms following 
the share issuance. That is the total assets for the 
IPO year as reported in the actual financial 
statements of that year.  
Retained Ownership  Percentage of new shares retained by insiders or  
  pre-IPO owners of the IPO firm. 




prospectus date and the year-end to which the 
forecasts pertain. 
Age     The age of the IPO-firm where age is the difference  
between the IPO year and the founding year in the  
prospectus. 
Gearing/Leverage   The ratio of total debts to total assets after the  
issue. 
Auditor’s Reputation              A dummy variable taking the value 1 if the auditor  
is one of the Big Four firms; otherwise 0. 
 
 
In explaining the influence of each of the above dependent variables on the 
magnitude of forecast error, scholars have largely relied on the use of “cross-sectional 
regression models where the absolute forecast error enters as the dependent variable” 
(Lonkani & Firth, 2005, p. 275).  In this regard, I tested Hypothesis 4 through the 
following cross-sectional regression model: 
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Discretionary current accrual as the dependent variable in Hypothesis 5. The 
dependent variable used in this hypothesis was the discretionary current accrual (DCA). 
To operationally define this dependent variable, it is important to first define an IPO-
firm’s total accrual. According to Cormier and Martinez (2006), one of the best ways for 




and cash flow from operations” (p. 219). The reason for the adoption of such a simple 
definition is because whilst earnings estimates could easily be manipulated by 
management of the firm; such manipulations of cash flow from operations is not possible 
because the firm’s bank accounts are in the custody of banks and other financial 
institutions outside the control of an IPO-firm’s management. This definition also 
presupposed that total accruals could be easily inferred from the financial statements of a 
firm; whilst this is true, such inference, Cormier and Martinez pointed out, cannot be 
easily made when one is to decompose the total accruals into its discretionary and non-
discretion components. Prior literature in this field have suggested various ways by which 
such a decomposition can be done, one such way alluded to by Roosenboom et al (2003) 
is the one put forward by DeAngelo in 1986 which held that discretionary current accrual 
(DCA) could be computed using: 
	,; = 	,;(,; + ,;<)/2 −
	,;<(,;< + ,;<)/2                                                       (8) 
Where DCAi,t is the discretionary current accrual of an IPO-firm i, t represents the 
fiscal year relative to the IPO (t =2, ..., 3), CA represents current accruals and TA stands 
for total assets. In relation to the CA, Roosenboom et al. (2003) noted from prior research 
that earnings management results, largely, from the changes in current accruals (i.e., 
changes working capital). These changes in current accruals, according to Roosenboom 
et al. (2003), could be computed as [(current assets – cash) – (current liabilities – current 




of the long-term debts that are reclassified as current liabilities because, they will be 
falling due within the next financial year. I set forth the operational definitions of the 
independent variables relating to the Hypothesis 5 in the following table. 
Table 5 
Operational Definition of Independent Variables Relating to Hypothesis 5 
Independent variable      Operational definition 
 
IAS/FRS compliance               An indicator/dummy variable is utilized, taking a  
                                                            value of “1” if a firm is complying with IASB 
standards, and 0 otherwise. 
External board  An indicator variable is utilized; taking a value of 
“1” if a firm’s board of directors is composed of a 
majority of external members and “0” otherwise. 
Auditor   An indicator variable is utilized; taking a value of  
“1” if a firm is audited by one of the “Big 4”, and  
“0” otherwise.   
Ownership/management structure      An indicator/dummy variable is utilized, taking a  
value of “1” if a firm pre-IPO was managed by the 
controlling stockholder(s) and “0” otherwise. 
Retained ownership   The percentage of retained ownership by the initial 




into account the primary issue and any secondary  
sale that the controlling stockholder may have  




In explaining the influence of each of the above variables on the level of earnings 
management, scholars have largely relied on the use of cross-sectional regression models 
where the discretionary current accruals (DCA) enters as the dependent variable 
(Roosenboom, 2003; Cormier and Martinez (2006); and Ahmad-Zaluki et al. 2011). In 
this regard, I tested Hypothesis 5 through the following cross-sectional regression 
equation: 
	 =  +  + ? +  +  $ +  $ + (9                  (9) 
First-day IPO returns as the dependent variable in Hypothesis 6. The 
dependent variable used in this hypothesis was R(1st Day) which implies the first-day 
return on an IPO-firm post issue. According to Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004), 
this first-day return has traditionally been defined in literature as the difference between 
the offer price and the first trading-day market price. In this regard, Chambers and 
Dimson (2009) defined the first-day return (RETi,1) as the change from the initial offer 
price (Pi,0) to the final price recorded on the (Pi,1): 




The operational definition of the independent variables that I used in explaining 
this R(1st Day) are set forth in the following. 
Table 6 
Operational Definition of Independent Variables Relating to Hypothesis 6 
Independent variable  Operational definition 
 
Price-to-Value ratio  The offer price-to-value ratio, where price is the 
first-day trading pricing of the IPO and value is the 
enterprise value of the IPO firm computed as the 
[(market value of equity + book value of debt – 
cash)/(shares outstanding after the 
offering)](Rhodes & Ligon, 2013) for the year of 
IPO flotation. The market value of equity is the 
product of the shares outstanding after the IPO 
offering and the as of the first-day trading price. 
Book-to-Market ratio  The book-to-market ratio, where book is the book 
value of equity for the fiscal year after the IPO date 
and market is the market value of equity is the 
product of the shares outstanding after the IPO 
offering and the as of the first-day trading price 
Growth The forecasted sales growth during the current year. 




forecasted sales growth is the growth in sales 
computed as the difference between the sales 
forecast of earnings incorporated in the IPO 
prospectuses and the actual sales as stated in the 
financial statements prior to the year of IPO 
flotation. 
Accruals The ratio of current accruals to total assets based on 
the first annual statement after the firm goes public 
and is considered a measure of earnings quality. 
Sales This is the sales for the fiscal year ending at least 
three months prior to the IPO date and is used as a 
control for size. 
EBIT margin  The ratio of EBIT to sales for the fiscal year  
ending at least three months before the IPO goes  
public. 
  
Following Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004, p.826), I tested Hypothesis 6 
through the following regression equation:  
(1E;  FG) =  +  + ? +   + 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Research Design and Rational 
Major categorizations of quantitative research design. In choosing a research 
design, Trochim (2006) admonishes that experimental design should be employed where 
random assignment and selection is possible. Quasi-experimental research design, 
Trochim further noted, is the design of choice where random assignment is impossible, 
but there exist control or comparison groups and the variables under study are capable of 
experimental manipulation by the researcher, to allow for the conduct of a near 
experimental research. Where there are no such groups (i.e., control or comparison 
groups) and where the manipulation of variables is simply impossible, the research 
design that is available to the researcher falls within the broader ambit of 
nonexperimental research. A substantial proportion of quantitative research is 
nonexperimental because, according to Johnson (2001), most important variables in 
social sciences are not easily manipulable. The topic under study, in this dissertation 
research, is rooted in financial economics, and according to Campbell, Lo, and 
MacKinlay (1997), the field of financial economics is a highly empirical discipline and 
that, among all branches of economics, the field of finance is the most empirical. In 
addition to its empirical nature, Campbell et al. further noted that the research design in 
financial economics, like other social sciences, is mostly nonexperimental. In view of 
these assertions, the research design of this study is a nonexperimental-based quantitative 
research. 
Categorizations of nonexperimental research design. According to Johnson 




dimensions of ‘objective’ and ‘time.’ In relations to the objective dimension, a 
nonexperimental research could be intended to be descriptive, predictive, or explanatory. 
A nonexperimental research is descriptive where the researcher is primarily concerned 
with describing a phenomenon and documenting the characteristics of the phenomenon 
(Johnson, 2001). For a predictive nonexperimental research, the concern of the researcher 
is about the prediction or the forecasting of an event or phenomenon in the future, 
(Johnson, 2001). A research will be deemed to be explanatory if the researcher is trying 
to develop or test a theory about a phenomenon to explain the ‘how’ and ‘why’ the 
phenomenon operates in the way it does (Johnson, 2001). For the time dimension, 
Johnson noted that the intent of this dimension is to assess the kind of data that the 
researcher ought to collect. The types of nonexperimental research that could be 
conducted along this time dimension, according to Johnson, could be cross-sectional, 
longitudinal, or retrospective. In cross-sectional research, Johnson pointed out that data is 
collected from research participants at a single point in time. In longitudinal research the 
same data, according to Johnson, is collected at more than one point in time; thereby 
affording the researcher the opportunity of data comparison across time. In retrospective 
research, Johnson noted that, the researcher looks backward in time to find out 
information on independent variables that can assist in explaining the current differences 
in the dependent variable. In amalgamating these objectives and time dimensions of a 





Types of Nonexperimental Research Designs 
 
Note.  From “Toward a new classification of nonexperimental quantitative research,” by 
B. Johnson, 2001, Educational Researcher, 30(2), p. 10.  
 From the description of these dimensions, it is obvious that this quantitative 
research study of mine is ‘cross-sectional’ by way of time and ‘explanatory’ by way of 
objective. It is cross-sectional because I collected data for each of the variables in each of 
the six hypotheses at a time in which those data occurred. The study is also ‘explanatory’ 
because I sought to explain the processes and procedures of IPO valuations on the GSE 
as well as explaining the ‘how’ and ‘why’ those valuations were carried out. 
Methodology 
Statistical Power and Sample Size Analyses 
In determining the sample sizes from  the study populations, it is important for my 
readers to note that the statistical tools I used in the conduct of my data analysis were 
logistic regression and multiple ordinary least squares regression analyses. In determining 
the sample size when using logistic regression in the testing of Hypothesis 1, the 
G*Power software relies on the works of Demidenko (2007) and Hsieh, Bloch, and 
Research Objectives Retrospective Cross-Sectional Longitudinal
Descriptive
Retrospective, Descriptive Study 
(Type 1)
Cross-Sectional, Descriptive Study 
(Type 2)
Longitudinal, Descriptive Study 
(Type 3)
Predictive
Retrospective, Predictive Study 
(Type 4)
Cross-Sectional, Predictive Study 
(Type 5)
Longitudinal, Predictive Study 
(Type 6)
Explanatory
Retrospective, Explanatory Study 
(Type 7)
Cross-Sectional, Explanatory Study 
(Type 8)






Larsen (1998). A procedure based on the work of Demidenko (2007), according to 
Buchner, Faul, and Erdfelder (2009), “is more general and slightly more accurate than 
that proposed by Hsieh et al. (1998)” and hence they recommend the use of Demidenko’s 
procedure. To determine the sample size for given study that intends to use logistic 
regression, one must first specify the effect size using the odds ratio, the probability of Y 
= 1 when X = 1, alpha value, and power size. For my analysis using the G*Power 3.1.7 
software, prior assessment of the sample size was dependent on the level of odds ratio 
that I set given a probability of 0.5 of Y=1 when X=1, alpha value of 0.05, and power of 
0.8. Setting my odds ratio, that a given valuation method will be chosen over the others at 
an odd ratio of 1.0, 1.5, 2.0, 2.5, 3.0, 3.5, 4.0, 4.5, 5.0, or 5.5 resulted in the sample sizes 














Sample Sizes Analysis Using G*Power and Demidenko (2007)’s Procedure 
Odd Ratio  Prob (Y=1, X = 1) Alpha (α)  Power (1-β)               Sample Size  
                                                                                                            (G*Power) 
1.0    0.5  0.05   0.8   -1  
1.5   0.5  0.05   0.8   163 
2.0   0.5  0.05   0.8   64 
2.5   0.5  0.05   0.8   41 
3.0   0.5  0.05   0.8   32 
3.5   0.5  0.05   0.8   28 
4.0   0.5  0.05   0.8   25 
4.5   0.5  0.05   0.8   23 
5.0   0.5  0.05   0.8   21 
5.5   0.5  0.05   0.8   20 
 
In in the selection of my sample size for this study, I considered an odds ratio of 
between 3.0 and 5.5 beacuse the number of stocks listed on the GSE were 34 during the 
period under consideration. For the remaining five hypotheses, I subjected those 
hypotheses to empirical testing using multiple OLS regression analyses. For the testing of 
Hypotheses 2 and 3 using student t-statistic, I fed the G*Power software with the 




independent variables) of 13 as specified in those hypotheses, and the power of analysis 
ranging from 0.6 to 0.95 results in the following plot of sample sizes: 
 
Figure 4.Sample size analysis for Hypotheses 2 and 3 using G*Power 3.1.7. 
From the Figure 4, the sample size of 24 at 0.8 power of analysis will suffice for 
the testing of Hypotheses 2 and 3. For hypotheses 4, 5, and 6, the student t-statistic, when 
used along with the G*Power software specifications of an effect size of 0.3, alpha of 
0.05, the number of predictors of 5, 6, and 6 as specified in Hypotheses 4, 5, and 6 
respectively, and the power of analysis ranging from 0.6 to 0.95 results in the following 





Figure 5.Sample size analyses for hypotheses 4, 5, & 3 using G*Power 3.1.7. 
From the Figure 5, the sample size of 23 at 0.8 power of analysis will suffice for 
the testing of Hypotheses 4, 5, and 6.  
Sampling Selection Criteria 
The sample in this study includes 30 IPOs listed on the GSE from 1991 to 2012. 
These IPOs have been sampled to be part of this study because of the availability of 
valuation and pricing information contained in their prospectuses. The GSE since 
commencement of trading in November 1990 has had 52 activities of equity issuance as 
at the end of December 2012. These activities, each of which required one form of equity 
valuation or the other comprised 24 IPO listings, 5 Placements, 1 Offer-for-Sale, 2 
Introductions, 18 Rights Issues, 1 Bonus Issue, and 1 Secondary Issue. For the purposes 




year-on-year equity issuance activities on the GSE and the related sample selection, 
inclusion, and exclusion criteria are set forth in the following table. 
Table 9 
Sample Selection, Inclusion, and Exclusion Criteria 
 
Data Collection 
I collected data required for the conduct of this study from secondary sources. The 
use of secondary data in this study cannot be overemphasized because, according to 
Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (2008), there are conceptual, methodological, and 
cost reasons for use of such data sources. The study is about the valuation, pricing, and 
performance of IPOs whose data are in the IPO prospectuses, the related valuation reports 

















1992 1.00               -              -                    -                  1.00        -          -               2.00                -               
1993 -                 -              -                    -                  -          -          -               -                  -               
1994 3.00               -              -                    -                  -          -          -               3.00                -               
1995 2.00               1.00            1.00                  -                  1.00        -          -               2.00                3.00             
1996 1.00               1.00            -                    -                  1.00        -          -               2.00                1.00             
1997 -                 -              -                    -                  1.00        -          -               1.00                -               
1998 -                 -              -                    -                  2.00        -          -               2.00                -               
1999 1.00               -              -                    -                  1.00        -          -               1.00                1.00             
2000 1.00               -              -                    -                  1.00        -          -               1.00                1.00             
2001 -                 -              -                    -                  -          -          -               -                  -               
2002 1.00               -              -                    1.00                 -          -          -               -                  2.00             
2003 1.00               -              -                    -                  2.00        -          -               1.00                2.00             
2004 4.00               -              -                    -                  2.00        -          -               2.00                4.00             
2005 1.00               -              -                    -                  -          -          -               -                  1.00             
2006 3.00               -              -                    1.00                 -          -          -               -                  4.00             
2007 2.00               -              -                    -                  1.00        -          -               1.00                2.00             
2008 2.00               -              -                    -                  1.00        -          -               -                  3.00             
2009 1.00               -              -                    -                  4.00        -          -               2.00                3.00             
2010 -                 -              -                    -                  2.00        -          -               -                  2.00             
2011 1.00               -              -                    -                  1.00        -          -               1.00                1.00             
2012 -                 3.00            -                    -                  -          1.00         1.00             1.00                -               
25.00             5.00            1.00                  2.00                 21.00      1.00         1.00             22.00              30.00           




firms, and the post-listing-trading results of those IPOs. The data relating to each of these 
documents are historical and, hence, conceptually can only be available as secondary 
data. Methodologically, Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias pointed out that, cross-
sectional research designs can only be possible with the use of secondary data sources. 
Information or data about the 30 sampled IPOs were elicited from such sources as (a) the 
IPO prospectuses lodged with the GSE and/or Stocks and Exchange Commission of 
Ghana (i.e., the SEC); (b) the trading information of these IPO firms from the GSE; (c) 
the decision-making factors that had informed the IPO prices from the perspectives of 
both the investment banks and the IPO firms; and (d) the pre- and post-IPO financial 
records of the IPO firms contained in their respective prospectuses as well as on the 
database of Annual Report Ghana (ARG). 
Data Analysis Plan 
Preparation of data for analysis. I arranged and coded the collected data using 
the Microsoft Excel. This arrangement and coding facilitated my uploading of the data on 
to the IBM’s SPSS software for further statistical analysis. Preparation of data for 
analysis, according to Green and Salkind (2011), also involved subjecting the data to 
missing-data analysis, analysis of outliers, analysis of the various assumptions that 
underpin logistic and ordinary least square regressions. I subjected my data to all these 
analysis and I shared the results of such analysis at the relevant sections of the study in 
both this chapter and the next. Preparation of data for analyses could also involve the 
transformation of data. Data transformation, according to Banasiewicz (2013), is the 




desired data quality” (p. 131). This mathematical re-repression of data may be required 
when there is the need to ensure that the distributions between the dependent and 
independent variables in a linear regression are approximately normal (Zumel & Mount, 
2014). These transformations, Banasiewicz further noted, do allow for direct side-by-side 
comparison of data that are otherwise not of direct comparable measures and hence has 
the advantage of improving the interpretability of data. In this study, I used the lognormal 
transformation of data as and when necessary. 
Statistical analysis of Hypothesis 1.This hypothesis, as was noted in prior 
sections, boarded on the choice of IPO valuation methods by the various investment 
bankers that ply their trade on the GSE. The hypothesis by way of null and alternate 
claim holds that: 
H0: The choice of IPO valuation methods by investment bankers in Ghana is not 
influenced by firm-specific and emerging market factors.  
H1: The choice of IPO valuation methods by investment bankers in Ghana is 
influenced by firm-specific and emerging market factors. 
The variables in Hypothesis 1, as was also noted in prior sections, were tested 
through the following regression equation: 
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In relation to the statistical analysis of the variables in this hypothesis, I indicated 
earlier on in this chapter that I analyzed the hypothesis using logistic regression. The 
reason for this decision was because the dependent variables in this hypothesis were 
dichotomous or binary in nature. Logistic regression, according to Field (2009), is “a 
multiple regression but with an outcome variable that is categorical and predictor 
variables that are continues or categorical in nature” (p. 265). In buttressing this 
definition, Hailpern and Visintainer (2003) pointed out that the other two statistical 
models employed in the analysis of binary response data are the probit model and 
discriminant analysis. The use of a probit model was, however, discounted because “it 
lacks natural interpretation of regression parameters” (Hailpern & Visintainer, 2003, p. 
213). The use of discriminant analysis addresses the regression parameter problem that 
confronts the probit model. In spite of this, however, the discriminant analysis requires 
the fulfillment of the assumption that the predictor variables are normally distributed and 
that they jointly assume a multivariate normal distribution. These assumptions, Hailpern 
and Visintainer further noted, are not usually fulfilled when variable in a regression 
analysis are dichotomous or discrete in nature. Logistic regression is superior to 
discriminant analysis because it does not make any assumption about the nature of 
variable distributions. Moreover logistic regression, unlike discriminant analysis, does 
not require the use of Bayes theorem in the extraction of variables of interest. Logistic 
regression, Hailpern and Visintainer concluded, is a direct probability model stated in 




using binary logistic regression in testing the choice of IPO valuation methods by 
investment bankers. 
In order to deploy logistic regression, there is a need for me to transform the 
linear regression equation (12) into its logit format. According to Field (2009), in logistic 
regression, instead of predicting the value of a dependent variable Y from independent 
variable X, or several independent variables (Xs), one should predict the probability of Y 
occurring giving known values of X or (Xs). Where there are several independent 
variables (Xs), Field posited that the logistic regression equation from which one can 
predict the probability of Y is given as flows: 
 (H) = IJK(LDMLCNC,BMLONO,BM⋯MLQNQ,B)                                                                         (13)  
From this logistic format, equation (12) could be logistically modeled. In this 
regard, the probability of an investment banker choosing to value an IPO using multiple 
(MULT) valuation method, for example, when giving the size of the IPO firm (SIZE), the 
age of the firm (AGE), the extent to which firm’s assets are tangible (AIP), the 
profitability of the firm pre-IPO (PROF), the growth prospects of the firm in relation to 
sales (GROW), and the historical and/or expected dividend payouts of the firm (DIV), the 
GDP (GDP), inflation rate (INF), money market interest rates (MMR), money supply 
(M2), size of the stock market (SZ), and the financial depth of the stock market (FD). 
This choice of the investment banker could be logistically stated as: 




Following the modelling of the logistic regression, Hosmer Jr, Lemeshow, and 
Sturdivant (2013) spoke of the need for fitting the model, testing for the significance of 
the coefficient, and estimating the confidence interval. In analyzing Hypothesis 1 in 
Chapter 4, I undertook all this model fitting, coefficient’s significance testing, and 
confidence interval estimations. 
Statistical analysis of Hypothesis 2. This hypothesis, as was noted in prior 
sections of this chapter, boarded on how investment bankers on the GSE determined the 
fair value estimate of a giving IPO by assigning weights to the valuation estimate of each 
of the valuation methods. The hypothesis by way of null and alternate claims holds that: 
H0: The weight assigned to the value estimate of each valuation method in 
determining the fair value estimate of an IPO does not depend on firm-specific and 
emerging market factors. 
H1: The weight assigned to the value estimate of each valuation method in 
determining the fair value estimate of an IPO depends on firm’s firm-specific and 
emerging market factors. 
Hypothesis 2, as was pointed out in prior sections, was tested using the following 
OLS regression equation: 
   , 	
 ,   ,   ,  
=  +  +  +  + 
 +   + !
+ " + #$
 + +% + 
 + 2 + 
+ 




For the statistical analysis of Hypotheses 2, 3, 4, and 5; I used multiple ordinary 
least squares regression (OLS). This is because each of the dependent variables in these 
hypotheses were not discrete but rather continues in nature. The OLS, according to 
Gujarati and Porter (2009), is commonly used in regression analysis because it is 
intuitively appealing and mathematically simpler than its nearest rival called maximum 
likelihood (ML). Regression, according to Field (2009), is a way of predicting the 
outcome (dependent) variable from one predictor (independent) variable (simple 
regression) or several predictor variables (multiple regression). Multiple regression is a 
general and highly flexible data analytic system (Cohen, Cohen, West & Aiken, 2013).  
Following the modelling of a given hypothesis using multiple regression, there is also a 
need for fitting the model, testing for the significance of the coefficient, and estimating 
the confidence interval. In analyzing Hypotheses 2, 3, 4, and 5 in Chapter 4, I undertook 
all this model fitting, coefficients significance testing, and confidence interval 
estimations. 
 Statistical analysis of Hypothesis 3. This hypothesis, as was noted in 
prior sections of this chapter, boarded on how investment bankers on the GSE introduce 
price discounts to the fair value estimate of a given IPO in arriving at the preliminary 
offer price of that IPO. The hypothesis by way of null and alternate claims holds that: 
H0: The application of price discount in the setting of preliminary offer price of an 
IPO does not depend on firm-specific and emerging market factors. 
H1: The application of price discount in the setting of preliminary offer price of an 




Hypothesis 3, as was pointed out in prior sections of this chapter, was tested using 
the following OLS regression equation: 
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Statistical analysis of Hypothesis 4. This hypothesis, as was noted in prior 
sections of this chapter, boarded on assessing the accuracy of earnings forecasts that are 
incorporated in the prospectuses of IPOs listed on the GSE. The hypothesis by way of 
null and alternate claims holds that: 
H0: The absolute forecasting error observed for each IPO firm is not influenced by 
the firm’s size, retained ownership, forecasting interval, age, gearing, auditor’s 
reputation, industry factors, and/or reduction in actual earnings. 
H1: The absolute forecasting error observed for each IPO firm is influenced by the 
firm’s size, retained ownership, forecasting interval, age, gearing, auditor’s reputation, 
industry factors, and/or reduction in actual earnings. 
Hypothesis 4, as was pointed out in prior sections of this chapter, was tested using 
the following OLS regression equation: 
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Statistical analysis of Hypothesis 5. This hypothesis, as was noted in prior 




the earnings forecasts incorporated in the prospectuses of IPOs listed on the GSE. The 
hypothesis by way of null and alternate claims holds that: 
H0: Earnings forecasts in the prospectuses of Ghanaian IPO firms’ do not exhibit 
non-zero earnings management. 
H1: Earnings forecasts in the prospectuses of Ghanaian IPO firms’ do exhibit non-
zero earnings management. 
Hypothesis 5, as was pointed out in prior sections, was tested using the following 
regression equation: 
	 =  +  + ? +  +  $ +  $ + (9                        (18) 
Statistical analysis of Hypothesis 6. This hypothesis, as was noted in prior 
sections of this chapter, boarders on assessing the post-issue return performance of the 
IPOs that were listed on the GSE for the period under review. The hypothesis by way of 
null and alternate claims holds that: 
H0: There is no significant cross-sectional relationship between price-to-value 
(P/V) ratios and over/undervalued first-day returns that are observed on the GSE. 
H1: There is a significant cross-sectional relationship between price-to-value 
(P/V) ratios and over/undervalued first-day returns that are observed on the GSE. 
Hypothesis 6, as was pointed out in prior sections of this chapter, was tested using 
the following regression equation: 
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For the statistical analysis of Hypotheses 6; I also used multiple ordinary least 
squares regression (OLS). 
Methodological Limitations 
Dealing with missing data. The key methodological limitations I encountered 
boarded on the difficulties in the data collection. The first of these difficulties was that no 
reliable data on industry averages were available; hence, I had to proceed with the 
conduct of research without the inclusion of the industry-related factors in hypotheses 1-3 
which I originally proposed to have included along with the firm-specific and emerging-
market factors. The second of these difficulties had to do with legitimate, and to some 
extent illegitimate, missing data points and cases. By legitimate missing data, I mean the 
instances of missing data points where as a result of their exclusion in some IPO 
prospectuses, I could not obtain the required data for those points. Examples of this 
abound where an IPO on the GSE was done by way of introduction. The valuation and 
pricing of such introduced IPO-firm were already available; hence there was no need for 
the inclusion of forecasted financial statements in its prospectus. In such cases, the 
forecasted data points required for such an IPO will be non-existent and therefore 
missing. By illegitimate missing data points or cases, I mean those instances where the 
data or case, that ought to be kept, had not been kept in the various databases. For 
example, I set out to collect data relating to all the 35 listed firms on the GSE; I only 
ended up collecting data relating to only 30. This was because no IPO prospectuses were 
available for four of those IPO firms. I must, however, point out that the remaining one 




which was outside my sampled data period of 1992-2012. By legitimate and illegitimate 
missing data, I must be quick to point out that this description has nothing to do with 
legality or law. I borrowed the usage of these terms from the work of Osborne (2012) 
who dedicated a whole chapter of his book to the issues of missing or incomplete data. In 
dealing with the missing data points in this study, I was guided by Osborn’s advice that 
the presence of missing data in any scientific research does not necessarily harm that 
research. Hence, when faced with such instances of missing data, the researcher must 
“use best practices and careful methodology to minimize missingness” (p. 131). Osborn 
also admonished that researchers should be transparent and report any incidences of 
missing data. Osborn also added that such reportage should include the rate of 
missingness in terms of the variables, and if possible provide reasons for that 
missingness. In response to this advice of Osborne, I provided the missing data 
summaries for all the variables in all the six hypotheses as follows: 
Missing data analysis in Hypotheses 1-3. Using the SPSS Missing Data 






Figure 6. Overall summary of missing values in Hypotheses 1-3. 
This summary, being an overall summary may not be very informative, and hence 
the SPSS provides summaries for the respective missing variables as set forth in the 
following table. 
Table 10 
Missing Data Analysis: Variable Summaries for Hypotheses 1-3 
 
From this table, it would be realized that of all the variables–dependent and 
independent–in Hypotheses 1-3, only three of the independent variables had missing data 
points. In relation to the DIV variable seven of the 30 sampled IPO-firms had their data 
N Percent
DIV (%) 7 23.3% 23 36.8676 17.36930
GROW (%) 4 13.3% 26 39.4920 31.16750
PROF (%) 4 13.3% 26 16.7572 16.24765
Variable Summarya,b
Missing
Valid N Mean Std. Deviation
a. Maximum number of variables shown: 25




points missing. This variable could be legitimately missing because four of those IPO-
firms got listed without forecasted data. Hence, the DIV variable which I measured as a 
percentage of forecasted dividend payouts to forecasted net income will not have data 
points for these IPO-firms. The remaining three missing data points was simply because 
three of the firms who had forecasted financial statements in their IPO prospectuses did 
not make such estimates of dividend payouts. In relation to the GROW and the PROF 
variables which had missing data points for the four of the 30 sampled IPO firms, arose 
because those four firms did not have forecasted financial statements in their IPO 
prospectuses. 
Missing data analysis in Hypotheses 4.   Using SPSS Missing Data Analysis 
tool, the overall summary of the missing data in these hypotheses is shown Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7.Overall summary of missing values in Hypotheses 4 
This summary, being an overall summary may not be very informative, and hence 
the SPSS provides summaries for the respective missing variables as set forth in Table 




independent–in hypotheses 4, only two of the independent and three of the dependent 
variables had missing data points. In relation to the OWN variable eight of the 30 IPO-
firms had their data points missing. This variable could be legitimately missing because 
not all the sampled IPO firms provided data relating to the percentage of the post-IPO 
shares retained by their pre-IPO owners. 
Table 11 
Missing Data Analysis: Variable Summaries for Hypotheses 4 
 
In relation to the HOR and the AFE variables which had missing data points for 
the four of the 30 sampled IPO firms, this arose because those four firms did not have 
forecasted financial statements in their IPO prospectuses. 
Missing data analysis in Hypotheses 5.   Using SPSS Missing Data Analysis 
tool, the overall summary of the missing data in these hypotheses is shown Figure 8. 
N Percent
OWN 8 26.7% 22 65.3514 19.47176
HOR 5 16.7% 25 43.5600 13.14686
SEQ 4 13.3% 26 71.8304 147.29512
FE 4 13.3% 26 -28.7802 54.08434
AFE 4 13.3% 26 49.8352 38.24643
Variable Summarya,b
Missing
Valid N Mean Std. Deviation
a. Maximum number of variables shown: 25





Figure 8. Overall summary of missing values in Hypotheses 5 
This summary, being an overall summary may be not very informative, and hence 
the SPSS provides summaries for the respective missing variables as set forth in Table 
12. 
Table 12 
Missing Data Analysis: Variable Summaries for Hypotheses 5 
 
From this table, it would be realized that of all the variables–dependent and 
independent–in Hypothesis 5, only one of the independent variables–ROWN–had 
missing data points. This variable, which was measured, in the same way, as the OWN 
variable in Hypothesis 4, had eight missing data points for eight of the 30 sampled IPO-
firms. This variable could be legitimately missing because not all the sampled IPO firms 
N Percent
ROWN(%) 8 26.7% 22 65.3513 19.47159
Variable Summarya,b
Missing
Valid N Mean Std. Deviation
a. Maximum number of variables shown: 25




provided data relating to the percentage of post-IPO shares retained by their pre-IPO 
owners. 
Missing data analysis in Hypotheses 6.   Using SPSS Missing Data Analysis 
tool, the overall summary of the missing data in these hypotheses is shown Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9. Overall summary of missing values in Hypotheses 6 
This summary, being an overall summary may be not very informative, and hence 
the SPSS provides summaries for the respective missing variables as set forth in Table 
13. From this table, it would be realized that of all the variables–dependent and 
independent–in Hypotheses 6, only three of the independent variables had missing data 
points. In relation to the GROWTHAIP variable the four missing data points was in 
respect to the four of the 30 sampled IPO firms that did not have forecasted financial 
statements in their IPO prospectuses. In relation to the BTM and the P/V ratios, these two 
variables which had some of their computational elements in common had these elements 





Missing Data Analysis: Variable Summaries for Hypotheses 6 
 
Chosen methodology for minimizing missingness. Three main methodologies 
have been put forward for dealing with missing data. The first of these, according to 
Osborne (2012) is the ‘listwise deletion’ method. This method is the traditional methods 
of dealing with missing data and hence the default for many statistical packages including 
SPSS. This method merely deletes any cases with missing values on any variable in the 
analysis. The second method Osborne spoke of is the ‘mean substitution’ method. Under 
this method, the group or overall sample mean is substituted for each variable with 
missing data. The theory behind this method, according to Osborne, is that “in the 
absence of any other information, the mean is the best single estimate of any participant’s 
score” (p. 118). The third and final method is the ‘simple’ or ‘multiple imputations’ 
methods. Under this method, the statistical package uses a variety of advanced computing 
techniques to estimate missing values by creating multiple versions of the same data. 
Each of these three methods has its advantages and disadvantages and although Osborne 
was careful to emphasize the supremacy of multiple imputation (MI) method; I dealt with 
N Percent
GrowthAIP(%) 4 13.3% 26 39.4920 31.16750
BTM Ratio 3 10.0% 27 1.9299 4.03135
P/V Ratio 3 10.0% 27 .8366 .54363
b. Minimum percentage of missing values for variable to be included: 10.0%
Variable Summarya,b
Missing
Valid N Mean Std. Deviation




the issue of missing data points using the ‘mean substitution’ method. In this regard, for 
each of the variables with missing data points, I filled those missing data point with the 
average (i.e., mean) of the already existing data points for that variable. My fascination 
with this method was because of its simplicity. The main flaw of this ‘mean substitution’ 
method, according to Osborne, is that 
if 20% of a sample is missing, even at random, substituting the identical score for 
a large portion of the sample artificially reduces the variance of the variable, and 
as the percentage of missing data increases, the effects of missing data become 
more profound. (p. 118)  
From my missing data analyses for each of the six hypotheses, it would be realised that 
none of those hypotheses suffered from such large portions of missingness as Osborne 
was alluding to. 
Ethical Concerns and Procedures 
This study, as I noted before in this chapter, is based on the use of data collected 
from secondary sources. The data collection process does not, therefore, involve survey 
or interview, so ethics is not an issue in this study. The only concern could come from the 
integrity of the data, but this is also not a concern because I collected all data from 
reputable databases. To accord with the Walden University’s ethical requirements on data 
collection, I began my data collection for this study following Institutional Review 





Summary and Conclusion 
In this methodology chapter, I reiterated the six key hypotheses that underpinned 
this study. The key variables in each of these hypotheses were operationally defined. I 
identified cross-sectional, explanatory research design as the most suitable research 
design for this study. The methodological underpinnings of this study such as sampling 
and sampling procedures, data collection methods, and data analysis plan were all set 
forth in this chapter. The ethical and other methodological issues confronting this study 
were also spelt out in this chapter. This chapter also leads into the next chapter because 
having set out the research design and other methodological procedures; I now proceed to 






Chapter 4: Results 
Introduction 
In this study, I explored IPO valuation, pricing, and performance on the GSE. The 
five key purposes of the study were (a) to consider the return characteristics of the 30 
IPOs listed on the GSE; (b) to examine the role of IPO valuations and pricing in 
explaining the observed return characteristics of the IPOs; (c) to examine the firm-
specific factors and emerging market factors that had influenced the choice of valuation 
methods used by investment bankers in their valuation and pricing of those IPOs; (d) to 
review how these investment bankers combined the value estimates of those valuation 
methods to determine the fair value estimate and price of a given IPO; and (e) to examine 
the incidences of errors and the possibilities of earnings in the earnings forecasts as well 
as the financial statements incorporated in the IPO prospectuses of these corporations. 
To fulfill these purposes, I posed four research questions:  
1. What valuation methods do underwriters in Ghana use in valuing IPOs listed 
on the GSE and what firm-specific and emerging-market factors influenced 
their choice of those valuation methods?  
2. How do underwriters combine the value estimate of each valuation method to 
arrive at fair values of IPOs and how do they set the preliminary offer price on 
the basis of those fair value estimates?  
3. Are the management earnings forecasts and the pre-IPO financial statements 
incorporated in the prospectuses of Ghanaian IPO firms free from forecasting 




4. What IPO pricing anomalies occur on the GSE and is there a cross-sectional 
relationships between the price-to-value ratios as determined by the 
investment bankers and the over/undervalued first-day returns observed on the 
GSE? 
To subject each of these research questions to a scholarly study, I put forward six 
research hypotheses and subjected each of these hypotheses to statistical testing. In 
Hypothesis 1, I claimed that the choice of IPO valuation methods by investment bankers 
in Ghana is dependent on firm-specific factors and emerging market factors. My claim in 
Hypothesis 2 was that the weight assigned to the value estimate of each valuation method 
in determining the fair value estimate of an IPO depends on firm-specific and emerging-
market factors. In Hypothesis 3, I claimed that the application of price discount in the 
setting of preliminary offer price of an IPO depends on firm-specific and emerging 
market factors. In Hypothesis 4, my claim was that the absolute forecasting error 
observed for each IPO firm is dependent on the firm’s size, retained ownership, 
forecasting interval, age, gearing, auditor’s reputation, industry factors, and/or reduction 
in actual earnings. For Hypothesis 5, I claimed that earnings forecasts in the prospectuses 
of Ghanaian IPO firms’ do exhibit non-zero earnings management. In Hypothesis 6, I 
considered IPO pricing anomalies on the GSE and claimed that there is a significant 
cross-sectional relationship between price-to-value (P/V) ratios and over/undervalued 
first-day returns observed on the GSE. In subjecting each of these hypotheses to 
statistical testing, I modeled Hypothesis 1 using binary logistic regression. I modeled the 




these statistical modeling and testing are the subject matter of this Chapter 4. In this 
regard, I organized the remaining sections of the chapter as follows: (a) data collection, 
(b) data analyses–descriptive statistics, (c) data analyses–hypotheses testing, and (d) 
summary of results. 
Data Collection 
Sources of Data Collection 
Data collection for this study, as I pointed out in Chapter 3, was done using 
secondary data sources. For each of these sources of data, I started with a complete 
universe of equity issuance activities on the GSE from its trading inception in 1992 to its 
trading activities of 2012. Secondary data on these equity issuance activities are held in 
the databases of the GSE, the Investment Banking Firms, the Issuing Firms, and other 
market watchers such as the Annual Reports Ghana (ARG). For inclusion in this sample 
the equity issuance activity has to satisfy the criteria of (a) being listed on the GSE; (b) 
being listed by way of an IPO, placement, offer-for-sale, introduction, and/or a rights 
issue; (c) being an issue of ordinary common shares and should not be a bonus issue or 
secondary issue; and (d) having a prospectus with clear indications of the valuation 
methods used, the respective weights assigned to the value estimate of each valuation 
method, and projected financial statements. 
Sample Selection Criteria 
The year-on-year equity issuance activities on the GSE and the related sample 





Sample Selection, Inclusion, and Exclusion Criteria 
 
Data Analysis: Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive Statistics of the Variables in Hypotheses 1-3 
Firm-specific factors. In relation to these factors, I provided in Table 15 their 
descriptive statics. As I pointed out in the prior chapters of this study, I obtained the data 
relating to the offer prices and the pre-offer financial statements from the prospectuses of 

















1992 1.00               -              -                    -                  1.00        -          -               2.00                -               
1993 -                 -              -                    -                  -          -          -               -                  -               
1994 3.00               -              -                    -                  -          -          -               3.00                -               
1995 2.00               1.00            1.00                  -                  1.00        -          -               2.00                3.00             
1996 1.00               1.00            -                    -                  1.00        -          -               2.00                1.00             
1997 -                 -              -                    -                  1.00        -          -               1.00                -               
1998 -                 -              -                    -                  2.00        -          -               2.00                -               
1999 1.00               -              -                    -                  1.00        -          -               1.00                1.00             
2000 1.00               -              -                    -                  1.00        -          -               1.00                1.00             
2001 -                 -              -                    -                  -          -          -               -                  -               
2002 1.00               -              -                    1.00                 -          -          -               -                  2.00             
2003 1.00               -              -                    -                  2.00        -          -               1.00                2.00             
2004 4.00               -              -                    -                  2.00        -          -               2.00                4.00             
2005 1.00               -              -                    -                  -          -          -               -                  1.00             
2006 3.00               -              -                    1.00                 -          -          -               -                  4.00             
2007 2.00               -              -                    -                  1.00        -          -               1.00                2.00             
2008 2.00               -              -                    -                  1.00        -          -               -                  3.00             
2009 1.00               -              -                    -                  4.00        -          -               2.00                3.00             
2010 -                 -              -                    -                  2.00        -          -               -                  2.00             
2011 1.00               -              -                    -                  1.00        -          -               1.00                1.00             
2012 -                 3.00            -                    -                  -          1.00         1.00             1.00                -               
25.00             5.00            1.00                  2.00                 21.00      1.00         1.00             22.00              30.00           





Descriptive Statistics of the Firm-Specific Variables in Hypotheses 1-3 
 
I collected the data relating to the total assets from the balance sheet ending one 
financial year before the IPO. These total assets, which I used as a proxy for measuring 
the size of the IPO firms, showed that the average size (SIZE) of the listed firms on the 
GSE in millions of Ghana Cedis is GH¢578.72 (GH¢39.46, median). Restating these 
values in US dollar terms, at an average exchange rate of GH¢1.5642 to $1 over the 20-
year study period, means that the average size of listed firms on the GSE in millions of 
dollars is $369.98 ($25.23, median). As noted in Chapter 3, I measured the age (AGE) of 
the IPO firms as the number of years the firm had been in existence prior to its IPO. I 
found out that the average age of the IPO firms, prior to their listing on the GSE, was 
27.23 years (23.00 years, median). The average company listed on the GSE, according to 
my sample, had 33.24% (23.29%, median) of its assets base being in plant, property, and 
equipment (AIP) in the financial year before the IPO. The profitability (PROF) of the 
IPO firms, which I measured in terms of their forecasted earnings before interest and tax 
(EBIT) vis-à-vis the forecasted sales for the year of IPO flotation, had shown an average 
of 16.76% (14.37%, median). The forecasted sales growth (GROW) , which I expressed 
Variables Mean Min Median Max S.D. n
Size (GH¢million) 578.72       0.11         39.46        12,347.50   2,241.32    30
Age (years) 27.23         4.00         23.00        51.00          13.28         30
AIP(%) 33.24         1.32         29.31        80.88          26.77         30
PROF(%) 16.76         (8.62)       14.37        63.79          15.28         26
GROW(%) 39.49         7.25         29.91        142.20        31.17         26




as the percentage of excess forecasted sales for the year of IPO flotation over the actual 
sales recorded by the IPO firm in the pre-IPO year, revealed on the average that an IPO 
firm listed on the GSE was forecasted to experience 39.49% sales growth (29.91%, 
median). In relation to forecasted dividend payments (DIV), I found from the sampled 
data that an IPO firm on the average was forecasted to pay 36.87% (30.00%, median) of 
its net income as dividend to its shareholders. 
Macroeconomic/emerging-market factors. In relation to these factors, I provide 
in Table 16 their descriptive statics. 
Table 16 
Descriptive Statistics of the Emerging-Market Variables in Hypotheses 1-3 
 
The GDP growth, which I measured as the annual GPD growth rate experienced 
in the economy in the year before the IPO flotation, witnessed an average growth rate of 
5.21% (5.20%, median). Inflation (INF) over the 20-years of IPO activities on the GSE 
averaged 22.50% (18.03%, median). This inflation, which I measured as the rate of 
inflation within the economy in the year prior to the IPO firm’s listing on the GSE, 
ranged between 10.71% and 59.46% over the study period. The interest rate (MMR), 
Variables Mean Min Median Max s.d. n
GDP(%) 5.21           3.30         5.20          8.01            1.23           30
INF(%) 22.50         10.71       18.03        59.46          12.86         30
MMR(%) 15.26         0.00 14.32        32.05          9.29           30
FER 111.83       91.49       100.38      160.78        23.06         30
M2(%) 31.23         13.30       31.92        56.53          11.67         30
SZ(%) 14.33         0.00 15.47        34.33          9.45           30




measured as the percentage rate of interest an investor/depositor was to earn from the 
money market, averaged 15.26% (14.32%, median). The level of exchange rate (FER) 
depreciation measured by the index of real effective exchange rate prevailing in the year 
before the IPO flotation, hovered around an average 111.83 (100.38, median). The level 
of the money supply (M2) in the Ghanaian economy over the 20-year period averaged 
31.23% (31.92%, median). The size of the stock market (SZ), as measured by the GSE-
All Share Index, indicated that the Ghanaian Stock Exchange witnessed an average 
growth of 14.33% (15.47%, median). This stock market size over the 20-year period of 
IPO-activities on the GSE grew from a minimum of 0.00% to 34.33% maximum. The 
level of financial intermediation (FD) within the Ghanaian economy increased from 
16.31% to 35.13% with an average percentage intermediation of 24.90% (25.75%, 
median). 
IPOs’ valuation methods. In relation to these factors, I provided in Table 17, 
their descriptive statics. I divided this table into three different panels with Panel A 
accounting for the various valuation methods used in the valuation of the sampled IPOs 
on the GSE. In Panel B, I accounted for the weights that were assigned to each valuation 
methods and in Panel C; I gave an account of the level of price discounts offered on the 
GSE. From the table, it would be noted that the number of different valuation methods 
(NMETHOD) that the investment bankers used to value the IPOs revealed that these 
bankers mostly used more than one valuation method with the maximum number of 
methods used in a giving IPO valuation ranging from 1 to 5 methods. The average 




firm on the GSE equaled 3.1. The percentage distribution of the investment bankers’ 
usage of these IPO valuation methods indicated that the discounted cash flow model 
(DCF) is the most popular valuation method with 93.0% and the weight that was 
generally assigned to this method averaged 48.93%.The other valuation methods (OTW)–
comprising mainly of net asset valuation (NAV), adjusted asset valuation (AAV), 
actuarial valuation (ACT), and existing market price (EMP)–follows with a percentage 
usage of 83.0% and the weight generally assigned to its value estimates averaged 
33.67%. The multiples valuation (MULT)–comprising mainly of price-to-earning (P/E) 
ratio and price-to-book (P/B) ratio–flows in a distance third with 50% usage and the 
weight generally assigned to its value estimates having a percentage distribution of 
16.27%. The dividend discounted model (DDM) follows in a very distant fourth with an 
average percentage usage of 0.03% and the average assigned weight of 1.00%.These 
descriptive statistics further revealed that those bankers do not use such methods as 
economic value added (EVA), residual income method (RIM), price-to-sales (P/S), and 






Descriptive Statistics of the Dependent Variables in Hypotheses 1-3 
 
Price discount. The descriptive statistics, in Table 17, seemed to depict that 
investment bankers and the management of listed firms had on the average offered a price 
discount (DISCOUNT) of 8.74%. The discounts, which I measured as the difference 
Variables Mean Min Median Max s.d. n
P/E ratio 0.43             -               -               -                   -               30
P/S ratio -               -               -               -                   -               30
P/B ratio 0.17             -               -               -                   -               30
P/C ratio -               -               -               -                   -               30
MULT 0.50             -               -               -                   -               30
DCF 0.93             -               -               -                   -               30
DDM 0.03             -               -               -                   -               30
EVA -               -               -               -                   -               30
NAV 0.20             -               -               -                   -               30
AAV 0.67             -               -               -                   -               30
ACT 0.07             -               -               -                   -               30
EMP 0.10             -               -               -                   -               30
OTH 0.83             -               -               -                   -               30
NMETHOD 3.10             1.00             3.00             6.00                 1.32             30
P/E(%) 13.00           -               -               50.00               16.50           30
P/S(%) -               -               -               -                   -               30
P/B(%) 3.27             -               -               30.00               7.82             30
P/C(%) -               -               -               -                   -               30
MULTW(%) 16.27           -               2.50             50.00               18.33           30
DCFW(%) 48.93           -               50.00           70.00               19.60           30
DDMW(%) 1.00             -               -               30.00               5.48             30
EVAW(%) -               -               -               -                   -               30
NAV(%) 3.67             -               10.00           35.00               8.90             30
AAV(%) 18.33           -               20.00           50.00               16.83           30
ACT(%) 3.33             -               -               50.00               12.69           30
EMP(%) 8.33             -               -               100.00             26.53           30
OTW(%) 33.67           -               30.00           100.00             24.21           30
DISCOUNT(%) 8.74             -               0.71             85.07               17.66           30
Panel B: Weighting of Valuation Methods
Panel B: IPOs' Pricing Discounts




between fair value estimate and the preliminary offer price, ranged from a state of no 
discount to as high as 85.07% discount offered by of one the sampled IPO firms. 
Descriptive Statistics of the Variables in Hypotheses 4 
Dependent variables. In Table 18, I set forth the three main metrics widely used 
in measuring the forecast accuracy of financial projections provided by the management 
of listed firms in their IPO prospectuses. These three main measures relate to forecast 
error (FE), absolute forecast error (AFE), and the squared forecast error (SQFE). 
Table 18 
Descriptive Statistics of the Dependent Variables in Hypotheses 4 
 
The mean forecast error, which measures the extent to which the management of 
IPO firms had systematically over/underestimated their firms’ earnings forecasts, stood at 
-28.56% (-20.03%, median). The negative sign of the forecasts error depicts that, on an 
average, the listed firms in Ghana have over-forecasted their earnings potentials by as 
much as 28.56%. The absolute forecast error, which measures the relative deviation of 
actual earnings from forecasted earnings, recorded on an average a deviation of 49.62% 
(39.67%, median). This measure, which gives an indication of the extent to which the 
forecasts were close to actual profits in absolute terms, showed that the earnings forecasts 
incorporated in the IPO prospectuses on the GSE had forecast inaccuracies amounting to 
49.62% when compared with the actual earnings of the IPO firms post-issue. The squared 
Variables Mean Min Median Max s.d. n
FE(%) (28.56)          (163.63)        (20.03)          62.45           54.01           26
AFE(%) 49.62           7.54             39.67           163.63         38.26           26




forecasts error widely used as a proxy for measuring investors’ losses as a result of 
forecast inaccuracies, recorded an average of 71.77% (24.02%, median).   
Independent variables. In Table 19, I set forth the descriptive statistics of the 
independent variables that were used to explain the average level of absolute forecast 
error (AFE) observed on the GSE.  
Table 19 
Descriptive Statistics of the Independent Variables in Hypotheses 4 
 
 Using the actual post-issue total assets as a proxy for measuring the sizes of the 
IPO firms, the results of the collected data showed that the average size of the IPO firms 
after their listing on GSE was GH¢1,164.32 million (GH¢85.59 million, median). The 
post-issue retained ownership (OWN) of stocks by the pre-issue owners of the IPO-firms 
averaged 65.35% (65.33%, median). This level of percentage ownership by the pre-IPO 
owners hovered around 20.00% by way of the minimum and 99.55% by way of 
maximum observed retentions on the GSE. The forecasting horizon (HOR), which I 
measured as number of months between prospectuses date and the year-end to which the 
forecasts in the prospectuses pertain, recorded an average of 43.56 months (40.00 
months, median). The minimum forecasting horizon observed on the GSE was 22.00 
months whilst the maximum was 72.00 months. In relation to the age of the IPO firms 
Variables Mean Min Median Max s.d. n
Size (GH¢million) 1,164.32      0.31             85.59           16,488.17        3,487.26      29
Own (%) 65.35           20.00           65.33           99.55               19.47           22
Hor (months) 43.56           22.00           40.00           72.00               13.15           25
Age (years) 27.23           4.00             23.00           51.00               13.28           30
Lev (%) 51.49           4.44             50.45           90.16               28.54           29




(AGE), which I measured as the number of years the firms had been in existence prior to 
their IPO, I found out that the average age of the IPO firms prior to their listing on the 
GSE was 27.23 years (23.00 years, median). The levels of indebtedness of the IPO-firms, 
measured as the percentage of total debt to total assets as recorded in the post-issue 
balance sheet of the IPO firm, showed that the firms at the time of their listing were 
geared/leveraged (LEV) at an average of 51.49% (50.45%, median). The distribution of 
this level of leverage was, however, widely dispersed with the least geared firm recording 
4.44% and the most geared recording 90.16%. The proportion of the financial forecasts in 
the IPO prospectuses of the listed firms on the GSE verified by one of the Big-4 audit 
firms stood at an average of 63.00%.    
Descriptive Statistics of the Variables in Hypotheses 5 
Dependent variables. In Table 20, I set forth the descriptive statistics of the 
discretionary current accruals (DCA), which I used as a proxy for measuring the levels of 
earnings management in the pre- and post-issue financial statements of the listed firms on 
the GSE. Inspired by the work of DeAngelo (1986), I computed this earnings 
management metric as: 
	,; = 	,;(,; + ,;<)/2 −
	,;<(,;< + ,;<)/2                                                     (20) 
Where DCAi,t is the discretionary current accrual of an IPO-firm i, t represents the 
fiscal year relative to the IPO (t = -2, ..., +3), CA represents current accruals and TA 





Descriptive Statistics: Discretionary Current Accruals in Hypotheses 5 
 
To allow for a comparative analysis, I set forth the descriptive statistics of DCA 
to account for the use of accruals 2 years before IPO flotations and 3 years after those 
flotations on the GSE. The average DCA of listed firms on the GSE which stood at -
9.58% (-0.68, median) of total assets 2 years before their IPOs increased to +4.22% 
(+4.60%, median) in the financial year following the IPO. Three years after the IPO, 
however, the average DCA had reduced to -1.40% (-2.93%, median). From these 
statistics, it could be noted that the extent to which the management of IPO firms have 
deployed creative accounting techniques to window-dress or creatively manage the 
earnings of their firms witnessed an increase of 13.80%, (i.e., 9.58+4.22), in the financial 
year following the IPO. This was, however, reduced by 5.62%, (i.e., 4.22+1.4), in the 3 
years following the IPO. To further provide an in-depth understanding of the deployment 
of earnings management, I provide the corresponding percentage changes in the net 
income to total assets as well as net operating cash flow to total assets in Table 21. I have 
also sought to further enhance these comparative analyses, between discretionary current 
accruals (DCA), net income (NI), and cash flows (CF), by providing a graphical 
presentation of their respective averages in Figure 10. From both their respective tables 
Variables Year (-2) Year (-1) Year (0) Year (+1) Year (+2) Year (+3)
Mean (9.58)                  0.66                     4.22               0.36               (8.31)                 (1.40)                  
Median (0.68)                  (1.07)                    4.60               0.58               (1.96)                 (2.93)                  
s.d. 28.78                 26.73                   26.91             16.64             21.20                17.82                 
Minimum (81.66)                (49.05)                  (69.25)           (39.13)            (87.69)               (37.12)                
Maximum 43.81                 96.63                   82.53             27.90             12.20                56.63                 




and the figure, it could be noted that in the years leading to the IPO floatation on the GSE 
both discretionary accruals and net incomes had witnessed increases whilst the cash flows 
for the corresponding years had rather seen decreases. 
Table 21 
Descriptive Statistics of the Net Income and Net Operating Cash Flows 
 
The reverse is rather true for the successive years after the IPO flotations, where 
both the discretionary current accruals and net incomes have rather decreased whilst the 
cash flows have witnessed some increases. The combined effect of these metrics seemed 
to suggest the possibilities of earnings management prior to IPO floatation on the GSE. 
Variables Year (-2) Year (-1) Year (0) Year (+1) Year (+2) Year (+3)
Mean 0.06                   18.83                   6.57               5.53               3.60                  1.70                   
Median 4.27                   1.55                     3.83               3.91               3.80                  3.60                   
s.d. 31.97                 40.33                   16.68             10.68             12.95                17.43                 
Minimum (162.55)             (4.64)                    (11.67)           (16.41)            (43.10)               (59.74)                
Maximum 26.12                 156.77                 83.49             41.98             32.53                27.54                 
n 30.00                 30.00                   29.00             30.00             30.00                28.00                 
Mean 9.31                   6.10                     1.40               12.91             8.95                  11.44                 
Median 4.90                   4.80                     2.45               10.69             6.22                  6.28                   
s.d. 14.17                 12.98                   29.79             19.22             16.52                26.46                 
Minimum (22.33)                (16.44)                  (120.29)         (14.93)            (13.50)               (15.84)                
Maximum 45.95                 41.05                   72.46             84.06             71.80                134.21               
n 28.00                 28.00                   27.00             30.00             30.00                29.00                 
Panel A: Net income





Figure 10. Graphical representation of the means of DCAs, NIs, and CFs 
Independent variables. To, however, subject the above observation to an 
empirical testing, I provide in Table 22 the independent variables that I considered as 
being capable of explaining the observed tendencies of earning management. 
Table 22 
Descriptive Statistics of the Independent Variables in Hypothesis 5 
 
In Panel A of Table 22, I provided the descriptive statistics of the independent 
variables measured in terms of the dummies of “0s” and “1s.” In this regard, for the 
n % n % n % n %
0 11 36.7 4 13.3 11 36.7 21 70
1 19 63.3 26 86.7 19 63.3 9 30
Total 30 100 30 100 30 100 30 100
Mean Min Median Max s.d. n
65.35     20.00    65.34      99.55      19.47    22
Panel B:Variables
ROWN(%)






variable relating to the use of international accounting standards (IAS), I assigned a 
dummy of “1” if the IPO firm’s pre- and post-issue financial statements accorded with 
the international financial reporting standards (IFRSs), otherwise “0”. From Panel A, it 
could be noticed that 63.3% of the sampled IPO firms had their financial statements 
according with the IFRSs whilst 36.7% used the Ghana Accounting Standards (GAS). 
For the variable relating to the extent to which the boards of IPO firms were made up of 
external/non-executive directors (EB) as against executive directors, I assigned a dummy 
variable of “1” if the majority of the pre -and post-IPO board of directors were non-
executive board members, otherwise “0”. From Panel A, it could be noticed that 86.7% of 
the sampled IPO firms had their board been made up of such non-executive directors 
whilst 13.3% of those firms have their boards dominated by their own executives. For the 
variable relating to the independent verification of the financial projections incorporated 
in the prospectuses of the IPO firms (AUD), I assigned a dummy variable of “1” if those 
projections were verified by one of the Big-4 audit firms, otherwise “0”. From Panel A, it 
could be noticed that 63.3% of the sampled IPO firms had their verifications done by one 
of those Big-4 firms whilst 36.7% used other firms that were outside the ambit of the 
Big-4. In measuring the extent to which owners (OWN) were involved in the day-to-
today management of the IPO firms before firms listing on the GSE, I utilized a dummy 
variable of “1” if a firm pre-IPO was managed by the controlling stockholder(s) and “0” 
otherwise. From Panel A, it could be noticed that 30% of the sampled firms had their 
owners involved in their day-to-day management; the remaining 70% did not have such 




retained by pre-IPO owners (ROWN), I used Panel B in presenting the results. From that 
Panel, it could be noticed that the percentage of post-IPO shares retained by pre-IPO 
owners averaged 65.35%. The results in the Panel further revealed that such post-IPO 
share retentions recorded a minimum of 20.00% and a maximum of 99.55% over the 
study period.   
Descriptive Statistics of the Variables in Hypotheses 6 
In Table 23, I set forth the descriptive statistics of both the dependent and 
independent variables in Hypothesis 6. 
Table 23 
Descriptive Statistics of the Variables in Hypothesis 6 
 
Dependent variables. The mean first-day return (R(1st Day)), which is the 
dependent variable in Hypothesis 6, recorded an average of 1.49% (0.63%, median). 
Judging by this percentage average return, the listed firms on the GSE seemed to have 
underpriced their IPOs. This seeming underpricing meant that investors had, on average 
gained GH¢1.31 million (GH¢0.013 million, median) over 20-year period of IPO 
activities on the GSE as was recorded by the MLOT variable. This overall gains, 
however, came with some investors losing as much as GH¢7.97 million as a result of 
overpricing on one of the IPOs. On the IPO that investors recorded most of their gains as 
Variables Mean Min Median Max s.d. n
R(1st Day) (%) 1.49               (50.00)              0.63          60.42           17.56            30
P/V Ratio 0.84               -                   0.92          2.20             0.54              27
BTM Ratio 1.93               0.12                  0.47          18.15           4.03              27
GrowthAIP (%) 39.49             7.25                  29.91        142.20         31.17            26
Accurals (%) 5.18               (39.74)              3.88          71.46           24.90            29
Sales (GH¢million) 247.24           0.15                  43.57        3,572.66      684.14          29
EBIT Margin (%) 15.93             (50.16)              14.49        54.80           23.84            29




a result of underpricing of that IPO amounted to GH¢37.86 million. For my readers to 
best understand these two extremes of IPOs under and overpricing on the GSE, I set the 
year-on-year analysis of the money left on the table (MLOT) in Table 24.The concept of 
‘money left on the table’ holds that underpricing is the excess of the first-day trading 
price over an IPO’s offer price. The greater the underpricing, the lower the gross IPO 
proceeds that accrues to the issuing firms, hence the greater the money those firms and 
their selling shareholders would have “left on the table” for the investors (Chambers & 
Dimson, 2009). IPO flotations on the GSE had resulted in money been left on the table 
for investors, because of the 14 years of IPO activities on the GSE presented in Table 24; 
nine of those years resulted in underpricing with the lowest amount recorded as GH¢0.01 
million in 2002 and the highest recorded in the year 2008 of GH¢38.78 million. The IPO 
flotations on the GSE for the remaining 5 years had, however, witnessed overpricing–the 
excess of IPO offer price over the first-day trading price. If underpricing had been termed 
‘money left on the table,’ then overpricing which is the opposite could also be termed 
‘money taken from the table.’ The lowest amount of money taken from the table–
overpricing–recorded on the GSE was GH¢0.02 million in 1991/2 whilst the highest 





IPO Under/(Over) pricing and Money Left on the Table (MLOT) 
 
Independent variables. Leading the pack of the independent variables that I used 
in explaining the under/(over) priced IPO offering on the GSE, is the price-to-value (P/V) 
ratio. The P/V ratio, which I measured as the ratio of first-day trading price to enterprise 
value of the IPO firm in the year of IPO flotation, recorded an average of 0.84 (0.92, 
median). The relationship between IPO under/(over) pricing and P/V ratio is that those 
IPOs with the lowest P/V ratios should earn the highest first-day returns (Purnanandam & 
Swaminathan, 2004, p. 823). In this regard, I will be able to explain the implications of 
the recorded average of 0.84 after my empirical testing of the above-noted proposition of 






1991/2 3 (0.02)                  (0.01)                   
1994 2 (0.05)                  (0.02)                   
1995 2 0.04                    0.02                     
1996 2 0.28                    0.14                     
1999 1 -                     -                      
2000 1 0.28                    0.28                     
2002 1 0.01                    0.01                     
2003 1 (7.97)                  (7.97)                   
2004 4 38.78                  9.70                     
2005 1 (0.05)                  (0.05)                   
2006 4 0.18                    0.04                     
2007 1 1.54                    1.54                     
2008 4 5.88                    1.47                     
2009 1 -                     -                      
2011 2 0.28                    0.14                     




next variable that I used in explaining the observed under/(over) pricing of IPOs on the 
GSE. The BTM, which I measured as the ratio of book value of equity for the fiscal year 
after the IPO date and the market value of equity arising out of the first-day trading 
prices, recorded an average of 1.93 (0.47 median). The next variable growth (GROWTH) 
measures the percentage growth rate between the sales forecasted in the IPO year and the 
actual sales reported in the pre-IPO year income statements. This variable on the average 
showed that the IPO firms on the GSE had an average forecasted sale of 39.49% 
(29.91%, median) in the year of IPO floatation above the actual sales recorded in their 
pre-IPO income statements. The next variable I considered as worthy of explaining the 
observed under/(over) pricing of IPOs on the GSE is the ratio of accruals to total asset 
(ACCRUALS). This variable showed on the average that listed firms on the GSE had 
5.18% (3.88%, median) of their total assets consisting of elements that are informed by 
accruals accounting. The other two remaining variables I considered were the actual sales 
(SALES) reported by the listed firms in the year of their IPO flotations and the margins 
of those sales that were reported as earnings before interest and tax (EBIT). The average 
sales recorded in the year of IPO flotations was GH¢247.57 million (GH¢43.57 million, 
median) and the average of EBIT margin of this sales was 15.93% (14.49%, median).  
Data Analysis: Hypotheses Testing 
Hypothesis 1: Choice of IPOs’ Valuation Methods 
As I pointed out in both chapters 1 and 3, the hypothesis tested here is:   
H0: The choice of IPO valuation methods by investment bankers in Ghana is not 




H1: The choice of IPO valuation methods by investment bankers in Ghana is 
dependent on firm-specific factors and emerging market factors.  
I also pointed out that this hypothesis was tested using the following binary logit 
model:  
 , 	
 , ,  , 
=  +  +  + 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
 +   + !
+ " + #$
 + +% + 
 + 2 + 
+ 
  + (                                                                                                  (21) 
 To operationalize this model, I considered each of these five categorical 
dependent variables as separate models in their own right. In this regard, I have entered 
each of those variables into the SPSS software as dummies of “0s” and “1s.” For 
example, I have used a dummy variable of “1” if the investment banker used the 
multiples valuation (MULT) for a given IPO-firm and a dummy variable of “0” if the 
banker did not use the multiples valuation (MULT) for that IPO-firm. In entering each of 
the 13 independent variables into each of the binary models, I used a forced entry method 
for the first six independent variables in the equation. These variables accounted for the 
firm-specific factors and given that these same factors were subjected to a similar 
empirical testing by Roosenboom (2007), I forced entered them in Block 1 of the model 
building process. This forced entry method, according to Field (2009), is the default 
method for conducting regression and hence where predictors have already been tested in 
a prior research the forced entry method would be the most appropriate. The remaining 




entered in Block 2 of the model using Forward Stepwise (Likelihood Ratio)–Forward 
LR. This entry method allows the SPSS, the free-hand of adding any of these market-
related independent variables to the model depending on the ability of that variable to 
improve the predictability of the model. By way of detailed example of the analysis that 
can be made of each of the five models, I have provided the binary logit analysis of the 
multiples valuation model (MULT-model) in the following pages, for the rest of the 
models –the DDM-model, the DCF-model, and the OTH-model–I only provided 
summaries of their key results. I constructed no model for EVA valuation method 
because, as was pointed in the descriptive statistics section in this chapter, no IPO on the 
GSE was value and priced using this method.  
 MULT’s binary logistic regression model. As was just noted, I carried 
out each of the binary logistic regression in blocks with (a) Block 0: taking account of no 
independent variable; (b) Block 1: taking account of the six independent variables 
relating to firm-specific factors; and (c) Block 2: taking account of the seven independent 
variables relating to emerging-market factors.  For Block 0, the logistic regression model 
produced as a result of having the constant as the only variable in the equation is as 





MULT’s Binary Logistic Model: Variables in the Equation in Block 0 
 The next important SPSS output my readers ought to bear in mind in Block 0 is 
the classification table and this is shown in Table 26. 
Table 26 
MULT’s Binary Logistic Model: Classification Table in Block 0 
 
This table suggests that if my readers and I presumed to know nothing about our 
independent variables and guessed that an investment banker will be using multiple 
valuation method in his/her valuation of a giving IPO, we will be 50.0% correct most of 
the time. In Block 0, therefore, all the independent variables were treated as ‘variables 
not in the equation.’ The SPSS output to this treatment is as shown in Table 27. 
B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
Step 0 Constant 0.000 .365 0.000 1 1.000 1.000
Variables in the Equation
Not Used Used
Not Used 0 15 0.0





a. Constant is included in the model.










MULT’s Binary Logistic Model: Variables Not in the Equation in Block 0 
This output was intended to enable us know whether the inclusion of any of these 
independent variables will improve the prediction of the model. The model, according to 
the output in Table 27, could be enhanced if the independent variables relating to the 
extent to which the assets of the IPO-firms were assessed to be tangible (AIP), the firm’s 
profitability (PROF), and its future dividend payments (DIV) are added to the constant. 
This is because the inclusion of these variables will be significant, given that each of 
them is shown to have a p-value of less than .05. If the inclusion of any of these variables 
will not have significantly changed the model, then there will not have been a reason to 
continue with the addition of that variable in this analysis. In spite of this assertion, force 
entering all the six firm-specific variables–significant or not–in “Block 1” is necessary 
because the overall significance of all the variables had a p-value of 0.01 which is less 
than .05. This depicts that their interactive effect is significant, and hence their entry will 
improve the predictability of the original model. The result of their entry is as shown in 
the SPSS output in Table 28. 
Score df Sig.
SIZE .585 1 .445
AGE .776 1 .378
AIP 10.916 1 .001
PROF 5.505 1 .019
GROW .000 1 .991
DIV 4.203 1 .040
16.896 6 .010








MULT’s Binary Logistic Model: Classification Table in Block 1 
 
From this output, it could be noted that the inclusion of the firm-specific variables 
had improved the predictive ability of the model by 40%–from 50% to 90%. In spite of 
this seeming improvement in the model’s predictability, one needs to evaluate the model 
fitness and assess whether each of the independent variables included make any 
significant contribution to the model. For the assessment of the overall fitness of the new 
model, one will require the comparison of the log-likelihood (LL) statistics. SPSS, rather 
than report the log-likelihood itself, multiplies the log-likelihood by -2 to give -2LL. For 
the data under consideration, the null hypothesis model–that is the model produced in 
Block 0–had a -2LL of 41.589. The -2LL of the model built in Block 2, however, was 
19.922. This reduction in the -2LL is an indication that the new model is a better 
predictor of the use or non-use of the multiples valuation methods by investment bankers 
on the GSE. As to how better the model predicts the outcome variable, SPSS provides the 
Model Chi Square, which is derived from the likelihood of observing the actual data 
under the assumption that the model that had been fitted is accurate.  
Not Used Used
Not Used 14 1 93.3















MULT’s Logistic Model: Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients in Block 1 
 
The value of the model chi-square statistic works on the principle that the 
difference between -2LL for the best-fitting model and 2LL for the null hypothesis model 
(in which all the b values were set to zero in block 0) is distributed like chi-squared, with 
degrees of freedom equal to the number of predictors; this difference is the Model Chi-
Square that SPSS referred to. For the data under consideration, the model’s chi-square 
was 21.667 (i.e., 41.589-19.992), and this is as shown in Table 29. This reduction is 
significant (χ2(6) = 21.667, p< 0.01), depicting that the addition of the six firm-specific 
independent variables will significantly improve the models ability to predict the use of 
multiples valuation method by the investment bankers on the GSE. In summarizing the 
enhancement in the model in Block 1, the SPSS produces the following output which I 
set forth in Table 30. 
Table 30 
MULT’s Binary Logistic Model: Model Summary in Block 1 
 
Chi-square df Sig.
Step 21.667 6 .001
Block 21.667 6 .001
Mode 21.667 6 .001
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients
Step 1
-2 Log likelihood Cox & Snell R Square Nagelkerke R Square
1 19.922a .514 .686






Although there is no analogous statistic in logistic regression that close to the 
coefficient of determination R2 in linear regression, the SPSS provides some 
approximations of the R2 through the above-noted output. The Cox and Snell’s R-Square 
attempts to imitate linear regressions’ R-Square based on ‘likelihood,’ but its maximum 
can be (and is usually) less than 1.0, making it difficult to interpret. Here it is indicating 
that the logistic regression model explains 51.4% of the variation in the dependent 
variable–the use of multiples valuation method. The Nagelkerke modification ranges 
from 0 to 1 and is, therefore, considered as a more reliable measure of the relationship. 
Nagelkerke’s R2 will normally be higher than the Cox and Snell’s test, and it is the most-
reported of the R-squared estimates (Burns & Burns, 2008). In our case it is .686, 
indicating a strong relationship of 68.6% between the predictors and the outcome variable 
under consideration. To be double sure about the fitness of the new model, SPSS also 
provides an alternative to the chi-square model called the Hosmer and Lemeshow test 
(i.e., H-L test for short). This test divides subjects into ten ordered groups of subjects and 
then compares the number in the each group (observed) to the number predicted by the 
logistic regression model (predicted). These ten ordered groups for the data under 
consideration is as shown in Table 31.The ten ordered groups created based on their 
estimated probability; those with estimated probability below 0.1 form one group, and so 
on, up to those with probability 0.9 to 1.0. Each of these categories gets divided into two 
groups based on the actual observed outcome variable (‘use’ and ‘not use’ of the 
multiples valuation method). The expected frequencies for each of the cells obtained 





MULT’ Binary Logistic Model: Contingency Table H-L Test in Block 1 
 
The probability (p) value is computed from the chi-square distribution with 8 
degrees of freedom to test the fitness of the logistic regression model. If the H-L 
goodness-of-fit test statistic is greater than .05, as it should be for well-fitting models, we 
fail to reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference between observed and model-
predicted values, implying that the model’s estimates fit the data at an acceptable level. 
That is, well-fitting models show non-significance on the H-L goodness-of-fit test. This 
desirable outcome of non-significance indicates that the model prediction does not 
significantly differ from the observed. For the data under consideration, the H-L 
goodness-of-fit test is as shown in Table 32. 
Observed Expected Observed Expected
1 3 2.941 0 .059 3
2 3 2.828 0 .172 3
3 2 2.578 1 .422 3
4 2 2.425 1 .575 3
5 3 2.126 0 .874 3
6 1 1.272 2 1.728 3
7 1 .557 2 2.443 3
8 0 .189 3 2.811 3
9 0 .064 3 2.936 3
10 0 .020 3 2.980 3
Contingency Table for Hosmer and Lemeshow Test







MULT’s Binary Logistic Model: Hosmer and Lemeshow Test in Block 1 
 
This table indicated that the H-L goodness-of-fit test is non-significant (χ2(8) = 
3.606, p = 0.891) and this is indicative of the fact that the model is predicting the real 
world data fairly well. In view of this high predictive ability of the firm-specific 
variables, I set in Table 33 the parameters of the model for Block 1: 
Table 33 
MULT’s Binary Logistic Model: Variables in the Equation in Block 1 
 
In proceeding to make further claims about the predictive power of the variables 
provided in the table, it is important to point out that the stepwise entry of the market-
related variables into the model building process in Block 2 resulted in none of those 
variables being added to the model. 
 In view of this, one can proceed with the model building based on the 
consideration of only firm-specific variables. In so proceeding, I will want at this point to 
illustrate the computation of the odds ratios for use of multiples valuation method by an 
Chi-square df Sig.
1 3.606 8 .891
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test
Step
Lower Upper
SIZE .000 .000 .037 1 .848 1.000 .999 1.001
AGE .079 .052 2.318 1 .128 1.083 .977 1.199
AIP -.072 .030 5.673 1 .017*** .931 .877 .987
PROF .064 .060 1.142 1 .285 1.066 .948 1.199
GROW -.003 .020 .026 1 .871 .997 .959 1.036
DIV .068 .046 2.206 1 .138 1.070 .979 1.171
Constant -2.789 2.425 1.322 1 .250 .061
Step 1a
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: SIZE, AGE, AIP, PROF, GROW, DIV.
Variables in the Equation





investment banker in the valuation of a given firm’s IPO on the GSE. In computing the 
P(MULT), Table 33 becomes even more important and hence I will, at this juncture, 
explain some of its elements. The first of these elements is the B-value which is the same 
as the b-value in linear regression in that the value represents the change in the logit of 
the dependent variable with a unit change in the independent variable. The logit of the 
dependent variable is simply the natural logarithm of the odd of MULT occurring. These 
odds are the exponential values of B as shown in the table. The second important element 
in the output is the Wald statistic which has a chi-square distribution and enables us to 
determine whether the B coefficient for each of the predictor variable is significantly 
different from zero. The next important element is the Exp(B) column in the table. The 
Exp(B) presents the extent to which raising the corresponding measure by one unit 
influences the odds ratio and hence the Exp(B) interpreted in terms of the change in odds. 
If the value of Exp(B) exceeds 1 then the odds of an outcome occurring increase; if the 
value is less than 1, any increase in the predictor variable leads to a drop in the odds of an 
outcome occurring. From the variables under consideration, it could be noted that, with 
the exception of the AIP, none of the remaining six firm-specific variables had values for 
the Wald statistics that were significant in that they all report p-values greater than .05. In 
contrast, however, the Wald statistics for the AIP (Wald = 5.673, p < .017) significantly 
predict the use of MULT in the valuation of a given firms IPO on the GSE. The Exp(B) 
value for this AIP variable (exp B = .931, CI0.95 = .877, .987) indicate that if the value 
of AIP goes up by 1, then the odds of an investment banker using MULT reduces because 




0.987, so one can be confident at a level of 95% that the value of Exp(B) in the 
population for the AIP variable lies somewhere between these two values. The Exp(B) 
values of variables such as SIZE, AGE, PROF, and DIV–in spite of their statistical 
insignificance–are all greater than 1, indicating that a unit change in the value of any one 
of them will increase the odds of an investment banker using the MULT valuation 
methods. The Exp(B) value of the variable GROW was like that of the AIP and hence, 
one unit increase in the observed value of GROW rather reduces the odds of MULT 
occurring.  
In summing up on whether or not the use of MULT is dependent on both the firm-
specific and market-related factors one can conclude that the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected in favor of the alternate. In spite of this failure to reject the null hypothesis, 
however, the resulting model’s ability to predict the odds of MULT occurring is so strong 
that it will not be out of place to claim that there is a practical, not statistical, argument 
that the choice of MULT as a valuation metric by investment bankers on the GSE is 
dependent on, at least, the six firm-specific factors. Proceeding on practical grounds, 
therefore, I can now turn to the computation of the odds ratio for use of MULT valuation 
methods on the GSE. In carrying out such calculations, Field (2009) admonished the use 
of the following steps: 
Step 1: State the logistic regression equation from the final model: 





 =  +  +  +  + 
 + 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
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 + #$
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  +  (                                                                                                  (23) 
Step 2: Use the values of βi values from the SPSS output in Table 33 and the Xi 
values for each IPO-firms under consideration to compute their βi Xi values. I have 
provided the computation of these values as part of the odds ratios’ computations for each 
of the IPO firm in Table 34. 
Step 3: Place the values of βiXi into the logistic regression equation and the odds 
ratio’s equations stated in Step 1, remembering to include the values of constant (βo) and 
assuming the error term (εi) to be zero. These computations are shown in the Table 34 as 
well. By way of an illustration, however, using the value for an IPO-firm with the GSE 
Listing Code ‘CAL’, I set forth the computations as required in this step as follows: 
 =  −2.79 + 0.00 + 1.19 − 0.14 + 2.06 − 0.10 + 2.93 = 2.61                         (24) 
() = 11 + R<.! = 0.93057                                                                                       (25) 
Therefore, for this IPO-firm there was a 93.06% chance that an investment banker 





MULT’s Binary Logistic Model: Computation of the Odds Ratios 
 
DDM’s binary logistic regression model. As I pointed out already, for each of 
the remaining binary logit models, I will only present the key summaries of their results. 
In running the model in SPSS, I noted that 96.7% of the model could be predicted by its 
constant (βo). Force entering the six independent firm-specific variables in Block 1 
revealed that the model’s predictive ability could be improved to a 100.0%. This was so 
because the model’s -2LL, which was 8.769 in Block 0 had reduced to 0.000 in Block 1. 
GSE Listing 
Code
βiXi βiXi βiXi βiXi βiXi βiXi Ʃ(βiXi) βo MULT i P (MULT i ) 
ACI -       1.98        (5.82)      0.17        (0.09)     -       (3.77)     (2.79)      (6.56)          0.14              
AGA -       3.95        (5.79)      -          -        -       (1.84)     (2.79)      (4.63)          0.96              
ALW -       2.21        (4.59)      0.72        (0.07)     1.20     (0.53)     (2.79)      (3.32)          3.50              
AYRTN -       3.24        (2.33)      1.02        (0.06)     2.04     3.91       (2.79)      1.12           75.49            
BOPP -       3.00        (5.30)      1.75        (0.07)     2.04     1.42       (2.79)      (1.37)          20.25            
CAL -       1.19        (0.14)      2.06        (0.10)     2.39     5.38       (2.79)      2.60           93.06            
CLYD -       1.19        (2.12)      1.15        (0.12)     -       0.09       (2.79)      (2.70)          6.30              
CML -       1.74        (4.54)      (0.55)       (0.09)     -       (3.45)     (2.79)      (6.23)          0.20              
CPC -       1.74        (0.81)      0.06        (0.12)     0.59     1.47       (2.79)      (1.32)          21.02            
EBG -       1.34        (0.20)      1.22        (0.05)     3.57     5.89       (2.79)      3.10           95.69            
EGL -       1.26        (1.48)      0.91        (0.03)     4.01     4.67       (2.79)      1.88           86.72            
ETI -       1.82        (0.27)      -          -        -       1.55       (2.79)      (1.24)          22.46            
GCB -       3.40        (0.21)      2.45        (0.05)     2.04     7.63       (2.79)      4.84           99.21            
GGBL -       4.03        (5.25)      0.59        (0.06)     3.38     2.69       (2.79)      (0.10)          47.59            
GOIL -       3.71        (1.79)      0.13        (0.11)     1.59     3.54       (2.79)      0.75           67.87            
GSR -       1.90        (4.36)      -          -        -       (2.47)     (2.79)      (5.26)          0.52              
GWEB -       1.82        (3.65)      0.89        (0.12)     2.04     0.98       (2.79)      (1.81)          14.09            
HFC -       1.50        (0.23)      4.08        (0.14)     1.95     7.16       (2.79)      4.37           98.75            
MLC -       1.90        (2.98)      0.54        (0.08)     1.70     1.07       (2.79)      (1.72)          15.15            
PBC -       1.50        (3.98)      0.41        (0.02)     1.57     (0.52)     (2.79)      (3.31)          3.53              
PKL -       2.84        (4.35)      (0.34)       (0.17)     3.96     1.94       (2.79)      (0.85)          29.91            
SCB -       1.66        (0.09)      2.75        (0.19)     4.14     8.26       (2.79)      5.47           99.58            
SIC -       3.63        (1.84)      0.93        (0.14)     2.71     5.30       (2.79)      2.51           92.49            
SOGEGH -       1.58        (0.34)      2.28        (0.05)     3.40     6.87       (2.79)      4.08           98.34            
SPL -       3.48        (0.68)      1.35        (0.08)     2.04     6.12       (2.79)      3.33           96.54            
SWL -       1.42        (2.47)      1.53        (0.43)     1.70     1.75       (2.79)      (1.04)          26.16            
TLW -       0.71        (2.56)      -          -        -       (1.85)     (2.79)      (4.6342)      0.96              
TOTAL -       3.56        (1.21)      0.21        (0.34)     5.53     7.74       (2.79)      4.95           99.30            
TRANSOL -       0.32        (2.10)      0.23        (0.24)     2.93     1.14       (2.79)      (1.65)          16.11            
UTB -       0.95        (0.31)      1.35        (0.07)     1.15     3.07       (2.79)      0.28           57.04            




This reduction, was however, not significant (χ2(6) = 8.769, p > 0.01), depicting that the 
addition of the six firm-specific independent variables had not significantly improved the 
models ability to predict the use of discounted dividend valuation method (DDM) by the 
investment bankers on the GSE. This insignificance of the independent variables was 
further buttressed by the Cox and Snell’s R-Square whose result of 0.253 indicates that 
those variables could only help in predicting the outcome variable by only 25.3%.The 
stepwise entry of the seven market-related variables into the Block 2 returned no results 
indicating that the addition of any of those variables would not make any significant 
change to the model produced in Block 1. In summing up on whether or not the use of 
DDM is dependent on both the firm-specific and market-related factors one can conclude 
that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected in favour of the alternate. 
DCF’s binary logistic regression model. In running the DCF-model, I found out 
that 93.3% of the model could be predicted by its constant (βo). Entering the six 
independent variables in Block 1 revealed that the model’s predictive ability could not be 
improved by even a single percentage and hence still remained at 93.3%. This was so 
because the model’s -2LL which was 14.696 in Block 0 reduced only by 0.770 to 13.925 
in Block 1. This reduction was also not significant (χ2(6) = 0.770, p> 0.01), depicting that 
the addition of the six firm-specific independent variables had not significantly improved 
the models ability to predict the use of DCF valuation method by the investment bankers 
on the GSE. This lack of significance of the independent variables was further buttressed 
by the Cox and Snell’s R-Square whose result of 0.025 indicates that those variables 




the model is also worse when measured with Nagelkerke’s R2 whose result was 0.065 
which is indicative of the fact that the six independent variables were capable of 
predicting the outcome variable by only 6.50%. In view of this lack of predictive ability 
of these six independent variables, the stepwise entry of the seven market-related 
variables returned no results. In summing up on whether or not the use of DCF valuation 
method is dependent on both the firm-specific and market-related factors one can 
conclude that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected in favour of the alternate. 
OTH’s binary logistic regression model. The results relating to this model 
showed that 83.3% of the model could be predicted by its constant (βo). Entering the six 
firm-specific independent variables in Block 1 revealed that the model’s predictive ability 
could be improved to 86.7%. This was so because the model’s -2LL which was 27.034 in 
Block 0 had reduced to 18.315 in Block 1. This reduction, was however, not significant 
(χ2(6) = 8.719, p> 0.01), depicting that the addition of the six firm-specific independent 
variables in Block 1 had not significantly improved the models ability to predict the use 
of other valuations methods (OTH) by the investment bankers on the GSE. This 
insignificance of the independent variables is further buttressed by the Cox and Snell’s R-
Square whose result of 0.252 indicating that the addition of those independent variables 
to the constant in Block 1 could only help in predicting the outcome variable by only 
25.2%. The stepwise entry of the market-variable saw the SPSS adding only one of such 
variables–GDP–in Block 2. This addition increased the model’s predictive ability to 
100%. This was so because; the model’s -2LL which was 18.315 in Block 1 further 




depicting that the addition of this GDP variables in Block 2 had significantly improved 
the models ability to predict the use of other valuations methods (OTH) by the investment 
bankers on the GSE. This improvement was further buttressed by the Cox and Snell’s R-
Square whose result had transformed from 0.252 in Block 1 to 0.594 indicating that the 
addition of that independent variable to the already existing constant and the six firm-
specific variables in Block 2 had helped in increasing the prediction of the outcome 
variable to 59.4%. In spite of this improved predictive ability of the variables in Block 2, 
none of those variables seemed to have had a significant Wald statistic as can be seen 
from Table 35. 
Table 35 
OTH’s Binary Logistic Model: Variables in the Equation in Block 2 
 
In summing up on whether or not the choice of OTH valuation methods are 
dependent on both the firm-specific and market-related factors one can conclude that the 
null hypothesis cannot be rejected in favour of the alternate. 
Hypothesis 2: Fair Value Estimates of IPOs 
In this section, I tested the following:   
Lower Upper
SIZE .034 55.644 .000 1 1.000 1.035 .000 2.391E+47
AGE .321 223.306 .000 1 .999 1.379 .000 1.652E+190
AIP -.012 717.337 .000 1 1.000 .988 0.000
PROF -.143 1366.066 .000 1 1.000 .867 0.000
GROW -.036 259.862 .000 1 1.000 .964 .000 1.509E+221
DIV -1.986 615.476 .000 1 .997 .137 0.000
GDP -38.098 12444.664 .000 1 .998 .000 0.000
Constant 295.046 85220.291 .000 1 .997 1.371E+128
Step 1a
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: GDP.
Variables in the Equation





H0: The weight assigned to the value estimate of each valuation method in 
determining the fair value estimate of an IPO does not depend on firm-specific factors 
and emerging market factors. 
H1: The weight assigned to the value estimate of each valuation method in 
determining the fair value estimate of an IPO depends on firm-specific factors and 
emerging market factors. 
I also pointed out that this hypothesis will be tested using the following ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regression model:  
   , 	
 , 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To operationalize this model, I considered each of the five dependent variables as 
separate models in their own right. In this regard, I have entered each of those variables 
into the SPSS as separate dependent variables resulting in the creation of five different 
OLS models – MULT-Model, DDM-Model, DCF-Model, EVA-Model, and OTH-Model. 
As was the case with the models in Hypothesis 1, I entered each of the 13 independent 
variables into each of the OLS models using forced entry method for the first six firm-
specific independent variables in the each of the model. These variables I forced entered 
into Block 1 because Roosenboom (2007) subjected similar variables to empirical testing 
on the French IPO-Market. This forced entry method, according to Field (2009), is the 




tested in a prior research the forced entry method would be the most appropriate. I 
entered the remaining seven independent variables relating to emerging-market factors n 
Block 2 of the model using a stepwise method. This method of entry, as was noted 
before, allows the SPSS the free-hand of adding any of these market-related independent 
variables to the model depending on the ability of that variable to improve the 
predictability of the model.  
MULTW’s OLS regression model. I provided a summary of the resulting 
regression model for the MULTW in Table 36. From the Table, it could be noted that the 
regression model accounted for 43.8% of the variance in the assignment of weight to the 
multiple valuation methods by the investment bankers on the GSE. This level of the 
models prediction is significant at F (6, 23) = 2.993, and p< .05. 
Table 36 
MULTHW’s OLS Regression Model: Overall Model Summary 
 
 In coming out with this overall level of significance, SPSS had excluded 
all the market-related variables from the model, depicting that the addition of any of 
those variables did not significantly improve the overall predictability of the model. In 
this regard, the level of significance and the predictive relationship observed in the 
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2
Sig. F 
Change
1 .662a .438 .292 15.41623 .438 2.993 6 23 .026 2.006
a. Predictors: (Constant), DIV (%), PROF (%), SIZE (GHS'million), GROW (%), AGE (Years), AIP (%)
b. Dependent Variable: MULTW (%)
Model Summaryb
Model R R Square
Adjusted R 
Square








overall model related only to the six firm-specific variables. In spite of the overall level 
of significance, it is important for me to delve into the respective predictability of each of 
the individual firm-specific variable constituting of the model.  
Table 37 
MULTW’s OLS Regression Model: Table of Coefficients 
 
From this table, it would be realized that of the six firm-specific variables only the 
tangibility of IPO-firms’ assets (AIP) variable had a significant predictive ability in 
explaining the weights that are assigned to the multiples valuation methods when such 
valuation methods are used by investment bankers on the GSE. The AIP variable is 
significant because it was the only variable with a p-value that was less than .05. The 
variable, however, was negatively correlated with such assignment of weight because its 
coefficient/beta was -0.334. This negative relationship presupposed that the greater an 
IPO-firms assets tangibility, the less weight the investment bankers assign to the use of 
multiples valuation methods in the valuation of the IPO of such a firm. Giving the overall 
level of significance of the model, one can conclude that the weight assigned to the 
multiples valuation method (MULT) is dependent on the firm-specific variables and 
Standardized 
Coefficients





(Constant) 11.415 11.650 .980 .337 -12.686 35.515
SIZE 
(GHS'million)
-.001 .001 -.083 -.512 .614 -.003 .002 .935 1.069
AGE (Years) .166 .237 .121 .700 .491 -.325 .658 .824 1.214
AIP (%) -.334 .132 -.487 -2.526 .019 -.607 -.060 .656 1.524
PROF (%) .206 .221 .170 .933 .360 -.251 .664 .734 1.363
GROW (%) -.036 .104 -.058 -.350 .729 -.251 .179 .903 1.108
DIV (%) .281 .199 .239 1.411 .172 -.131 .693 .852 1.174
1











hence the null hypothesis can be rejected in favour of the alternate hypothesis. In this 
regard summarizing the results of the regression model from the coefficient table yields: 
  =  +  +  +  + 
 +   + !   (27) 
  = 11.415 − 0.001() + 0.166 − 0.334() + 0.206(
)
− 0.036( ) + 0.281()                                                                 (28) 
For the model to be considered as being capable of generalization, the model, like 
any other multiple regression models, will have to fulfill assumptions of 
multicollinearity, homoscedasticity, autocorrelation, and normality. In relation to the 
multicollinearity assumption, the regression model could be said to violate such an 
assumption when there is a high correlation between two or more of the firm-specific 
predictor variables. According to Field (2009), multicollinearity poses a challenge to 
multiple regressions because as collinearity increases (a) so does the standard errors 
associated with the β coefficients thereby making the βs less trustworthy; (b) the size of R 
(i.e., the measure of correlation between predictors and the outcome) is limited or 
reduced; and (c) the relative importance of each of the individual predictors becomes less 
noticeable. The SPSS produces various collinearity diagnostics of which the two most 
common are the variance inflation factor (VIF) and its reciprocal called the tolerance 
statistics. The general rules of thumb are that (a) if any of the VIF values is greater than 
10; and/or (b) if the average VIF is substantially greater than 1 then there will be a cause 
for concern and the regression model will be biased (Field, 2009). In relation to the 




problem and hence a sign of multicollinearity (Field, 2009). For the regression model 
under consideration, it would be noted from Table 37 that the VIFs for all the six firm-
specific variables were less than 10 and their average VIF was 1.242 and this is not 
substantially greater than 1. The tolerance statistics for each of variables were all well 
above 0.02, and hence one can safely conclude that there is no collinearity among the 
predictor variables. In relation to the homoscedasticity assumption, Field pointed out that 
“at each level of the predictor variables, the variance of the residuals should be constant” 
(p. 220) and that if they are not, they will be said to be heteroscedastic. To assess whether 
the homoscedasticity assumption, Field admonishes the use of a scatter plot of ZRSID 





Figure 11. Plot of *ZRESID against *ZPRED for the MULTW’s OLS Regression Model 
When data is exhibiting homoscedasticity, Field (2009) further pointed out the 
scatter plot should show “a random array of dots evenly dispersed around zero” (p. 247). 
In other words, the scatter plot should show a random pattern and should not funnel out. 
For the scatter plot shown in Figure 11, it is obvious that the data is not showing a 
distinct funneling but rather a random pattern, indicating that the variance of the residuals 
exhibit homoscedasticity. For the autocorrelation assumption, Field pointed out that “for 
any two observations, the residual terms should be uncorrelated (or independent)” (p. 
220). If the residuals are not independent, they will be said to be auto-correlated or serial-
correlated. The Durbin-Watson test statistic is usually relied upon to assess the existence 
of autocorrelation or lack of independence of errors. This test statistic can vary between 0 
and 4 with a value of 2 depicting that the residuals are uncorrelated. A value greater than 
2 indicates a negative correlation, whereas a value below 2 indicates a positive 
correlation (Field, 2009). For the data under consideration, the Durbin-Watson statistic 
was 2.006 depicting that the residuals are not auto/serially correlated. In relation to the 
normality assumption, Figure 12 is testament to the fact that the data under consideration 
is normally distributed. In view of the overall significance of the model and its 
accordance with the various assumptions of multiple regressions, I can confidently say 
that the weight assigned by investment bankers on the GSE to use of multiples valuation 
methods in IPO valuation is dependent upon the six firm-specific variables and hence the 





Figure 12. Histogram of normally distributed residuals for the MULTW’s OLS Model    
DDMW’s OLS regression model. A summary of the resulting regression model 
for the DDMW is provided in Table 38. From the Table, it could be noted that the 
regression model accounted for only 14.6% of the variance in the assignment of weight to 
the discounted dividend valuation method by the investment bankers on the GSE. This 
level of the models prediction was not significant at F (6, 23) = 0.653, and p> .05. In 
coming out with this overall level of insignificance, SPSS had excluded all the market-
related variables from the model, depicting that the addition of any of those variables did 





DDMW’s OLS Regression Model: Overall Model Summary 
 
In spite of this overall level of insignificance, it is important for me to delve into 
the respective predictability of each of the individual firm-specific variable in the 
constituting the model.  
Table 39 
DDMW’s OLS Regression Model: Table of Coefficients 
 
From Table 39, it would be realized that none of the six firm-specific variables 
had a significant predictive ability in explaining the weights that are assigned to the 
discounted dividend valuation method when such valuation methods are used by 
investment bankers on the GSE. This was because all variables had a p-value that was 
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2
Sig. F 
Change
1 .382a .146 -.077 5.68500 .146 .653 6 23 .687 1.929
b. Dependent Variable: DDMW (%)
Model Summary
b
Model R R Square
Adjusted R 
Square





a. Predictors: (Constant), DIV (%), PROF (%), SIZE (GHS'million), GROW (%), AGE (Years), AIP (%)
Standardized 
Coefficients





(Constant) 1.860 4.296 .433 .669 -7.028 10.747
SIZE (GHS'million) 6.125E-05 .000 .025 .126 .901 -.001 .001 .935 1.069
AGE (Years) .142 .088 .344 1.620 .119 -.039 .323 .824 1.214
AIP (%) -.066 .049 -.323 -1.358 .188 -.167 .035 .656 1.524
PROF (%) -.021 .082 -.059 -.262 .796 -.190 .147 .734 1.363
GROW (%) -.011 .038 -.059 -.291 .773 -.090 .068 .903 1.108
DIV (%) -.051 .073 -.145 -.694 .495 -.203 .101 .852 1.174












greater than .05. For these reasons of the overall and individual levels of insignificance of 
the model, one can conclude that the weight assigned to the discounted dividend 
valuation method (DDM) is not dependent on both the firm-specific and market-related 
variables; hence the null hypothesis cannot be rejected in favour of the alternate 
hypothesis. In spite of failure to reject the null hypothesis, the resulting insignificant 
model could be summarized from the above coefficients in Table 39 as follows: 
  =  +  +  +  + 
 +   + !     (29) 
  = 1.860 − 0.00006125() + 0.142() − 0.066()
− 0.021(
) − 0.011( ) − 0.051()                                (30) 
In assessing the model’s compliance with the various assumptions of linear 
regression, it could first be noted from Table 39 that the VIFs for all the six firm-specific 
variables were less than 10 and their average VIF which stood at 0.837 was less than 1. 
The tolerance statistics for each of variables were all well above 0.02, and hence one can 
safely conclude that there is no collinearity among the predictor variables. In relation to 
the homoscedasticity assumption, the scatter plot of ZRSID against ZPRED for the model 





Figure 13. Plot of *ZRESID against *ZPRED for the DDMW’s OLS Regression Model 
From this histogram plot in Figure 13, it could be noted that the data is not 
showing a random pattern but rather a distinct funneling, indicating that the variance of 
the residuals exhibit heteroscedasticity and hence the assumption of homoscedasticity is 
violated by the model. For the autocorrelation assumption, the Durbin-Watson statistic is 
1.929 depicting that the residuals are somewhat not auto/serially correlated and hence the 
model has accorded with the assumption of autocorrelation. In relation to the normality 





Figure 14. Histogram of normally distributed residuals for the DDMW’s OLS Model  
In view of the overall non-significance of the model and its violations of three out 
four of the most critical assumptions of linear regression, I cannot help but to confidently 
say that the weight assigned by investment bankers on the GSE to the use of dividend 
discounted valuation method in IPO valuations is not dependent upon any of the 
hypothesized firm-specific and market-related variables and hence the null hypothesis 
cannot be rejected in favour of the alternate. 
DCFW’s OLS regression model. The summary of the resulting regression 
models for the DCFW are provided in Table 40. From the Table, it could be noted that 
two models have resulted from the forced entry of the six-firm specific variables in Block 




Model 1 accounted for only 16.3% of the variance in the assignment of weight to the 
discounted cash flow valuation method by the investment bankers on the GSE. This level 
of the model’s prediction was not significant at F (6, 23) = 0.744, and p> .05. Model 2, 
on the other hand, accounted for as much as 46.9% of the variance in the assignment of 
weight to the discounted cash flow valuation method by the investment bankers on the 
GSE. This level of the model’s prediction was significant at F (6, 22) = 12.695, and p< 
.05.   
Table 40 
DCFW’s OLS Regression Model: Overall Model Summary 
 
In coming out with this overall level of significance in model 2, however, SPSS 
had excluded all the market-related variables from the model with the exception of the 
GDP variable, depicting that the addition of the GDP variable had a significant effect in 
transforming an otherwise insignificant model in Block 1 into a significant model in 
Block 2 and thereby improved the overall predictability of the model. In spite of this 
overall level of significance of the model 2, it is important for me to delve into the 
respective predictability of each of the individual firm-specific and the additional market-
related variable in constituting the model in Block 2.  
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2
Sig. F 
Change
1 .403a .163 -.056 20.16843 .163 .744 6 23 .620
2 .685b .469 .300 16.42117 .306 12.695 1 22 .002 1.943
a. Predictors: (Constant), DIV (%), PROF (%), SIZE (GHS'million), GROW (%), AGE (Years), AIP (%)
b. Predictors: (Constant), DIV (%), PROF (%), SIZE (GHS'million), GROW (%), AGE (Years), AIP (%), GPD (%)
c. Dependent Variable: DCFW (%)
Model Summaryc
Model R R Square
Adjusted R 
Square









DCFW’s OLS Regression Model: Table of Coefficients 
 
From the Table 41, it would be realized that none of the six firm-specific 
variables had a significant predictive ability in explaining the weights that are assigned to 
the discounted dividend valuation method when such valuation methods are used by 
investment bankers on the GSE. This was because all variables had a p-value that was 
greater than .05. In spite of this, however, the only market-related variable –GDP–had a 
significant predictive ability in that it had a p-value that was less than .05. For this reason 
of the overall level of model significance despite the individual level of insignificance on 
the part of the firm-specific variables, one can conclude that the weight assigned to the 
discounted cash flow dividend valuation method (DCF) is dependent on both the six 
firm-specific variables and one of the market-related variables–the GDP, hence the null 
hypothesis should be rejected in favour of the alternate hypothesis. In view of this 
Standardized 
Coefficients





(Constant) 47.124 15.241 3.092 .005 15.594 78.653
SIZE (GHS'million) .000 .002 -.056 -.285 .778 -.004 .003 .935 1.069
AGE (Years) -.323 .311 -.218 -1.039 .310 -.965 .320 .824 1.214
AIP (%) .219 .173 .298 1.266 .218 -.139 .576 .656 1.524
PROF (%) -.038 .289 -.029 -.130 .897 -.636 .561 .734 1.363
GROW (%) .164 .136 .242 1.207 .240 -.117 .445 .903 1.108
DIV (%) -.062 .261 -.049 -.236 .815 -.601 .477 .852 1.174
(Constant) 110.787 21.755 5.093 .000 65.671 155.904
SIZE (GHS'million) .002 .002 .223 1.250 .225 -.001 .005 .755 1.324
AGE (Years) -.219 .255 -.148 -.859 .399 -.747 .309 .813 1.230
AIP (%) .210 .141 .286 1.490 .151 -.082 .501 .656 1.525
PROF (%) -.182 .239 -.140 -.763 .453 -.678 .313 .713 1.403
GROW (%) .052 .115 .077 .455 .654 -.186 .291 .836 1.197
DIV (%) -.210 .216 -.166 -.970 .343 -.658 .239 .820 1.219
GPD (%) -10.693 3.001 -.669 -3.563 .002 -16.917 -4.469 .684 1.462
1
2











rejection of the null hypothesis, the resulting significant model could be summarized 
from the above coefficients in Table 41 as follows: 
	
  =  +  + () +  + 
 +   + !
+ !                                                                                                             (31) 
	
  = 110.787 + 0.002() − 0.219() + 0.210() + 0.182(
)
+ 0.052( ) − 0.210() − 10.693()                                 (32) 
In assessing the model’s compliance with the various assumptions of linear 
regression, it could first be noted from Table 41 that the VIFs for all the six firm-specific 
variables and the one market-related variable were less than 10 and their average VIF 
which stood at 1.337 and this was not substantially greater than 1. The tolerance statistics 
for each of variables were all well above 0.02, and hence one can safely conclude that 
there is no collinearity among the predictor variables. In relation to the homoscedasticity 
assumption, the scatter plot of ZRSID against ZPRED for the model is as shown in 
Figure 15. From this histogram plot, it could be noted that the data is showing a random 
pattern rather than any form of distinct funneling, indicating that the variance of the 





Figure 15. Plot of *ZRESID against *ZPRED for the DDMW’s OLS Regression Model 
For the autocorrelation assumption, the Durbin-Watson statistic is 1.943 depicting 
that the residuals are somewhat not auto/serially correlated and hence the model has also 
accorded with the assumption of autocorrelation. In relation to the normality assumption, 





Figure 16. Histogram of normally distributed residuals for the DCFW’s OLS Model  
In view of the overall significance of the model and its accordance with all of the 
most important assumptions of linear regression, I safely say that the weight assigned by 
investment bankers on the GSE to the use of dividend discounted valuation method in 
IPO valuations is dependent upon the six hypothesized firm-specific and GDP as a 
market-related variable and hence the null hypothesis should be rejected in favour of the 
alternate. 
OTHW’s OLS regression model. I have provided a summary of the resulting 
regression model for the OTHW in Table 42. From the Table, it could be noted that the 
regression model accounted for only 13.1% of the variance in the assignment of weight to 





OTHW’s OLS Regression Model: Overall Model Summary 
 
This level of the model’s prediction was not significant at F (6, 23) = 0.653, and 
p> .05. In coming out with this overall level of insignificance, SPSS had excluded all the 
market-related variables from the model, depicting that the addition of any of those 
variables did not also significantly improve the overall predictability of the model. In 
spite of this overall level of insignificance, it is important for me to delve into the 
respective predictability of each of the individual firm-specific variable in the 
constitution of the model.  
Table 43 
OTHW-model’s OLS Regression: Table of Coefficients 
 
From Table 43, it would be realized that none of the six firm-specific variables 
had a significant predictive ability in explaining the weights that are assigned to the other 
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2
Sig. F 
Change
1 .362a .131 -.096 25.48293 .131 .577 6 23 .745 2.048
a. Predictors: (Constant), DIV (%), PROF (%), SIZE (GHS'million), GROW (%), AGE (Years), AIP (%)
b. Dependent Variable: OTHW (%)
Model Summaryb
Model R R Square
Adjusted R 
Square












(Constant) 39.602 19.258 2.056 .051 -.235 79.440
SIZE (GHS'million) .001 .002 .102 .507 .617 -.003 .006 .935 1.069
AGE (Years) .014 .393 .008 .037 .971 -.798 .826 .824 1.214
AIP (%) .181 .218 .199 .829 .415 -.270 .632 .656 1.524
PROF (%) -.147 .366 -.091 -.403 .691 -.904 .609 .734 1.363
GROW (%) -.117 .172 -.139 -.679 .504 -.472 .239 .903 1.108
DIV (%) -.168 .329 -.108 -.512 .614 -.850 .513 .852 1.174
1











valuation methods. This was because all the variables had a p-value that was greater than 
.05. For these reasons of the overall and individual levels of insignificance of the model, 
one can conclude that the weight assigned to the other valuation methods (OTH) is not 
dependent on both the firm-specific and market-related variables and hence the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected in favour of the alternate. In spite of failure to reject the 
null hypothesis, the resulting insignificant model could be summarized from the 
coefficients in Table 43 as follows: 
  =  +  + () +  + 
 +   + !  (33) 
  = 39.602 + 0.001() + 0.014() + 0.181() − 0.147(
)
− 0.117( ) − 0.168()                                                                 (34) 
In assessing the model’s compliance with the various assumptions of linear 
regression, it could first be noted from Table 43 that the VIFs for all the six firm-specific 
variables were less than 10 and their average VIF which stood at 1.242 was not  
substantially greater than 1. The tolerance statistics for each of variables were all well 
above 0.02, and hence one can safely conclude that there is no collinearity among the 
predictor variables. In relation to the homoscedasticity assumption, the scatter plot of 





Figure 17. Plot of *ZRESID against *ZPRED for the OTHW’s OLS Regression Model 
From this histogram plot in Figure 17, it could be noted that the data is showing a 
random pattern rather than a distinct funneling, indicating that the variance of the 
residuals exhibit homoscedasticity. For the autocorrelation assumption, the Durbin-
Watson statistic is 2.048 depicting that the residuals are not auto/serially correlated and 
hence the model has accorded with the assumption of autocorrelation as well. In relation 





Figure 18. Histogram of normally distributed residuals for the OTHW’s OLS Model 
 In view of the overall insignificance of the model in spite of its accordance with 
the most important assumptions of linear regression, I cannot help but to safely say that 
the weight assigned by investment bankers on the GSE to the use of other valuation 
methods is not dependent upon any of the hypothesized firm-specific and market-related 
variables and hence the null hypothesis cannot be rejected in favour of the alternate 
hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 3: Price Discounts and the Setting of Preliminary Offer Prices 
The hypothesis to be tested here is: 
H0: The application of price discount in the setting of preliminary offer price of an 
IPO does not depend on firm-specific factors and emerging market factors. 
H1: The application of price discount in the setting of preliminary offer price of an 




I also pointed out that this hypothesis will be tested using the following ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regression model:  
	$ =  +  +  +  + 
 +   + !
+ " + #$
 + +% + 
 + 2 + 
+ 
  + (                                                                                                (35) 
To operationalize this model, I entered each of the first six firm-specific 
independent variables into the model using forced entry method. These variables were 
forced entered into Block 1 because Roosenboom (2007) subjected similar variables to 
empirical testing on the French IPO market. This forced entry method, according to Field 
(2009), is the default method for conducting regression and hence where predictors have 
already been tested in a prior research the forced entry method would be the most 
appropriate. I entered the remaining seven independent market-related variables in Block 
2 of the model using a stepwise method. This method of entry, as was noted before, 
allows the SPSS the free-hand of adding any of these market-related independent 
variables to the model depending on the ability of that variable to improve the 
predictability of the model. A summary of the resulting DISCOUNT’s regression model 
is provided in Table 44. From the Table, it could be noted that the regression model 
accounted for only 18.0% of the variance in the price discount offered by the 





DISCOUNT’s OLS Regression Model: Overall Model Summary 
 
This level of the models prediction was not significant at F (6, 23) = .841, and p> 
.05. In coming out with this overall level of insignificance, SPSS had excluded all the 
market-related variables from the model, depicting that the addition of any of those 
variables did not also significantly improve the overall predictability of the model. In 
spite of this overall level of insignificance, it is important for me to delve into the 
respective predictability of each of the individual firm-specific variable in the 
constitution of the model.  
Table 45 
DISCOUNT’s OLS Regression: Table of Coefficients 
 
From Table 45, it would be realized that none of the six firm-specific variables 
had a significant predictive ability in explaining the price discounts offered in the sales of 
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2
Sig. F 
Change
1 .424a .180 -.034 17.96083 .180 .841 6 23 .551 2.370
a. Predictors: (Constant), DIV (%), PROF (%), SIZE (GHS'million), GROW (%), AGE (Years), AIP (%)
b. Dependent Variable: DISCOUNT (%)
Model Summaryb
Model R R Square
Adjusted R 
Square












(Constant) 5.369 13.573 .396 .696 -22.710 33.447
SIZE (GHS'million) 6.654E-06 .002 .001 .004 .997 -.003 .003 .935 1.069
AGE (Years) .573 .277 .431 2.071 .050 .001 1.145 .824 1.214
AIP (%) -.174 .154 -.263 -1.128 .271 -.492 .145 .656 1.524
PROF (%) -.108 .258 -.092 -.418 .680 -.641 .426 .734 1.363
GROW (%) -.029 .121 -.047 -.238 .814 -.279 .222 .903 1.108
DIV (%) -.103 .232 -.090 -.442 .662 -.583 .377 .852 1.174
1












the various IPOs on the GSE. This was because all the variables had a p-value that was 
greater than .05. For these reasons of overall and individual levels of insignificance of the 
model, one can conclude that the price discounts that were offered on each IPO were not 
dependent on both the firm-specific and market-related variables and hence the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected in favour of the alternate. In spite of failure to reject the 
null hypothesis, the resulting insignificant model could be summarized from the 
coefficients in Table 45 as follows: 
	$ =  +  + () +  + 
 +  
+ !                                                                                                             (36) 
	$ = 5.369 + 0.0000006654() + 0.0573() − 0.174()
− 0.108(
) − 0.029( ) − 0.103()                                (37) 
In assessing the model’s compliance with the various assumptions of linear 
regression, it could first be noted from Table 45 that the VIFs for all the six firm-specific 
variables were less than 10 and their average VIF which stood at 1.242 was not  
substantially greater than 1. The tolerance statistics for each of variables were all well 
above 0.02, and hence one can safely conclude that there is no collinearity among the 
predictor variables. In relation to the homoscedasticity assumption, the scatter plot of 





Figure 19. Plot of *ZRESID against *ZPRED for the DICOUNT’s OLS Model 
From this histogram plot, it could be noted that the data is not showing a random 
pattern but is rather showing a distinct funneling, indicating that the variance of the 
residuals exhibit heteroscedasticity and in this regard the assumption of homoscedasticity 
is violated. For the autocorrelation assumption, the Durbin-Watson statistic is 2.37 seems 
to be depicting that the residuals are auto/serially correlated, and hence the model has 
also violated the assumption of autocorrelation. In relation to the normality, Figure 20 





Figure 20. Histogram of normally distributed residuals for the DSICOUNT’ OLS model  
In view of the overall insignificance of the model and its violation of some of the 
most important assumptions of linear regression, I cannot help but to safely say that the 
price discounts offered during the IPO offerings on the GSE were not dependent upon 
any of the hypothesized firm-specific and market-related variables and hence the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected in favour of the alternate hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 4: Forecast Errors in IPOs’ Valuation 
The hypothesis, I tested here is: 
H0: The absolute forecasting error observed for each IPO firm is not dependent on 





H1: The absolute forecasting error observed for each IPO firm is dependent on the 
firm’s size, retained ownership, forecasting interval, age, gearing, and auditor’s 
reputation. 
I also pointed out that this hypothesis will be tested using the following ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regression model: 

 =  +  +  $ +  +  +  + ! + (9    (38) 
To operationalize this model, I entered each of the six independent variables into 
the model using forced entry method. These variables were forced entered into Block 1 
because Gounopoulos (2011) and several other scholars alluded to in the prior chapters, 
have subjected similar variables to empirical testing in other stock markets around the 
world. This forced entry method, according to Field (2009), is the default method of 
conducting regression and hence where predictors have already been tested in a prior 
research the forced entry method would be the most appropriate. I have provided a 
summary of the resulting AFE regression model n Table 46. 
Table 46 
AFE’s OLS Regression Model: Overall Model Summary 
 
From Table 46, it could be noted that the regression model accounted for only 
14.30% of the variance in the average absolute forecast error (AFE) observed in the 
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2
Sig. F 
Change
1 .378a .143 -.080 36.98761 .143 .640 6 23 .697 1.978
a. Predictors: (Constant), AUD, HOR, SIZE, LEV, AGE, OWN
b. Dependent Variable: AFE
Model Summaryb
Model R R Square
Adjusted R 
Square








projected earnings of the sampled IPO-firms on the GSE. This level of the models 
prediction was not significant at F (6, 23) = .640, and p> .05. In spite of this overall level 
of insignificance, it is important for me to delve into the respective predictability of each 
of the independent variables in the model.  
Table 47 
AFE’s OLS Regression Model: Table of Coefficients 
 
From Table 47, it would be realized that none of the independent variables had a 
significant predictive ability in explaining the average AFE observed in the earnings 
projections of IPO-firms on the GSE. This was because all the variables had a p-value 
that was greater than .05. For these reasons of overall and individual levels of 
insignificance of the model, one can conclude that the absolute forecast errors observed 
on the GSE for each IPO-firm were not dependent on the hypothesized independent 
variables and hence the null hypothesis cannot be rejected in favour of the alternate. In 
spite of failure to reject the null hypothesis, the resulting insignificant model could be 
summarized from the coefficients in Table 47 as follows: 

 =  +  +  $ +  +  +  + ! + (9   (39) 
Standardized 
Coefficients





(Constant) 92.092 46.453 1.983 .059 -4.002 188.187
SIZE -1.554E-06 .002 .000 -.001 .999 -.005 .005 .779 1.284
OWN -.335 .418 -.201 -.801 .431 -1.200 .530 .593 1.686
HOR .315 .638 .109 .494 .626 -1.005 1.635 .769 1.300
AGE -.545 .656 -.203 -.831 .414 -1.901 .811 .622 1.608
LEV -.510 .294 -.402 -1.738 .096 -1.118 .097 .695 1.438







Interval for B Collinearity Statistics
1





 = 92.092 − 0.0000001554() − 0.335( $) + 0.315()
− 0.545() − 0.510() + 6.947() + (                           (40) 
In assessing the model’s compliance with the various assumptions of linear 
regression, it could first be noted from Table 47 that the VIFs for all the six independent 
variables were less than 10 and their average VIF which stood at 1.489 was not  
substantially greater than 1. The tolerance statistics for each of variables were all well 
above 0.02, and hence one can safely conclude that there was no collinearity among the 
predictor variables. In relation to the homoscedasticity assumption, the scatter plot of 
ZRSID against ZPRED for the model is as shown in Figure 21.  
 
Figure 21. Plot of *ZRESID against *ZPRED for the AFE’s OLS Model 
From this histogram plot in Figure 21, it could be noted that the data is showing a 




exhibit homoscedasticity. For the autocorrelation assumption, the Durbin-Watson statistic 
is 1.978 seemed to be depicting that the residuals are not auto/serially correlated, and 
hence the model has accorded with the assumption of autocorrelation as well. In relation 
to the normality, Figure 22 proves that this assumption was also accorded with.  
 
Figure 22. Histogram of normally distributed residuals for the AFE’s OLS Model  
In view of the overall insignificance of the model and in spite of its accordance 
with the most important assumptions of linear regression, I cannot help but to safely say 
that the absolute forecast errors observed in the earnings forecasts of IPO offerings on the 
GSE were not dependent upon any of the hypothesized independent variables and hence 
the null hypothesis cannot be rejected in favour of the alternate. 
Hypothesis 5: Earning Management in IPOs’ Valuation 




H0: Ghanaian IPO firms’ do not exhibit non-zero earnings management in the pre- 
and post-issue IPO years. 
H1: Ghanaian IPO firms’ do not exhibit non-zero earnings management in the pre- 
and post-issue IPO years. 
I also pointed out that this hypothesis will be tested using the following ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regression model:  
	 =  +  + ? +  +  $ +  $ + (9                        (41) 
To operationalize this model, I entered each of the independent variables into the 
model using forced entry method. These variables were forced entered into Block 1 
because scholars such as Roosenboom, (2003); Cormier and Martinez (2006); and 
Ahmad-Zaluki, et al. (2011) have subjected similar variables to empirical testing on other 
stock markets around the world. This forced entry method, according to Field (2009), is 
the default method for conducting regression and hence where predictors have already 
been tested in a prior research the forced entry method would be the most appropriate. I 
provide a summary of the resulting DCA regression model in Table 48. 
Table 48 
DCA’s OLS Regression Model: Overall Model Summary 
 
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2
Sig. F 
Change
1 .574a .330 .190 24.21378 .330 2.361 5 24 .071 1.799
b. Dependent Variable: Yr(0)_DCA
Model Summaryb
Model R R Square
Adjusted R 
Square









From Table 48, it could be noted that the regression model accounted for 33.0% 
of the variance in the discretionary current accruals (DCA) observed during the year of 
IPO floatation of the sampled IPO-firms on the GSE. This level of the model's prediction 
was, however, not significant at F(5, 23) = 2.361, and p > .05. In spite of this overall level 
of insignificance, it is important for me to delve into the respective predictability of each 
of the independent variables in the model.  
Table 49 
DCA’s OLS Regression Model: Table of Coefficients 
 
From Table 49, it would be realized that with the exception of variable OWN, 
none of the other independent variables had a significant predictive ability in explaining 
the average DCA observed in the financial performance and position of IPO-firms on the 
GSE. This was because all these variables had a p-value that was greater than .05. The 
variable, OWN was, however, significant in that its p-value was less than .05. In spite of 
the individual significance of this very variable, giving the overall and individual levels 
of insignificance of the model, one can conclude that the Ghanaian IPO firms’ do not 
exhibit non-zero earnings management in the pre- and post-issue IPO years and hence the 
null hypothesis cannot be rejected in favour of the alternate. In spite of failure to reject 
Standardized 
Coefficients





(Constant) -49.493 25.308 -1.956 .062 -101.726 2.741
IAS -1.844 11.316 -.034 -.163 .872 -25.199 21.511 .657 1.522
EB 31.704 16.692 .407 1.899 .070 -2.746 66.154 .607 1.647
AUD -2.226 10.899 -.041 -.204 .840 -24.720 20.268 .708 1.411
OWN 36.058 13.381 .625 2.695 .013 8.442 63.674 .520 1.924
ROWN(%) .296 .262 .202 1.132 .269 -.244 .837 .877 1.140













the null hypothesis, the resulting insignificant model could be summarized from the 
coefficients in Table 49 as follows: 
	 =  +  + ? +  +  $ +  $ + (9                        (42) 
	 = −49.493 − 1.844() + 31.704(?) − 2.226() + 36.058( $)
+ 0.296( $) + (                                                                                    (43) 
In assessing the model’s compliance with the various assumptions of linear 
regression, it could first be noted from Table  49 that the VIFs for all the six firm-specific 
variables were less than 10 and their average VIF which stood at 1.529 was not  
substantially greater than 1. The tolerance statistics for each of variables were all well 
above 0.02, and hence one can safely conclude that there was no collinearity among the 
predictor variables. In relation to the homoscedasticity assumption, the scatter plot of 





Figure 23. Plot of *ZRESID against *ZPRED for the DCA’s OLS Model 
From this histogram plot in Figure 23, it could be noted that the data is showing a 
random pattern rather a distinct funneling, indicating that the variance of the residuals 
exhibit homoscedasticity. For the autocorrelation assumption, the Durbin-Watson statistic 
of 1.799 seemed to be depicting that the residuals are not auto/serially correlated and 
hence the model has accorded with the assumption of autocorrelation as well. In relation 
to the normality, Figure 24 proves that this assumption was also accorded with.  
 
Figure 24. Histogram of normally distributed residuals for the DCA’s OLS Model  
In view of the overall insignificance of the model and in spite of its accordance 
with the most important assumptions of linear regression, I cannot help but to safely say 




post-issue IPO years and hence the null hypothesis cannot be rejected in favour of the 
alternate. 
Hypothesis 6: IPO Pricing Anomalies on the Ghana Stock Exchange 
The hypothesis I tested here was: 
H0: There is no significant cross-sectional relationship between price-to-value 
ratios (P/V) and over/undervalued first-day returns observed on the GSE. 
H1: There is a significant cross-sectional relationship between price-to-value 
(P/V) ratios and over/undervalued first-day returns observed on the GSE. 
I also pointed out that this hypothesis will be tested using the following ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regression model:  
(1E; FG) =  +  + ? +   + 		 + 
+ !? + (9                                                                                            (44) 
To operationalize this model, I entered each of the independent variables into the 
model using forced entry method. These variables were forced entered into Block 1 
because scholars such as Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004) have subjected similar 
variables to empirical testing in other stock markets around the world. This forced entry 
method, according to Field (2009), is the default method for conducting regression and 
hence where predictors have already been tested in a prior research the forced entry 
method would be the most appropriate. I provided a summary of the resulting R(1st Day) 





R(1st Day)’s OLS Regression Model: Overall Model Summary 
 
From Table 50, it could be noted that the regression model accounted for 25.30% 
of the variance in the percentage of first day return (R(1st Day)) observed in the sampled 
IPO-firms on the GSE. This level of the model’s prediction was not significant at F(6, 
23) = 1.298, and p> .05. In spite of this overall level of insignificance, it is important for 
me to delve into the respective predictability of each of the independent variables in the 
model.  
Table 51 
R(1st Day)’s OLS Regression Model: Table of Coefficients 
 
From Table 51, it would be realized that with the exception of variable P/V ratio, 
none of the other independent variables had a significant predictive ability in explaining 
the first-day return observed in the post-issue performance of the sampled IPO-firms on 
the GSE. This was because all these variables had a p-value that was greater than .05. 
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2
Sig. F 
Change
1 .503a .253 .058 13.18396 .253 1.298 6 23 .297 2.150
a. Predictors: (Constant), EBIT (%), Accural(%), P/V Ratio, GrowthAIP(%), Sales(GHS'million), BTM Ratio
b. Dependent Variable: R(1st Day)(%)
Model Summaryb
Model R R Square
Adjusted R 
Square







B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound
Upper 
Bound Tolerance VIF
(Constant) -14.337 6.530 -2.195 .038 -27.846 -.827
P/V Ratio 13.082 5.030 .496 2.601 .016 2.676 23.487 .892 1.121
BTM Ratio .504 .773 .142 .651 .521 -1.096 2.103 .688 1.453
GrowthAIP(%) .029 .086 .061 .334 .741 -.148 .206 .974 1.027
Accural(%) -.041 .102 -.074 -.406 .689 -.252 .169 .966 1.035
Sales(GHS'million) .001 .004 .032 .160 .874 -.008 .009 .802 1.247
EBIT (%) .061 .126 .105 .481 .635 -.200 .322 .686 1.457
1










The variable P/V ratio was, however, significant in that its p-value was less than .05. In 
addition to this individual level of significance and the overall significance of the model, 
there seem to be significant cross-sectional relationship between price-to-value ratios 
(P/V) and over/undervalued first-day returns observed on the GSE and hence the null 
hypothesis should be rejected in favour of the alternate. In view of this rejection of the 
null hypothesis, the resulting significant model could be summarized from the 
coefficients Table 51 as follows: 
(1E; FG) =  +  + ? +   + 		 + 
+ !? + (9                                                                                            (45) 
(1E; FG) = −14.337 + 13.082() + 0.504(?) + 0.029( )
− 0.041(		) + 0.001() + 0.061(?) + (     (46) 
In assessing the model’s compliance with the various assumptions of linear 
regression, it could first be noted from Table 51 that the VIFs for all the six firm-specific 
variables were less than 10 and their average VIF which stood at 1.223 was not  
substantially greater than 1. The tolerance statistics for each of variables were all well 
above 0.02, and hence one can safely conclude that there was no collinearity among the 
predictor variables. In relation to the homoscedasticity assumption, the scatter plot of 
ZRSID against ZPRED for the model is as shown in Figure 25. From this histogram plot, 
it could be noted that the data is showing a random pattern rather a distinct funneling, 
indicating that the variance of the residuals exhibit homoscedasticity. For the 
autocorrelation assumption, the Durbin-Watson statistic of 2.150 seemed to be depicting 




the assumption of autocorrelation as well. In relation to the normality, Figure 26 proves 
that this assumption was also accorded with. 
 
Figure 25. Plot of *ZRESID against *ZPRED for the R(1st Day)’s OLS Model 
In view of the overall significance of the model and its accordance with the most 
important assumptions of linear regression, I cannot help but to safely say that the there is 
significant cross-sectional relationship between price-to-value ratios (P/V) and 
over/undervalued first-day returns observed on the GSE, and hence the null hypothesis 





Figure 26. Histogram of normally distributed residuals for R(1st Day) OLS Model  
Summary of Results 
In Chapter 4, I presented the results of my research. My intention was that 
through these findings, I will be able to provide answers to the four research questions I 
posed at the beginning of this Chapter. The first of these research questions was: what 
valuation methods do underwriters in Ghana use in valuing IPOs listed on the GSE and 
what firm-specific and emerging market factors influenced their choice of those valuation 
methods? In relation to the first part of this question, I found out that the valuation 
methods that are used on the GSE in the valuation of a giving firm’s IPO are the 
discounted cash flow method (DCF), the adjusted asset-based valuation method (AAV), 
the net asset valuation method (NAV), the price-to-earnings (P/E) ratio, price-to-book 




my hypothesis, that investment bankers on the GSE do not use such valuation methods as 
price-to-sales (P/S), price-to-cash-flow (P/C), economic value added (EVA), and residual 
income (RIM). In relation to the second part of this question, I found that there the choice 
of those valuations methods by the investment bankers on the GSE does not necessarily 
depend on any of the hypothesized firm-specific or market related factors. 
The second question, I posed was: how do underwriters combine the value 
estimate of each valuation method to arrive at fair value of IPOs and how do they set the 
preliminary offer price on the basis of those fair value estimates? On this question, I 
found from the results that the underwriters or investment bankers in Ghana mostly use 
more than one valuation method in arriving at the fair value estimate of a given firm’s 
IPO. In arriving at such fair value estimates, the investment bankers assign weights to the 
value estimates of each of the valuation methods used. The assignment of these weights, 
contrary to my hypothesis, does not necessarily depend on any of the hypothesized firm-
specific and market-related factors. I also found out from the results that the investment 
bankers in arriving at the final offer price do give price discounts on the estimated fair 
values to the investors.  
In relation to the third research question: are management earnings forecasts in 
the prospectuses of Ghanaian IPO firms free from forecasting errors and the tendencies of 
earnings management? I found out that the IPOs listed on the GSE–like their listed 
counterparts in other frontier or emerging markets–are not free from forecasting errors. 
Using the forecast error (FE) as a headline measurement metric, I found out that the listed 




relation to the earnings management ambit of the question, I found out that the use of 
discretionary current accruals by the management of Ghanaian corporations increases in 
the years just prior to their listing on the GSE and thereafter the use of such accruals 
reduces. This observed increasing, and decreasing trends in the use of discretionary 
current accruals give an indication of the tendencies of earnings management by listed 
firms on the GSE.  
The fourth and final questions I sought answers to was: what IPO pricing 
anomalies occur on the GSE and are there a cross-sectional relationship between the 
price-to-value ratios as determined by the investment bankers and the over/undervalued 
first-day returns observed on the GSE? I found out from the results that IPOs on the GSE 
were on the average underpriced and that over the 20-year period of IPO activities on the 
market monies were left on the table for investors as a result of the observed 
underpricing. I also found out that there was significant cross-sectional relationship 
between the price-to-value ratios and the underpricing return-performance observed on 
the market.  
Giving the results obtained in this chapter, I now proceed to chapter 5 where I 
discussed the findings of the analyzed data in relation to providing answers to each of the 
four research questions on which this study revolved. I also presented in chapter 5 the 
implications of the research findings for each of the major stakeholders on the GSE and 






Chapter 5: Discussions, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
Introduction 
In this study, I investigated the valuations, pricing, and performance of 30 
sampled IPOs listed on the GSE for the 20-year period 1992-2012. In conducting the 
investigation, I had a five-fold purpose (a) considering the return characteristics of those 
IPOs; (b) examining the role of valuation and pricing in explaining the observed return 
characteristics of those IPOs; (c) considering the firm-specific and emerging market 
factors that had influenced the choice of IPO valuation methods by the listed firm 
managers and their investment bankers; (d) reviewing combination of the value estimates 
of each of the valuation methods in determining the fair value estimate and the eventual 
price of a given IPO; and (e) examining the incidences of errors and the possibilities of 
earnings management in the financial data that were used to back those IPO valuation and 
pricing. To fulfill these purposes, I conducted a 20-year cross-sectional explanatory e 
research that explored the valuation, pricing, and performance of IPOs on the GSE. The 
four research questions were as follows: 
1. What valuation methods do underwriters in Ghana use in valuing IPOs listed 
on the GSE and what firm-specific and emerging-market factors influenced 
their choice of those valuation methods?  
2. How do underwriters combine the value estimate of each valuation method to 
arrive at fair values of IPOs and how do they set the preliminary offer price on 




3. Are the management earnings forecasts and the pre-IPO financial statements 
incorporated in the prospectuses of Ghanaian IPO firms free from forecasting 
errors and the tendencies of earnings management?  
4. What IPO pricing anomalies occur on the GSE and is there a cross-sectional 
relationships between the price-to-value ratios as determined by the 
investment bankers and the over/undervalued first-day returns observed on the 
GSE?  
 The main findings of this study revealed, in relation to the first research 
question, that the methods used in the valuation of the 30 sampled IPOs included: (a) the 
discounted cash flow method (DCF); (b) the adjusted asset-based valuation method 
(AAV); (c) the net asset valuation method (NAV); (d) the price-to-earnings (P/E) ratio; 
(e) price-to-book (P/B) ratios; and (f) the dividend valuations method (DDM). The results 
also revealed that none of the hypothesized firm-specific and/or emerging-market factors 
influenced the choice of those valuation methods. These findings, as are elaborated 
further in later sections of this chapter, might imply that investment bankers on GSE 
randomly select valuation methods. A further implication of these findings is that those 
bankers do not give much thought to the characteristics of the firm or the market-related 
factors pertaining in the economy in which the firms were operating. This could also 
mean that the choice of valuation methods on the GSE is influenced more by the 
investment bankers’ familiarity with those valuation methods. In this regard, investment 
bankers operating on the GSE seemed to always use the same methods for valuing the 




For the second question, I found that investment bankers used more than one 
valuation method in determining the fair value estimates of IPOs on the GSE. 
Roosenboom (2007) and Deloof et al. (2009) also found the use of more than one 
valuation methods on Euronext Paris and Euronext Brussels respectively. In arriving at 
such fair value estimates, the investment bankers on the GSE, assigned weights to the 
value estimates of each of the valuation methods used. The assignment of these weights, 
the results further revealed, were influenced by the purpose of the valuation and the 
characteristics of the firms being valued. I also found from the results that corporate 
managers and their investment bankers offered price discounts on the estimated fair 
values. The results, however, revealed that none of the hypothesized firm-specific and 
emerging-market factors influenced the offer of those price discounts. The reasons for 
these findings could also be attributed to the over familiarity of investment bankers with 
certain valuation methods I spoke about in the previous paragraph. 
 In relation to the third research question, I found that the IPOs listed on the GSE 
were not free from the possibilities of forecasting errors. The research works on the Stock 
Exchange of Thailand (SET) by Lonkani and Firth (2005) and the Istanbul Stock 
Exchange (ISE) by Bulut and Er (2011) found the same results. Using the forecast error 
(FE) as a headline measurement metric, I discovered that listed firms on the GSE had 
over-forecasted their earnings potentials by as much as 28.56%. The over-forecasting 
found on the SET and ISE were 6.86% and 13.44% respectively. These findings imply 
that the forecasting error I found on the GSE was 15.12% and 21.70% above the 




management, I found that the use of discretionary current accruals (DCA) increased in 
the years leading to IPO listings on the GSE. I also found that the use of such accruals 
rather reduced in the years after the IPOs. These observed increasing and decreasing 
trends of DCA, implied the use of earning management in the pre-IPO financial 
statements incorporated in the prospectuses of listed firms on the GSE. The 
corresponding increasing and decreasing trends in the net incomes (NI) reported in the 
financial statements of the sampled IPOs confirms the observed implications of earnings 
management. Furthermore, the cash flows of those IPO firms were rather converse to the 
increasing and decreasing trends observed in relation to DCA and NI. Cash flows might 
have witnessed a reverse trend because, unlike accruals and net income, it less likely for 
corporate managers to manipulate cash flows (Cormier & Martinez, 2006). 
 For the fourth and final research questions, the results showed that IPOs on the 
GSE were on the average underpriced by 1.49%. This finding confirms the claim of 
Loughran et al. (1994) that all countries with stock exchanges do experience the short-run 
underpricing phenomenon. My result of an average 1.49% on the GSE seemed to be on 
the lower side when juxtaposed against the results reported in other markets. According 
to Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004), the underpricing phenomenon recorded in the 
United States’ markets had, for decades, averaged between 10 to 15%. Chambers and 
Dimson (2009) found that underpricing in the United Kingdom had averaged 19% for 
over 21 years since market reforms in 1986. The findings of Adjasi, Osei, and Fiawoyife 
(2011) on the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) revealed an incredible 43.28%. My 




for the benefit of investors in the market. In an extreme case of money being left on the 
table, investors gained as much as GH¢37.86 million from the IPO of the then Ashanti 
Gold Fields (now listed as AngloGold Ashanti, following a takeover). The results, 
however, showed that in some circumstances monies were taken from the investors by 
the listed firms as a result of IPO overpricing. In an extreme case of money being taken 
from investors, I found that investors lost as much as GH¢7.97 million from the IPO of 
Cocoa Processing Company Limited (CPC). I also found that there was significant cross-
sectional relationship between the price-to-value (P/V) ratios and the observed 
under/overpricing of IPO return performance on the market. This implied that the P/V 
ratios could explain the return performances observed on the GSE. 
In the next section of this chapter (i.e., interpretations of research findings), I 
provided detailed discussions of these research findings. I did so in the context of the 
theoretical and/or conceptual frameworks that underpinned this study, as well as the 
larger body of IPO literature set forth in chapter 2. I followed this interpretation section 
with such other sections as: (a) the implication for social change–in which I examined the 
roles of the various stakeholders in furthering the required improvements in the valuation 
and pricing of IPOs on the GSE; (b) the key limitations of the study–these related to the 
difficulties I encountered in data collection as well as the need for caution in the 
generalization of the research findings to other markets; (c) recommendations for further 
actions–where I called for rigorous scrutiny of the actual and projected financial 
statements incorporated in the prospective IPO prospectuses as a means of dealing with 




recommendation for further research–where I proposed the extension of these research to 
cover other frontier or emerging stocks markets in Africa; and (e) concluding statement–
in which I recapped the discussions of my findings, recommendations, and conclusion 
that I reached in this and other chapters of the study. 
Interpretation of Research Findings 
Research Question 1: Choice IPO Valuation Methods 
The valuation methods used by the investment bankers on the GSE were devoid 
of such eccentric methods as price-to-sales (P/S), price-to-cash-flow (P/C), economic 
value added (EVA), and residual income (RIM). The discounted cash flow (DCF) was 
the most popular method: it was used to value 93.33% of the 30 IPOs studied on the 
market. This high rate of DCF’s usage on the GSE was consistent with its high rate of 
usage on the Euronext Brussels. Deloof et al. (2009) in their study of 49 IPOs on the 
Euronext Brussels between 1993 and 2001 found the usage of DCF in the valuation of all 
the 49 IPOs. This high rate of usage on both the GSE and Euronext Brussels confirms the 
claimed theoretical and practical superiority of DCF over the other valuation methods. 
This theoretical and practical supremacy of DCF, according to Deloof et al., is anchored 
in the fact that the method takes into account the fundamentals characteristics of the IPO-
firms. These characteristics included the future cash flows, the growth prospects, and the 
related risks that tell us about value of the IPO-firm independent of market prices (Deloof 
et al., 2009). In the opinion of Pereiro (2006), however, the widespread use of DCF as a 
primary tool in valuations was mainly due to the influence of mainstream financial 




widespread use of DCF on the GSE could be due either to (a) the perceived superiority of 
the method by the investment bankers, or (b) the influence of mainstream financial 
economics thinking the investment bankers were exposed to in their undergraduate and/or 
post graduate education. 
To tease out the fundamentals that had accounted for such rate of usage of DCF, I 
hypothesized that the choice of the method on the GSE was influenced by firm-specific 
and emerging-market factors. The hypothesized firm-specific factors included such 
variables as the size of the IPO firm (SIZE), the age of the firm (AGE), the extent to 
which firm’s assets are tangible (AIP), the profitability of the firm pre-IPO (PROF), the 
growth prospects of the firm in relation to sales (GROW), and the historical and expected 
dividend payouts of the firm (DIV). I could not find evidence from the empirical results 
that any of those firm-specific factors influenced the choice of DCF method on the GSE. 
This finding was consistent with the results of Roosenboom (2007) on Euronext Paris. On 
this market, Roosenboom could also not find evidence that any of those firm-specific 
factors influenced the choice of DCF method in the valuation of 228 IPOs. In relation to 
emerging market variables–GDP, inflation rate (INF), money market interest rates 
(MMR), exchange rate (FER), money supply (M2), size of the stock exchange (SZ), and 
the financial depth of the stock exchange (FD)–I could not find evidence of the influence 
of any of those variables. The implication of these findings could be that investment 
bankers on GSE randomly select the DCF valuation method without given much thought 
to (a) the characteristics of the firm being valued, or (b) the market-related factors 




could further imply that the choice of DCF on the GSE is more influenced by the 
investment banker’s familiarity with the DCF valuation methods. These implications 
support Pereiro’s proposition that the mainstream financial economics thinking is behind 
the investment bankers’ choice of the DCF and other valuation methods. This might also 
imply that each of the investment bankers on the GSE always uses DCF to value the 
shares of the corporations they bring public. This is because the 6.67% non-usage of DCF 
on the GSE arose in only two circumstances of IPO valuation and pricing. Those two 
IPOs were valued using the price averages available in the markets in which their firms 
were already trading. In the case of Golden Star Resource (GSR), for example, the offer 
price of GH¢3.00 per share was determined based on “the 20-day weighted volume 
average price of GSR’s common shares on AMEX as of November 14, 2007” (GSR’s 
Prospectus, p. 10). 
The price-to-earnings (P/E) ratio and price-to-book (P/B) ratios were the only 
multiples valuation methods used in the valuation of the 30 sampled IPOs. The P/E ratio 
recorded a usage of 43% whilst the P/B ratio accounted for a percentage usage of 7%. 
This summed up to 50% usage of the multiple valuation methods on the GSE. This 
percentage usage was 31.63% less than the usage of multiples valuation methods on 
Euronext Brussels reported by Deloof et al. (2009). The finding on the Euronext Brussels 
was that of the 49 sampled IPOs, 40–representing 81.63%–were valued using multiples 
methods. Unlike the GSE, however, Deloof et al also found that in addition to the P/E 
and P/B ratios, other multiples such as P/C, Enterprise Value/EBITDA, Enterprise 




valuation of IPOs on the Euronext Brussels. The usage of multiples valuation methods on 
the GSE were not as high because the market is relatively small: hence there were not 
that many comparators. In spite of this, I found that the choice of comparable firms on the 
GSE depended on the industry in which the IPO operated. In the case of Ayrton Drugs 
Manufacturing Limited (AYRTN), for example, the use of P/E ratio was “derived from 
the prevailing market perception of the values of companies in the same or comparable 
regulated industry, [that is] companies regulated by the Food and Drugs Board namely 
Starwin Products Ltd (SPL) and PZ Limited” (AYRTN’s Prospectus, p. 35). This 
confirms the findings of Berkman et al. (2000) that firms in the same industry have 
similar risk, growth characteristics, and accounting methods. 
In the choice of multiples valuation methods on the GSE, the only firm-specific 
variable that was statistically significant was the extent to which IPO-firms’ assets were 
tangible (AIP). This finding implied that at core of P/E and P/B ratios is the book value of 
firms’ assets and liabilities. Roosenboom (2007) rather found profitability (PROF) and 
growth (GROW) as the firm-specific factors that influenced the choice of multiple 
valuation methods on the Euronext Paris. The implication of Roosenboom’s findings was 
that IPO-firms that were forecasted to be relatively profitable and rapidly growing were 
more likely to use one of the multiples valuation methods. From my results on the GSE, I 
also found that none of the emerging-market factors significantly influenced the use of 
multiple valuations methods. I came to the same conclusions in relation to other valuation 
model choices such as the DCF, DDM, and OTH. These findings were, however, 




variables as statistically significant, in their study of 221 stocks on the Karachi Stock 
Exchange (KSE) in Pakistan. These variables were GDP, inflation rate (INF), money 
market interest rates (MMR), money supply (M2), and the financial depth of the stock 
exchange (FD). The lack of statistical significance of any of these variables on the GSE 
could be due either to (a) the over-familiarity of investment bankers with the various 
valuation methods; or (b) the limited nature of the sampled IPOs studied on the GSE. 
The discounted dividend method (DDM) was the least popular valuation methods 
on the GSE because it recorded a percentage usage of 0.03%. In fact, of the 30 sampled 
IPOs, only one firm adopted the DDM valuation. This finding was contrary to the results 
of Deloof et al. (2009) who found that of the 49 sampled firms on the Euronext Brussels, 
24 of these firms (60%) used the DDM. In spite of this 60% usage rate of DDM, Deloof 
et al. noted that this valuation method was considered by investment bankers in Belgium 
to be too conservative. In view of this, most of those bankers were less reliant on value 
estimate of DDM. The use of DDM, Deloof et al. further noted, was for the purposes of 
serving as a check on the value estimates derived using other valuation techniques. These 
findings of Deloof et al. could explain the observed unpopularity of DDM on the GSE. 
This could imply that investment bankers in Ghana, like their counterparts in Belgium, do 
not regard the value estimates of DDM as a reliable. Starwin Products Limited (SPL) was 
the only firm that deployed DDM on the GSE. In this deployment, SPL derived 30% of 
the fair value of its IPO from the use of this valuation method. The investment bankers of 
SPL justified their usage of DDM on the ground that “the assignment of 30% to the 




shareholders attached to the firm’s ability to pay dividends”(SPL’s Prospectus, p. 33). 
This justification presupposed that if it were not for this desire of the SPL’s pre-IPO 
shareholders, the use of DDM would not have been necessary. In view of this fact, it was 
not possible for me to assess the firm-specific and emerging-market factors that could 
have influenced the choice of DDM by the generality of investment bankers on the GSE.  
The key finding in relation to the use of other valuation methods (OTH)–net asset 
valuation (NAV) and adjusted asset valuation (AAV)–revealed a percentage usage of 
83%. This high rate of usage positioned the OTH as the most used valuation methods on 
the GSE, second only to the DCF. The widespread use of the OTH valuation methods on 
the GSE relates to the ease with which investments bankers could employ the services of 
third party valuation agencies. These valuation agencies were hired to verify the existing 
assets of a firm intending listed and to give a fair value estimate of those assets. These 
fair value estimates were derived through the revaluation of net book values (i.e., net 
asset valuation (NAV)) or adjustments of those assets to reflect their fair market values 
(i.e., adjusted asset valuation (AAV)). In relation to the firm-specific and market-related 
factors that influenced the choice of OTH valuation methods, I found that none of those 
factors were statistically significant. This finding was consistent with that of 
Roosenboom (2007) who could not find as statistically significant the firm-specific 
factors that influenced the choice of OTH valuation methods on the Euronext Paris. The 
implication of these findings might be that investment bankers on the GSE, like their 
counterparts on Euronext Paris, do not give much thought to factors that could influence 




Research Question 2: Fair Values and Setting of IPO Offer Prices 
This research question boarded on how underwriters combined the value estimate 
of each valuation method to arrive at fair values and the preliminary offer prices of the 
IPOs. One of the key findings revealed the use explicit fitness-based quantitative 
weighting techniques. According to Pereiro (2002), the usage of this weighting technique 
depends on the purpose for which the valuation was being conducted and the 
characteristics of a corporation being valued. The investment bankers, then assign for 
each value estimates with a weight that reflects the relative importance of a giving 
valuation method vis-à-vis the valuation purpose and firm characteristics. To buttress 
these assertions of Pereiro, I provide in the following paragraphs the justification for 
weight-assignments incorporated on page 35 of the IPO Prospectus of AYRTN:  
1.  The assignment of weight of 25% to the Net Book Value approach is 
designed to reflect the fundamental importance of facilities, buildings, machinery, 
and equipment in the production process, which ultimately determines the ability 
of the enterprise to generate products for sale. Typically in the Pharmaceutical 
Industry the importance of deployable assets to viable operations could be 
weighed anywhere from 20% to 35%. The 25% applied is a fair average.  
2.  The validity of any enterprise is significantly reflected in its ability to 
generate and return cash flow for reinvestment and dividend payments. Every 
investor’s preference to hold equity in a firm which has the potential to generate 
cash flow over and above its operating requirements. Firms in this category have 




flows and dividends. The assignment of a weight of 45% to the FCFE [i.e., DCF] 
model of share pricing is to reflect this importance.  
3.  The weight of 30% assigned to the P/E model is to reflect the importance 
of stock market’s perception of the present and future strengths and potential of 
companies in the same regulated industry as AYRTN. The inference is that even 
though AYRTN is currently not listed on the GSE, 30% of its current estimated 
value is derived from the prevailing market perception of the values of companies 
in the same or comparable regulated industry, [that is] companies regulated by the 
Food and Drugs Board namely Starwin Products Ltd (SPL) and PZ Limited.  
In relation to the factors that influenced these assignments of weight on the GSE, I 
hypothesized that such assignments would be dependent on the firm-specific and 
emerging-market factors. In assigning weight to the multiples valuation methods on the 
GSE, the findings revealed the tangibility of IPO-firms’ assets (AIP) as the only 
statistically significant variable. This finding was not in conformity with the findings of 
Roosenboom (2007) in relation to the weight assigned to these valuation methods on the 
Euronext Paris. Roosenboom, rather, found the growth prospects of IPO firms (GROW) 
and their historical and expected dividend payouts (DIV) as the statistically significant 
variables. I did not find evidence that any of the hypothesized firm-specific and 
emerging-market variables influenced the weight assignments to the value estimates of 
DDM and OTH on the GSE. These findings do not also conform to the results of 
Roosenboom (2007) on the Euronext Paris. Roosenboom found, in relation to DDM, that 




assignments of weight. On the weight assigned to the values estimates of OTH, 
Roosenboom reported as statistically significant the pre-IPO profitability (PROF) of the 
IPO firms. For the assignment of weight to the value estimate of DCF valuation method, 
the results on the GSE revealed GDP as the only significant emerging-market variable 
that influenced the investment bankers. Like Roosenboom, I could not find any of the 
hypothesized firm-specific variables as statistically significant.  
In relation to the determination of final offer prices of the 30 sampled IPOs on the 
GSE, I found that investment bankers introduced discounts on the preliminary offer 
prices. This is consistent with the conceptual framework of IPO valuation and pricing of 
Roosenboom (2012) reproduced in chapter 1 of this study. Using the IPO offerings of 
AYRTN as an example, the preliminary offer price per share that resulted from the 
combined value estimates DCF, P/E, and NAV was GH¢0.0918. The investment bankers 
in offering a price discount asserted that “from the exhaustive analysis of the company’s 
operating circumstances and past financial performance as contained in our share price 
valuation, we recommend a price of GH¢0.0850 per share” (AYRTN’s Prospectus, p. 
35). To make the potential investors aware of this price discount, the investment bankers 
added that “this price offers investors a discount of GH¢0.00680 per share on the 
estimated value of the company” (AYRTN’s Prospectus, p. 35). This finding confirms 
Roosenboom (2007) assertion that the offer of these price discounts become one of the 
key messages sold to investors during road shows, and other marketing campaigns 
launched in support of a pending IPO. In teasing out the factors that influenced the 




variables that had been the subject of this study so far. I found that none of those 
variables were statistically significant. Roosenboom (2007) in his research, however, 
found the growth prospects of IPO firms (GROW) to be influential. The implication of 
my finding might be that investment bankers on the GSE perceive the offer of such price 
discounts as a concomitant part of valuing and pricing IPOs. This perception could mean 
that those bankers do not give much thought to the firm-specific and/or market-related 
factors. 
Research Question 3: Forecasting Errors and Earnings Management 
In this research question, I considered whether the actual and projected financial 
statements in the IPO prospectuses were free from forecasting errors and earnings 
management. The results on forecasting errors revealed that the mean forecast error (FE) 
stood at -28.56%. The FE measures the extent to which the management of IPO firms had 
systematically over/underestimated their firms’ earnings forecasts. The negative sign of 
the forecasts error implied that, on an average, the listed firms in Ghana have over-
forecasted their earnings potentials by as much as 28.56%. The absolute forecast error 
(AFE), which measures the relative deviation of actual earnings from forecasted earnings, 
recorded an average deviation of 49.62%. The measure gives an indication of the extent 
to which the forecasts were close to actual profits in absolute terms. The observed AFE 
implied that the earnings forecasts in the IPO prospectuses on the GSE had forecast 
inaccuracies of 49.62% relative to the actual post-issue earnings of the IPO-firms. This 
finding was consistent with the results of Abrokwa and Nkansah (2014), whose study on 




put my findings in a context, I provide in Table 52 the results of similar studies 
considered in the literature review in chapter 2 of this study. 
Table 52 
Summary of Previous Studies on the Accuracy of Forecast Earnings 
 
From these comparative results in Table 52, the observed forecasting inaccuracies 
on the GSE were closer to results obtained by Lonkani and Firth (2005) and Bulut and Er 
(2011). The over-forecasting of 28.56% observed on the GSE seemed high when 
compared with the 6.86% and 13.44% over-forecasting, respectively, found in Thai and 
Turkish markets. The absolute forecast error (AFE) of 49.62% found on the GSE seemed 
to have ranged between the 35.76% and 79.01% observed in the Thai and Turkish 
markets respectively. This implied that whilst the AFE was within the observed range, 
the FE was above the Turkish and the Thai markets by 15.12% and 21.70% respectively.  
In examining the factors that had influenced the observed forecasts inaccuracies 
on the GSE, I used the AFE as the dependent variable. I hypothesized that the level of 
AFE observed on the GSE could be predicted by such independent variables as the IPO 
firm’ size (SIZE), proportion of shares retained by the pre-IPO owners of the firm 
(OWN), forecast horizon (HOR) of the IPO firm’s earnings forecasts, the pre-IPO 






Jelic et al (1998) Malaysia 1984-1995 122 33.37           54.10            
Chen et al (2001) Hong Kong 1993-1996 162 9.94             21.96            
Lonkani & Firth (2005) Thailand 1991-1996 175 (6.86)            35.76            
Bulut & Er (2011) Turkey 2000-2007 30 (13.44)          79.01            




operating history of the IPO firm as measured by age (AGE), the level of IPO firm’s 
gearing/leverage post-issue (LEV), and the reputation of the IPO firm’s auditors (AUD) 
pre-issue. From the results, I found that none of these independent variables were 
statistically significant. To put these findings in a context, I provide in Table 53 a 
summary of the results of related studies. 
Table 53 
Determinants of Prospectuses’ Forecast Errors Investigated in Prior Studies 
 
From Table 53, it could be noted that it is not unusual for the result of a 
quantitative study such as this to have none of the independent variables being 
statistically significant. Table 53 also showed that Chen et al. (2001) studied all the six 
independent variables that I examined in this study. Chen et al., found the use of the Big-
4 Audit firms (AUD) as the only statistically significant variable on the Stock Exchange 
of Hong Kong (SEHK). My findings on the GSE were, however, not consistent with 
those of Abrokwa and Nkansah (2014) who in a similar study on the same GSE found, as 
statistically significant, such variables as the IPO firm’ size (SIZE), forecast horizon 
(HOR) of the IPO firm’s earnings forecasts, and the reputation of the IPO firm’s auditors 
(AUD) pre-issue. These findings of Abrokwa and Nkansah were contrary to the results I 
obtained mainly because of the methodological differences between their study and mine. 
Study Country SIZE OWN HOR AGE LEV AUD
Jelic et al (1998) Malaysia + + +* + +
Chen et al (2001) Hong Kong + + + + + +**
Lonkani & Firth (2005) Thailand +** +** + +
Bulut & Er (2011) Turkey +* +** +*** + + +***
Gounopoulos (2011) Greece + +** + +** +




Abrokwa and Nkansah studied the forecasting accuracy of 14 stocks on the GSE between 
2004 and 2011. In their study, they treated the periods covered by the earnings forecast of 
each of these 14 firms–averaging between 3-5 year forecasting period–as distinct data 
points. This resulted in them having and examining a total of 55 data points of earnings 
forecasts. If I had followed this approach of Abrokwa and Nkansah, I would have had 
100 data points in total from 30 sampled IPOs that I studied. I, however, could not follow 
Abrokwa and Nkansah because I could not find other literature in this field of IPO 
research that supported their approach.  
In relation to the second part of the research question, I investigated the 
tendencies for earnings management in the financial statements incorporated in IPO 
prospectuses on the GSE. In measuring these tendencies of window-dressing, I used the 
discretionary current accruals (DCA) as a proxy. From the results, I found that the DCA 
which stood at -9.58% 2 years prior to the IPO listings had increased to +4.22% in the 
year following the IPOs. Three years after the IPO, however, the average DCA had 
reduced to -1.40%. From these results, it could be concluded earnings management on the 
GSE had witnessed an increase of 13.80%, (i.e., 9.58+4.22), in the first financial year 
following the IPO. This was, however, reduced by 5.62%, (i.e., 4.22+1.4), in the 3 years 
following the IPO. To situate these findings within the larger body of literature, I relied 
on the research results of Roosenboom et al. (2003). In the study of 64 IPOs on the 
Euronext Amsterdam, Roosenboom et al., found an average DCA of -1.5% two year 
before the IPO. This increased to 6.5% in the first financial year as a public company. 




earnings management ranging from 1.5% to 5% of lagged total assets” (p. 256). The 
observed 13.80% on the GSE was, therefore, far higher than the range observed in other 
markets. These findings implied that the deployment of earnings management was 
prevalent on the GSE. This observation is further buttressed by the findings that both 
DCA and net incomes (NI) witnessed increases whilst the cash flows (CF) rather 
decreased. These results confirm the claim of Cormier and Martinez (2006) that it is less 
likely for corporate managers to manipulate cash flow. This further implied that whilst it 
is easy to manipulate accruals and net incomes through earning management, such 
manipulations on cash flows is rarely possible. This is because cash, as a financial 
accounting variable, is usually outside the control of corporate managers. 
To examine the existence of earning management in the IPO prospectuses of GSE 
listed firms, I used DCA as dependent variable. The independent variables that I used in 
explaining the observed DCA included the decision of the IPO firm to comply with 
international accounting standards (IAS), the extent to which the firm’s board of directors 
consist of non-executive directors (EB), the quality of the firm’s auditor (AUD), the 
ownership structure of the firm’s shares pre-issue (OWN), and the post-issue levels of 
shares ownership retained by the pre-IPO owners (ROWN). From the results, I found the 
pre-IPO ownership structure of the firm (OWN) as the only variable that was significant 
in explaining the level of earnings management observed in the year following the IPO. 
Cormier and Martinez (2006) conducted a similar study of 118 IPO firms listed on 
Euronext Paris between 2000 and 2002. They found compliance with international 




non-executive (EB), the post-issue levels of shares ownership retained by the pre-IPO 
owners (ROWN), and the quality the firm’s auditor (AUD) as statistically significant. My 
findings on the GSE implied the higher the level of owner-managers, the less the 
window-dressing of the financial statements incorporated in the IPO prospectuses. This 
conclusion should, however, be juxtaposed against the concerns of overcompensation and 
overexpensing raised by Pereiro (2002) and Koller et al. (2010). Overcompensation of 
owner-managers means that the salaries paid to such managers are usually higher than 
average salaries on the labor market (Pereiro, 2002). Overexpensing arises where owner-
managers’ personal or private spending are treated as corporate expenses (Pereiro, 2002). 
The existence of these related phenomena of overcompensation and overexpensing could 
rather make owner-manager firms more prone to earnings management.       
Research Question 4: Characteristics of IPO Return Performance 
In this research question, I considered the IPO pricing anomalies–
under/overpricing–observed on the GSE. I also considered whether there was a cross-
sectional relationship between the price-to-value ratios and the observed pricing anomaly. 
From the results, I found that the first-day return (R(1st Day)) recorded an average of 
1.49%. This average return depicts that the listed firms on the GSE seemed to have, 
generally, underpriced their IPOs. This finding is in conformity with the results of 
Loughran et al (1994) who found the incidences of short-run underpricing in all the 25 
countries covered in their study. My finding on the GSE also confirmed the conclusion 
reached by Loughran et al. that the underpricing phenomenon exists in every country 




1.49% seemed to be on the lower side. This is because Purnanandam and Swaminathan 
(2004) claimed that the underpricing phenomenon on the United State’s markets had over 
the past decades averaged between 10-15% (p. 811). Chambers and Dimson (2009) found 
that underpricing in the UK had averaged 19% in the 21 years since the market reforms in 
1986. The 1.49% average I observed could be due to the relatively small number of 
stocks listed on the GSE. Notwithstanding the relatively lower underpricing average on 
the GSE, Van Heerden and Alagidede (2012) found that the depth and breadth of the 
underpricing differs one country to the next. Adjasi et al. (2011) who studied 125 IPO on 
the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) found a rather incredible 43.28% underpricing on 
that market. The finding of 43.28% was incredible because it was over and above the 10-
15% found in the United States and the 19% found in the United Kingdom.  
A related concept that goes hand-in-hand with the phenomenon of underpricing is 
the concept of money left on the table (MLOT). This concept asserts that the greater the 
underpricing of a given IPO, the lower the gross sales proceeds of the IPO that accrues to 
the issuing firm (Chambers & Dimson, 2009). This, according to Chambers and Dimson 
(2009), means that the greater the money those firms and their selling shareholders would 
have “left on the table” for the investors. My findings on MLOT revealed that 
underpricing on the GSE resulted in an average of GH¢1.31 million being left on the 
table. The highest amount of money left on the table for investors amounted to GH¢37.86 
million on the IPO of then Ashanti Gold Fields. I also found that some IPOs on the GSE 




such overpricing on the GSE amounted to GH¢7.97 million on the IPO of Cocoa 
Processing Company Limited (CPC). 
The independent variables that I used to explain the over/underpricing on the GSE 
were the price-to-value ratio of the IPO firm’s stocks (P/V), the book-to-market value of 
the IPO firm’s equity (BTMV), the level of accruals in the IPO firm’s earnings post-issue 
(ACCRUALS), the consensus analysts’ earnings growth rate for the IPO firm’s stock 
post-issue (GROWTHAIP), and the post-issue ratio of IPO firm’s EBITDA to sales 
(EBITDA). From the results, I found the price-to-value ratio of the IPO firm’s stocks 
(P/V) to be statistically significant. This implied that there was a cross-sectional 
relationship between the price-to-value ratios and the observed underpricing on the GSE. 
Implications for Social Change 
In addition to the contribution of this study to the existing body of knowledge, the 
research findings also have significant implications for positive social change. This is 
because those findings draw attention to the key roles of the various stakeholders 
involved in the IPO pricing and valuation on the GSE. In the following subsections, I am 
further elaborating on the social change implications of the study’s findings on the 
different concerned stakeholders. 
The Ghana Stock Exchange 
A critical aspect of the study, I wish to bring to the notice of the GSE, is the need 
to ensure that IPO offerings accurately reflect the underlying fundamentals of the IPO-
firms. The findings have shown an average underpricing of 1.49% over the 20 year-




average gained GH¢1.31 million as a result of money being left on the table. In spite of 
this gains, the same investors had in an extreme case of IPO overpricing lost as much as 
GH¢7.97 million. Moreover, the level of earnings management in the pre-IPO financial 
statements incorporated in IPO prospectuses recorded an average of 13.80% of lagged 
total assets. This finding is well above the 1.5% to 5.0% of lagged total assets expected of 
IPO offerings in an exchange (Roosenboom et al., 2003). The findings have also shown 
the forecast errors (FE) on the GSE were 15.12% and 21.07% above those observed in 
the Turkish and Thai markets. These extreme cases of investor losses, forecasting errors, 
and earnings management could have contributed to the recent levels of IPO 
undersubscription observed on the GSE. The IPO offerings of Tullow Oil Plc, which 
recorded an undersubscription of 11.75% in 2011 was a typical example. For the GSE to 
increase the ratio of listed companies to the number of enterprises within the Ghanaian 
economy; then the way it values and prices IPOs are important. In this regard, the 
management and board of the GSE in their review of the actual and projected financial 
statements, incorporated in IPO prospectuses, should go beyond just a mere reliance on 
auditor certifications. Such reviews should include the measurement of forecasting errors 
and earnings management in those financial statements. This review is necessary because 
the earnings projections–which form the foundation for the eventual valuation and 
pricing of IPOs–come from these financial statements. 
The Investment Bankers 
The findings of this study revealed that there is more room for improvement in the 




over-familiarity widely informed investment bankers’ choice of the various valuation 
methods. The result also revealed that their selection of those methods was not 
necessarily dependent on the firm-specific and the market-related factors. I made a 
similar finding of the investment bankers’ determination of the preliminary offer prices of 
the IPOs they had listed on the GSE. The investment bankers also offered price discounts 
without much attention paid to the firm-specific and market-related factors. Investment 
bankers need to reconsider their over-familiarity with the various valuation methods, their 
determination of preliminary offer prices, and their arbitrary offer of price discounts. This 
will ensure that potential IPO-firms are valued and priced on the basis of their unique 
firm characteristics and the economic environment in which they are operating. In 
addition to using auditors in the certification of the actual and projected financial 
statements, investment bankers should strengthen their own due diligence of the 
corporation they lead public. In this way, the observed tendencies of forecast inaccuracies 
and high levels of earnings management could be reduced to acceptable levels. These 
reductions will ensure improvements in the valuation and pricing of IPOs by these 
investment bankers. In the long-run, the investment bankers will stand to benefit as 
investors confidence and corporate perceptions of their professional services will equally 
be enhanced. 
The Corporations Wishing Listed 
For corporations wishing and intending listed on the GSE, the findings provide 
them with the opportunity of learning from the mistakes of their forebears. These 




pre-IPO financial statements and over-forecasting of their projected financial statements. 
These mistakes do result in the over/underpricing anomalies witnessed on the GSE. The 
perpetuation of these mistakes by corporation wishing listed on the GSE will only lead to 
further loss of investor confidence in the market. This loss of investor confidence comes 
with the consequence of undersubscriptions. The result of these undersubscriptions had in 
the cases of Commit Properties Limited and Hearts of Oak Football Club resulted in their 
inability to meet the listing requirement of the exchange. These firms could not, 
therefore, get listed on the GSE.         
The Regulatory/Supervisory Authorities 
When valuation and pricing of Facebook’s IPO went wrong, the regulatory or 
supervisory authorities came up for blame. In the case of capital markets in Ghana, the 
SEC has the responsibility for ensuring the protection of investors over IPO offerings on 
the GSE. In this regard, the findings of this research could contribute to the enhancement 
of the regulatory and/or supervisory role of such a policy maker. One reason attributed to 
the failure of regulators in the case of the Facebook’s IPO was their inability to ensure 
transparency. There was a lack of such transparency in relation to the revenue and 
earnings projections used in the valuation and pricing of that IPO. My findings on the 
GSE had also revealed the possibilities of over-forecasting the earnings projections and 
the tendencies of earnings manipulation of the pre-IPO financial statements. The SEC, 
much more than the GSE, should be rigorous with their review of those actual and 
projected financials in the IPO prospectuses of the firms intending listed. For as 




Ghanaian SEC could provoke stock crashes and damage investors’ confidence in the 
overall financial system. 
The Investing Public 
One of the primary goals of this research is to contribute to the improvement of 
investor confidence on the GSE. The findings have revealed mix results of investors–
gaining in some instances of IPO offerings and losing in others. Admittedly these 
winning and losing scenarios are part of the risks involved in being an investor on any 
stock exchange. If the other major stakeholders paid heed to the findings of this research; 
the confidence of investors in the IPO activities on the GSE might improve. The 
investing public, especially institutional investors have a role to play in this improvement 
of the accuracy of IPO valuation and pricing on the GSE. Institutional investors could 
contribute by actively participating in the pre-bookbuilding meetings with the investment 
bankers. In these pre-bookbuilding meetings, the institutional investors should come out 
with their own research reports that give an indication of a possible price range of a 
pending IPO. These research reports could transform the role of institutional investors 
into information-revealing participants in the valuation and pricing of IPOs on the GSE. 
In this regard, the institutional and other informed investors will become information-
revealing and not just information-receiving participants. 
Limitations of the Study 
In the conduct of this study, the key limitations I encountered related to the 
difficulties in data collection and the generalizability of the study findings beyond the 




data collection. The need for primary data collection in a study such this, was pointed out 
by Deloof et al. (2009) in their conduct of a similar study on the Euronext Brussels. 
According to Deloof et al., gathering of practical information about the actual conduct of 
valuation and pricing of IPOs can only come from speaking with the investment bankers. 
In this regard, I initially proposed to augment my secondary data collection with the 
conduct of face-to-face interviews with 5 of the 20 investment banking firms. I also 
proposed to have administered survey instruments among the remaining 15 investment 
bankers, 35 IPO-firm managers, and 60 institutional investors. These interviews and 
surveys were tailored to soliciting data relating to the roles each of these participants in 
the valuation and pricing of IPO on the GSE. The conduct of this interviews and surveys 
required a letter of cooperation from the various firms from which I was to draw the 
survey and interview participants. These letters of agreement–which were necessary for 
securing Walden University’s IRB final approval–were not forthcoming for two months 
or so. In the end, I had to concentrate only on the use of secondary data. If the collection 
of primary data were possible, it would have enabled me to speak to the reasons for the 
under/overpricing anomalies observed the GSE. In my pre-data collection proposal, I also 
expressed a desire to consider the industry-related factors in addition to the firm-specific 
and emerging market factors in the study. During the secondary data collection, it became 
impossible for me to obtain the data relating to such industry related variables. If the 
collection of primary data were possible, I would not have encountered this difficulty of 




Another key limitation I encountered was in relation to the need for caution in 
generalizing the findings of the study beyond the GSE. This generalization “involves 
drawing broad conclusions from particular instances–that is, making an inference about 
the unobserved based on the observed” (Polit & Beck, 2010, p. 1451). My observations 
about IPO valuation, pricing, and performance in emerging market related only to the 30 
sampled IPOs on the GSE. In drawing unobserved inference from this study, such an 
inference should be restricted only to the entire population of IPOs on the GSE. This, 
therefore, calls for some level of caution when making generalization of the findings of 
this study to other stock markets. This warning of mine is akin to that of Pereiro (2002) 
who advised of similar care when interpreting results of research conducted in emerging 
markets. Pereiro provided several reasons as to why there is the need for such caution. 
The first of these reasons is that emerging stock markets tend to be relatively small in 
relation to the universe of corporations that operate in those markets. The second reason 
is that the importance of capital markets in emerging economies is insignificant relative 
to GDPs of those economies. The third reason related to the highly concentrated nature of 
emerging stock markets and hence their equity trading and related activities hovers 
around only small number of stocks. The fourth reason is that the cost of capital 
information in emerging stock markets is scares, unreliable and volatile. The fifth reason 
is that data series in emerging stock markets are extremely short; because price and 




Recommendations for Action 
The first recommendation for action is a call for rigorous scrutiny of the actual 
and projected financial statements that form the basis for valuation, pricing, and 
performance of IPOs. The call for this scrutiny is in relation to the reduction in the 
observed forecast errors and earnings management in those financial statements. This 
scrutiny has the potential of ensuring transparent financial statements, as well as the 
protection of investors and enhancement of their confidence in the IPO activities on the 
GSE. As was noted by Cervellati et al. (2013), the absence of this transparency has the 
potential of provoking stock crashes and damaging investors’ confidence in the overall 
financial system. This call for action is an appeal that the concerned stakeholders on the 
GSE ought to take serious. 
The second recommendation for action is a call for the SEC and GSE to be aware 
of the possibilities of overcompensation and overexpensing in the financial statements of 
potential IPO-firms. This call is important where a firm intending listed on the GSE is 
owner-managed. Review of the financial statements of owner-manager firms intending 
listing on the GSE will help in reducing the observed tendencies of earnings 
management. Overcompensation in owner-manager firms, according to Pereiro (2002), 
arises as a result of less clarity in the treatment of salaries and dividends paid to those 
owner-managers. The SEC and GSE could estimate excess compensation to owner-
managers by analyzing the average salaries paid to equivalent managerial roles in the 
labor market. The SEC and GSE could deal with overexpensing by carefully scrutinizing 




The third recommendation for action is a call for corporate managers and their 
investment bankers to move from financial budgeting to financial forecasting. My 
examination of most of the IPO prospectuses revealed that the financial projections 
provided by those firms were budgets and not financial forecasts. Although both 
forecasting and budgeting borders on the development of futuristic plans, the two are not 
one and the same. Whilst budgeting has its roots in the use of accounting information, 
forecasting is an integration of accounting, statistical, and econometric modeling. My 
review of the IPO prospectuses did not reveal the usage of such statistical and 
econometric modeling of the financial projections incorporated in those prospectuses. A 
move towards forecasting, and not budgeting, could also help in the reduction of the 
forecasting errors observed on the GSE.      
The fourth and final recommendation for action is a call on institutional investors 
to build their own valuation models. This call means that investors on the GSE should go 
beyond just the mere reliance on analyst reports and recommendations on pending IPOs. 
The call also means that investors should also go beyond just using static earnings and 
cash-flow ratios as a means of assessing upcoming IPOs. This is because the extent of 
information production from such traditional ratios is quite limited (Jenkinson & Jones, 
2009). This call is also apt because of the findings of such levels of IPO overpricing 
which in an extreme case resulted in a loss of GH¢7.97 million by investors. The building 
up of independent valuation models by the institutional and other informed investors 




Recommendations for Further Studies 
The first recommendation for further study is rather a recommendation for the 
dissemination of the findings of this study. It is when practitioners and other scholars 
become aware of the study that they can further the study. In this regard, I intend to 
circulate my research findings through presentations at academic and professional 
conferences. I also intend to serialize my study and its results in print media such as the 
Ghanaian Business and Financial Times (B&FT). I also intend to serialize my study and 
its results through the relevant social media platforms. I will be publishing my research 
through the UMI Dissertation Publishing on ProQuest. I also intend to serialize the study 
in a way that will allow for further publications in major financial journals in Africa and 
the world as a whole.       
My second and final recommendation for future study stems from the limited 
generalizability of the findings in this research. My principal recommendation for future 
research is that the current study should be expanded to include other emerging/frontier 
markets in Africa. This research could examine the valuation, pricing, and performance 
of IPOs in such markets as the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE), the Egyptian Stock 
Exchange (ESE), The Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE), and the Kenyan Stock Exchange 
(KSE). The extension of my research to include such other markets in Africa could 
provide the researchers with a larger sample size to make generalization possible. This 
research could also consider the administration of surveys on the roles of investment 
bankers, corporate managers, and institutional investors in the valuation, pricing, and 





This dissertation research is unique in the sense that it focused on all aspects of 
IPOs’ valuation, pricing, and performance. In relation to the valuation, the study 
examined the methods used in valuing IPOs on the GSE, as well as the weights assigned 
to the value estimates of each of those valuation methods. I further examined the levels of 
price discounts offered by the management of IPO-firms and their investment bankers in 
arriving at the eventual offer prices of the sampled IPOs. Prior to the determination of 
these offer prices, investment bankers had to determine the IPOs’ fair values. To do so, 
there was a need to have the actual and projected financial statements of the pending 
IPO-firm. In this study, I subjected these two categories of financial statements 
incorporated in the IPO prospectuses to test. I tested the actual financial statements for 
the tendencies of earnings management and the projected financial statements for the 
possibilities of forecasting inaccuracies. Finally, I examined in this study the short-term 
return performance of the IPO-firms listed on the GSE.  
From the findings, I can conclude in relation to valuation methods that the 
discounted cash flow method (DCF) is the most popular and widely used method. This 
was closely followed by the asset-based valuation methods such as the net asset valuation 
(NAV) and the adjusted assets valuation (AAV). The multiples valuation methods used 
were the P/E and P/B ratios, but their usage was only possible where comparative 
multiples were available on the market. Only one IPO-firm used the discounted dividend 
model (DDM) as one of the methods in its IPO valuation. I also found that for any giving 




valuation method. In assigning weights to value estimates of each of these valuation 
methods, I found that investment bankers considered the purpose of the valuations and 
the characteristics of the corporations being valued. In relation to the tendencies of 
earnings management, I found that such tendencies existed on the GSE. This is because 
the use of discretionary accruals prior to the IPOs’ listings increased beyond the level 
considered as normal. I also found that these increases in discretionary accruals were 
buttressed by equally increasing net incomes without corresponding increases in the cash 
flows of those corporations. I also established that there were possibilities of forecasting 
inaccuracies in the projected financial statements incorporated in the prospectuses of the 
sampled IPOs. In relation to the IPO pricing anomalies, I found that the IPOs on the GSE 
were generally underpriced. I also found that this underpricing had resulted in investors 
gaining as much as GH¢37.86 million in the case of the then Ashanti Gold Fields. Other 
notable investor gains that had resulted from underpricing included a GH¢2.93 million 
gains on the IPO of SIC Insurance Company Limited (SIC), and GH¢2.79 million in 
relation to the IPO of UT Financial Services Limited (UTB). This finding should, 
however, be juxtaposed against IPOs overpricing that had in an extreme case resulted in 
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MULT DCF DDM EVA OTH MULTW DCFW DDMW OTHW
   (%)
ACI* 0 1 0 0 1 2 60          40        4.55        
AGA 1 1 0 0 1 4 30           50          20        -          
ALW 0 1 0 0 1 2 70          30        6.98        
AYRTN 1 1 0 0 1 4 30           45          25        7.41        
BOPP 0 1 0 0 1 2 70          30        13.85      
CAL 1 1 0 0 1 4 50           30          20        -          
CLYD 0 1 0 0 1 2 60          40        -          
CMLT 0 1 0 0 1 2 60          40        2.34        
CPC 0 1 0 0 1 2 70          30        -          
EBG 1 1 0 0 0 3 40           60          -       -          
EGL 1 1 0 0 0 5 15           30          55        -          
ETI 0 1 0 0 1 2 100      -          
GCB 1 1 0 0 1 4 30           50          20        11.56      
GGBL 0 1 0 0 0 3 30          70        4.46        
GOIL 1 1 0 0 1 5 45           45          10        85.07      
GSR 0 0 0 0 1 1 100      1.42        
GWEB 0 1 0 0 1 2 50          50        -          
HFC 1 1 0 0 1 4 30           50          20        19.35      
MLC 0 1 0 0 1 2 70          30        -          
PBC 0 1 0 0 1 2 70          30        -          
PKL 0 1 0 0 1 2 70          30        37.50      
SCB 1 1 0 0 1 4 40           50          10        3.43        
SIC 1 1 0 0 0 6 28           18          55        -          
SOGEGH 1 1 0 0 1 4 40           50          10        33.33      
SPL 1 1 1 0 1 5 5             30          30       35        26.47      
SWL 0 1 0 0 1 2 70          30        -          
TLW 0 0 0 0 1 1 50          50        -          
TOTAL 1 1 0 0 1 4 30           60          10        -          
TRANSOL 1 1 0 0 0 4 40           60          -       4.51        




Fundamental Valuation Mehtods Assignment of Valuation Weights (%)

















AGE     
(years)
AIP (%) PROF (%) GROW (%) DIV (%) GDP (%) INF(%) MMR FER M2(%) SZ (%) FD(%)
ACI 3.62                25.00             80.88   2.63         30.14          -       5.28        18.03     21.32     160.78   39.08     1.15       16.31     
AGA 945.12            50.00             80.47   -          -              -       5.20        26.67     14.32     92.79     23.24     18.68     26.92     
ALW 70.60              28.00             63.71   11.31       24.78          17.62   4.11        59.46     28.73     115.96   43.17     25.51     18.59     
AYRTN 4.48                41.00             32.31   15.96       20.00          30.00   5.90 15.12     10.16     100.00   19.47     15.47     30.84     
BOPP 13.42              38.00             73.64   27.36       24.15          30.00   5.20        26.67     14.32     92.79     23.24     18.68     26.92     
CAL 58.78              15.00             1.98     32.15       33.83          35.09   5.20        26.67     14.32     92.79     23.24     18.68     26.92     
CLYD 0.43                15.00             29.47   17.95       40.61          -       5.20        26.67     14.32     92.79     23.24     18.68     26.92     
CML 0.21                22.00             63.10   (8.62)       29.67          -       4.70        14.62     32.05     142.26   17.49     18.50 24.57     
CPC 23.72              22.00             11.19   0.95         40.51          8.73     4.50        14.82     16.21     92.56     39.21     12.01     34.59     
EBG 319.57            17.00             2.72     19.11       16.81          52.50   5.90 15.12     10.16     100.00   19.47     15.47     30.84     
EGL 38.43              16.00             20.62   14.23       10.26          58.91   5.28        18.03     21.32     160.78   39.08     1.15       16.31     
ETI 6.45                23.00             3.71     -          -              -       5.90 15.12     10.16     100.00   19.47     15.47     30.84     
GCB 779.20            43.00             2.98     38.27       15.44          30.00   4.11        59.46     28.73     115.96   43.17     25.51     18.59     
GGBL 197.08            51.00             72.89   9.16         19.60          49.77   8.01        10.71     0.00 97.63     31.92     10.98     28.37     
GOIL 58.62              47.00             24.86   2.03         36.75          23.45   6.40 10.92     8.89       105.26   39.34     15.84     21.10
GSR 611.34            24.00             60.60   -          -              -       6.46 10.73     8.90 104.54   36.83     9.61       22.86     
GWEB 0.84                23.00             50.63   13.90       40.00          30.00   5.60 12.62     13.63     91.49     27.28     29.77     31.43     
HFC 258.29            19.00             3.20     63.79       47.57          28.67   4.85        24.96     23.63     123.92   33.50 1.98       21.35     
MLC 11.18              24.00             41.45   8.36         25.38          24.93   4.85        24.96     23.63     123.92   33.50 1.98       21.35     
PBC 5.65                19.00             55.24   6.40         7.25            23.09   4.40        12.41     23.56     140.50   25.42     11.87     32.52     
PKL 3.00                36.00             60.49   (5.33)       55.74          58.19   3.30 24.87     23.15     100.38   52.57     34.33     18.40
SCB 984.94            21.00             1.32     42.93       62.78          60.83   3.33        37.26     0.00 157.50   13.30 0.00 17.51     
SIC 64.09              46.00             25.54   14.52       45.68          39.89   6.46 10.73     8.90 104.54   36.83     9.61       22.86     
SOGEGH 436.77            20.00             4.70     35.63       17.03          50.00   3.30 24.87     23.15     100.38   52.57     34.33     18.40
SPL 0.82                44.00             9.39     21.14       25.00          30.00   5.20        26.67     14.32     92.79     23.24     18.68     26.92     
SWL 0.11                18.00             34.30   23.84       142.20        25.00   4.00 32.91     30.85     92.96     56.53     9.93       35.13     
TLW 12,347.50       9.00               35.50   -          -              -       8.01        10.71     0.00 97.63     31.92     10.98     28.37     
TOTAL 40.48              45.00             16.86   3.33         114.52        81.28   3.33        37.26     0.00 157.50   13.30 0.00 17.51     
TRANSOL 2.11                4.00               29.14   3.56         78.82          43.08   5.90 15.12     10.16     100.00   19.47     15.47     30.84     
UTB 74.80              12.00             4.35     21.15       22.27          16.93   6.46 10.73     8.90 104.54   36.83     9.61       22.86     








Appendix C: Data Sheet – Dependent and Independent Variables in Hypotheses 4 
 
AFE FE SFQ SIZE OWN HOR AGE LEV AUD
ACI 163.63    (163.63)    751.70       8.79            -          36.00     25.00           37.26       1
AGA -          -           -            1,230.85     67.40      -        50.00           36.57       1
ALW 115.50    (115.50)    137.03       59.56          -          60.00     28.00           74.85       0
AYRTN 22.55      (9.40)        6.18           7.52            79.91      54.00     41.00           15.67       1
BOPP 53.13      (53.13)      47.45         12.69          60.00      30.00     38.00           10.55       0
CAL 37.27      37.27       16.41         82.55          82.07      52.00     15.00           79.89       1
CLYD 50.05      (50.05)      48.94         1.11            68.82      45.00     15.00           20.49       0
CMLT 18.37      18.37       16.86         -              73.25      24.00     22.00           -           0
CPC 50.11      (29.44)      45.03         334.48        75.00      28.00     22.00           4.94         0
EBG 7.54        7.54         1.13           431.86        94.87      31.00     17.00           90.16       1
EGL 62.45      62.45       90.19         114.83        -          36.00     16.00           50.45       0
ETI -          -           -            10,084.54   67.32      -        23.00           86.06       1
GCB 20.08      20.08       8.42           1,154.72     40.00      22.00     43.00           84.68       1
GGBL 11.77      0.48         2.80           204.19        -          72.00     51.00           77.62       1
GOIL 26.46      0.93         9.14           81.36          57.27      52.00     47.00           72.84       1
GSR -          -           -            753.71        98.66      -        24.00           30.44       1
GWEB 109.79    (109.79)    183.18       1.12            51.43      40.00     23.00           26.55       0
HFC 27.96      (27.96)      12.49         364.49        -          60.00     19.00           80.25       0
MLC 18.52      (18.52)      6.77           13.36          61.21      36.00     24.00           46.79       1
PBC 42.01      (42.01)      44.28         4.69            20.00      33.00     19.00           4.44         0
PKL 103.24    (103.24)    149.27       3.06            -          48.00     36.00           69.39       1
SCB 8.89        8.89         1.86           1,404.21     -          36.00     21.00           88.64       1
SIC 46.36      6.02         26.16         85.58          50.00      60.00     46.00           47.75       1
SOGEGH 27.73      (21.54)      8.57           576.69        40.00      60.00     20.00           81.18       0
SPL 77.25      (77.25)      61.79         2.68            55.47      51.00     44.00           30.63       1
SWL 49.59      (49.59)      50.26         0.31            63.35      35.00     18.00           24.03       0
TLW -          -           -            16,488.17   99.55      -        9.00             55.18       1
TOTAL 37.33      15.31       21.87         126.12        -          -        45.00           56.17       1
TRANSOL 81.35      (81.35)      106.76       4.29            75.00      38.00     4.00             23.01       1

















AFE FE SFQ ln(SIZE) OWN HOR ln(1+AGE) LEV AUD
ACI 163.63    (163.63)    751.70       2.17            -          36.00     3.26             37.26       1
AGA -          -           -            7.12            67.40      -        3.93             36.57       1
ALW 115.50    (115.50)    137.03       4.09            -          60.00     3.37             74.85       0
AYRTN 22.55      (9.40)        6.18           2.02            79.91      54.00     3.74             15.67       1
BOPP 53.13      (53.13)      47.45         2.54            60.00      30.00     3.66             10.55       0
CAL 37.27      37.27       16.41         4.41            82.07      52.00     2.77             79.89       1
CLYD 50.05      (50.05)      48.94         0.10            68.82      45.00     2.77             20.49       0
CMLT 18.37      18.37       16.86         -              73.25      24.00     3.14             -           0
CPC 50.11      (29.44)      45.03         5.81            75.00      28.00     3.14             4.94         0
EBG 7.54        7.54         1.13           6.07            94.87      31.00     2.89             90.16       1
EGL 62.45      62.45       90.19         4.74            -          36.00     2.83             50.45       0
ETI -          -           -            9.22            67.32      -        3.18             86.06       1
GCB 20.08      20.08       8.42           7.05            40.00      22.00     3.78             84.68       1
GGBL 11.77      0.48         2.80           5.32            -          72.00     3.95             77.62       1
GOIL 26.46      0.93         9.14           4.40            57.27      52.00     3.87             72.84       1
GSR -          -           -            6.63            98.66      -        3.22             30.44       1
GWEB 109.79    (109.79)    183.18       0.11            51.43      40.00     3.18             26.55       0
HFC 27.96      (27.96)      12.49         5.90            -          60.00     3.00             80.25       0
MLC 18.52      (18.52)      6.77           2.59            61.21      36.00     3.22             46.79       1
PBC 42.01      (42.01)      44.28         1.54            20.00      33.00     3.00             4.44         0
PKL 103.24    (103.24)    149.27       1.12            -          48.00     3.61             69.39       1
SCB 8.89        8.89         1.86           7.25            -          36.00     3.09             88.64       1
SIC 46.36      6.02         26.16         4.45            50.00      60.00     3.85             47.75       1
SOGEGH 27.73      (21.54)      8.57           6.36            40.00      60.00     3.04             81.18       0
SPL 77.25      (77.25)      61.79         0.98            55.47      51.00     3.81             30.63       1
SWL 49.59      (49.59)      50.26         (1.16)           63.35      35.00     2.94             24.03       0
TLW -          -           -            9.71            99.55      -        2.30             55.18       1
TOTAL 37.33      15.31       21.87         4.84            -          -        3.83             56.17       1
TRANSOL 81.35      (81.35)      106.76       1.46            75.00      38.00     1.61             23.01       1

















IAS EB AUD OWN ROWN
Year (-2) Year(-1) Year (0) Year (+1) Year (+2) Year (+3) %
ACI (71.20)   96.63   30.38     2.71       (2.37)       6.15        1 1 1 1 -     
AGA (1.83)     2.66     (21.76)   10.03     (1.64)       (5.33)      1 1 1 0 67.40 
ALW (67.96)   (15.57)  (17.99)   21.89     6.99        6.46        1 1 0 0 -     
AYRTN 6.27      17.49   33.61     (19.21)   9.92        8.14        1 0 1 1 79.91 
BOPP (15.13)   15.68   7.02       (2.61)     (1.77)       0.10        0 1 0 0 60.00 
CAL 7.28      (1.53)    5.61       (5.99)     (49.03)     56.63      0 1 1 0 82.07 
CLYD 15.26    55.95   55.11     (39.13)   (87.69)     37.31      0 1 0 1 68.82 
CMLT (0.79)     (0.37)    23.44     0.58       3.72        (11.51)    0 1 0 1 73.25 
CPC (8.37)     (5.08)    3.82       (9.23)     (1.92)       (10.90)    0 1 0 0 75.00 
EBG 2.59      (0.58)    (3.09)     7.14       (2.01)       5.55        1 1 1 0 94.87 
EGL (0.58)     (4.94)    19.31     (16.16)   (4.83)       (2.39)      1 1 0 0 -     
ETI 2.10      (13.14)  15.29     (3.13)     (5.70)       (8.61)      1 1 1 0 67.32 
GCB 2.11      3.21     5.37       1.10       12.20      (21.75)    1 1 1 0 40.00 
GGBL (37.15)   20.94   (13.86)   25.83     (7.93)       -         1 1 1 0 -     
GOIL (2.68)     9.14     10.18     (5.81)     (17.29)     6.25        1 1 1 0 57.27 
GSR (3.55)     (1.49)    0.46       (4.44)     3.53        (3.69)      1 1 1 0 98.66 
GWEB 43.81    (27.54)  (12.60)   (15.12)   (2.05)       (17.19)    0 1 0 1 51.43 
HFC (20.63)   20.61   14.88     (32.77)   10.26      (0.41)      1 1 0 0 -     
MLC 0.08      4.17     9.02       (3.87)     5.01        (4.34)      0 1 1 0 61.21 
PBC 11.99    (8.35)    6.69       4.75       11.97      (10.00)    0 1 0 0 20.00 
PKL (52.59)   (46.47)  (69.25)   12.93     (7.65)       (31.88)    1 1 1 0 -     
SCB (1.70)     (21.30)  (38.29)   7.06       7.82        (6.71)      1 1 1 0 -     
SIC 20.77    (18.39)  (0.12)     13.17     (0.86)       3.24        1 1 1 0 50.00 
SOGEGH (0.04)     (0.65)    0.51       27.90     (34.47)     (3.47)      1 1 0 0 40.00 
SPL 2.37      0.49     (14.90)   26.23     (24.69)     (6.10)      0 0 1 1 55.47 
SWL (19.37)   2.05     (14.12)   26.13     (26.90)     4.44        0 0 0 1 63.35 
TLW 21.15    (4.27)    0.81       4.26       5.83        -         1 1 1 0 99.55 
TOTAL (81.66)   (5.82)    1.36       2.79       2.30        3.21        1 1 1 0 -     
TRANSOL (42.81)   (49.05)  82.53     (20.96)   (29.87)     (37.12)    0 1 1 1 75.00 





















Year (-2) Year(-1) Year (0) Year (+1) Year (+2) Year (+3) Year (-2) Year(-1) Year (0) Year (+1) Year (+2) Year (+3)
ACI (162.55)  0.06      (7.89)       (5.22)        (3.12)      (11.48)    15.40    5.45       (4.90)     (0.18)       6.38          (11.55)    
AGA 26.12     156.77  23.05      12.01       4.88       5.98       45.95    26.09     31.46     16.50       10.71        29.72     
ALW (0.01)      (0.00)     0.01        (0.01)        (0.01)      (0.00)      0.03      (0.02)     0.01       (0.01)       0.01          0.00       
AYRTN 17.03     0.76      13.74      16.24       16.98     22.38     15.63    10.30     8.62       14.20       2.56          18.05     
BOPP 21.78     1.47      4.06        0.13         6.74       4.19       22.92    9.70       (0.23)     8.39         4.64          7.84       
CAL 4.50       2.15      4.22        2.75         2.99       2.74       12.85    4.53       2.45       9.69         (13.50)       7.52       
CLYD 11.01     0.10      12.31      10.07       4.80       (20.23)    17.74    2.02       (13.66)   17.15       17.71        6.28       
CMLT (3.02)      (0.02)     -          12.67       15.80     3.31       2.49      (0.96)     -        13.27       21.67        9.05       
CPC 20.83     1.64      2.75        (0.91)        0.90       1.12       -        -        -        0.01         0.94          10.62     
EBG 5.56       17.33    3.83        2.92         3.65       3.88       3.93      5.05       4.42       3.98         3.86          4.77       
EGL 10.32     3.68      7.27        12.46       8.66       11.47     10.70    12.77     15.67     11.35       6.34          12.02     
ETI 2.45       125.46  1.34        0.72         1.26       1.21       2.33      2.23       3.83       2.47         7.36          (1.04)      
GCB 1.50       26.01    2.85        2.28         0.98       2.66       (1.19)     8.40       (4.08)     12.06       4.84          16.17     
GGBL 2.30       (4.64)     0.23        12.25       6.13       -         20.87    (11.01)   25.23     14.10       13.64        -         
GOIL 2.93       3.48      4.94        4.27         5.28       6.10       4.51      (15.13)   4.37       14.02       19.95        11.36     
GSR (2.35)      60.31    (4.43)       (16.41)      (0.93)      (0.87)      0.52      3.30       0.84       4.33         15.28        14.37     
GWEB 6.20       0.25      22.64      1.94         16.53     19.97     (22.33)   (4.48)     (14.91)   7.17         (12.45)       (15.80)    
HFC 1.59       5.77      2.37        2.49         2.59       3.98       41.66    (16.44)   10.53     16.62       (4.53)         5.94       
MLC 4.43       0.49      4.17        5.35         4.80       0.34       (0.13)     (0.25)     (2.83)     1.11         6.11          0.43       
PBC (6.11)      (0.91)     (10.25)     9.61         9.38       9.46       -        -        72.46     68.03       71.80        13.51     
PKL (16.72)    (0.29)     (11.67)     (15.78)      (15.40)    (36.92)    (6.45)     (1.04)     (4.33)     3.22         (0.07)         (0.19)      
SCB 4.27       33.19    4.09        4.33         3.94       5.70       7.16      11.64     9.33       10.04       7.74          4.17       
SIC 4.27       2.95      83.49      41.98       32.53     24.18     5.30      5.01       (120.29) 25.90       (12.46)       37.23     
SOGEGH 2.77       15.52    3.35        23.76       25.40     27.54     2.03      (0.44)     15.86     84.06       40.70        134.21   
SPL 19.29     0.20      0.43        9.96         2.78       0.79       (4.85)     36.07     (6.23)     4.48         (0.52)         3.32       
SWL 9.45       0.01      9.88        (0.30)        (14.45)    8.76       19.25    22.05     (4.79)     (14.93)     (0.03)         3.33       
TLW 0.51       106.85  6.48        0.71         1.88       -         4.59      8.75       16.28     16.21       15.17        -         
TOTAL (1.63)      1.37      3.04        5.96         4.20       9.15       8.93      0.75       (11.48)   12.39       (1.07)         27.88     
TRANSOL 10.41     0.60      -          6.22         (43.10)    (59.74)    28.11    41.05     -        (7.58)       25.17        (15.84)    




Dependent and Independent Variables for Hypotheses 5















(GH¢'million) PV Ratio BM GROWT(%) ACCURALS SALES EBIT
ACI (20.00)              (0.02)                0.09       0.52    30.14           (14.03)             3.01          (17.27)   
AGA 60.43               37.86               0.92       0.25    -               (8.82)               563.63      36.97    
ALW 0.71                 0.00                 0.88       0.69    24.78           (39.74)             7.53          15.69    
AYRTN 3.53                 0.13                 1.02       0.34    20.00           54.94              7.95          22.09    
BOPP 12.00               0.84                 1.01       0.58    24.15           13.31              8.18          6.27      
CAL -                   -                   1.19       0.55    33.83           9.72                14.79        30.86    
CLYD 10.00               0.08                 1.06       0.47    40.61           41.76              1.29          14.49    
CMLT 5.00                 0.00                 0.18       0.31    29.67           -                  -            -        
CPC (37.00)              (7.97)                0.61       0.31    40.51           11.35              24.97        4.05      
EBG 0.55                 0.05                 1.00       0.24    16.81           0.23                63.18        37.98    
EGL -                   -                   -        -      10.26           71.46              68.27        14.19    
ETI -                   -                   0.85       0.29    -               2.89                1,197.02   48.91    
GCB 8.00                 0.27                 0.17       8.03    15.44           3.88                18.29        34.89    
GGBL -                   -                   -        -      19.60           (38.12)             244.29      8.47      
GOIL 7.50                 1.54                 0.77       0.49    36.75           12.12              306.49      1.75      
GSR 3.33                 0.19                 0.43       0.72    -               (0.43)               312.45      (50.16)   
GWEB (8.33)                (0.05)                0.93       0.35    40.00           10.39              0.68          (26.20)   
HFC -                   -                   0.00       18.15  47.57           23.56              70.95        49.32    
MLC (50.00)              (0.05)                0.03       1.87    25.38           21.26              0.46          7.17      
PBC 4.00                 0.28                 1.02       0.12    7.25             (4.60)               49.97        (0.96)     
PKL 20.00               0.01                 2.20       0.43    55.74           (26.88)             9.91          (0.91)     
SCB -                   -                   0.00       4.88    62.78           (32.46)             218.57      54.80    
SIC 8.33                 2.93                 1.04       0.70    45.68           (5.02)               52.81        18.15    
SOGEGH 2.50                 0.03                 1.63       9.87    17.03           0.84                96.40        39.14    
SPL -                   -                   1.89       0.61    25.00           12.68              1.46          7.05      
SWL 4.00                 0.01                 0.90       0.42    142.20         4.02                0.15          35.09    
TLW 0.26                 0.28                 0.82       0.27    -               (6.28)               3,572.66   46.56    
TOTAL -                   -                   -        -      114.52         (7.73)               177.83      3.44      
TRANSOL -                   -                   0.96       0.41    78.82           33.74              33.04        2.85      
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